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Toward a European Bund: The Constitutionalism Deficit of  Integration and How to Fix It
Axel Domeyer
This dissertation examines the nature of  the European political and legal order and evaluates it in  
light of  the principles of  liberal and democratic constitutionalism. The EU, I argue, has features of  
both an international organization and a heterarchical federation, or  Bund, in which neither the 
units nor the center are sovereign and the member state peoples retain their independent political 
existence.  Due  to  its  peculiar  hybrid  character,  the  status  quo  has  a  constitutionalism  deficit:  
enforcement of  formal competence limits is weak, the legislative process is undemocratic, and the 
European Court of  Justice wields too much unchecked power to elaborate the content of  basic 
rights. Adequate reform would eliminate residual features of  the international organization model 
and establish a  proper  Bund.  The dissertation examines how this  political  form differs  from a 
federal state and provides normative reasons to prefer a heterarchical solution. I further contend 
that in a possible future Bund, domestic parliaments should have a stronger oversight role. The 
European Parliament might  then still  have a supporting function,  but direct  election would no 
longer  be  useful  and  indeed  counterproductive.  Last,  the  dissertation  argues  that  if  a  federal 
compact were agreed upon, the best ratification method would be to hold national conventions,  
similar to the state assemblies that ratified the US constitution. This procedure is superior to both a 
national referendum and a vote of  the domestic parliament.
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“The Basic Law grants powers to participate and develop a European Union which 
is  designed  as  an  association  of  sovereign  national  states  (Staatenverbund).  The 
concept of  Verbund refers to a close long-term association of  states which remain 
sovereign, an association which exercises public authority on the basis of  a treaty,  
whose fundamental order, however, is subject to the disposal of  the member states 
alone, and in which the peoples of  the member states [...] remain the subjects of  
democratic legitimation.”
—Federal Constitutional Court, Lisbon Judgment, 2009.1
“Yet, insofar as European and national law are understood as formally autonomous 
systems, each of  which is originally based on the will of  the people [...], such a hier-
archy does not follow as a theoretical necessity. […] Rather, the relationship is plural-
istic and cooperative.”
—Ingolf  Pernice.2
In a 2009 landmark decision, the highest German court (FCC) found the Lisbon Treaty compatible 
with the Basic Law. At the same time, it described the EU as, in essence, an international organiza-
tion, whose legal order is subordinate to the constitution of  each member state. The judges use the  
neologism Staatenverbund (association of  states) in order to account for the “supranational” ele -
ments of  the present institutional structure, but the ruling denies the European order the status of  a 
genuine constitution. This doctrine enables the FCC to assert the right to ascertain that individual  
Union policies conform to the Basic Law. When there is a violation, German state organs will be  
barred from enforcing the measure in question. Or so, at least, the judges promise.
1 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, headnotes (my translation).
2 Ingolf  Pernice, "The Treaty of  Lisbon. Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action," Columbia Journal of  International  
Law 15, no. 3 (2009), 383.
2Most journalistic commentators reacted with praise for the decision.3 But the academic public 
rejected it almost in unison. The mainstream of  scholarship holds that one can no longer under-
stand the relationship between domestic  and European norms in hierarchical  terms.  Jurists  and 
political scientists instead advocate a “heterarchical” conception. These authors believe the FCC 
should have acknowledged the emergence of  a novel species of  political regime, in which both the 
domestic and the transnational level have a proper constitution. The relationship between domestic  
and Union norms, runs the argument, is therefore coequal.  From this viewpoint, portraying the 
European legal order as subordinate to the Basic Law is anachronistic and detrimental to the integ -
ration project.4
The tumultuous debate over the Lisbon decision shows that profound disagreement about the 
nature of  the status quo persists. It is not too difficult to explain this fact. The dispute reflects the  
hybrid form of  the EU: while the present institutional structure retains important features of  an in -
ternational organization, it also has traits that are characteristic of  a federal order. The result, I will  
argue, is a doctrinal impasse: neither the FCC nor its critics can mount a persuasive defense of  their  
respective position. This, in turn, is more than an esoteric jurisprudential problem. We should be  
concerned about the peculiar hybrid character of  the EU because it undermines constitutionalism.  
The first goal of  the dissertation is to explain this statement. My second objective is to reflect on 
possible future reform.
What do I mean by constitutionalism? At the close of  the 18th century, the revolutions in Amer-
ica and France inaugurated a new conception of  legitimate political order. From then on, public 
3 Michael  Bergius,  "Im Kern für Europa,"  Frankfurter Rundschau,  30 June 2009,  Reinhard Müller,  "Weckruf  aus 
Karlsruhe," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 July 2009, Heribert Prantl, "Europäische Sternstunde," Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 1 July 2009, Heinrich Wefing, "Mehr Volk wagen," Die ZEIT, 1 July 2009, Kathrin Werner, "Kluge Lösung 
des EU-Dilemmas," Financial Times Deutschland, 1 July 2009.
4 For a brief  review and breakdown of  the numerous responses in legal scholarship see Matthias Jestaedt, "Warum in  
die Ferne schweifen, wenn der Maßstab liegt so nah? Verfassungshandwerkliche Anfragen an das Lissabon-Urteil des 
BVerfG," Der Staat 48, no. 4 (2009), 497-498.
3power has been understood to derive from a positive constitution, whose ultimate source is the  
people. But a simple reference to popular origin is hardly enough to legitimate the actual practice of  
ruling. The higher law must also express a substantive conception of  how government should work.  
A wide range of  different ideologies can fill this space. The approach that emerged in the West is  
best called “liberal and democratic.” Constitutions of  this kind need to implement the following  
three principles: the rule of  law, democratic legislation, and basic rights protection. Of  course, these 
ideas require further specification. Later on, I will therefore elaborate on each tenet, drawing in par-
ticular from the work of  Jürgen Habermas. But for the moment, a concise overview is enough: the 
rule of  law means that public power must operate based on formal norms, which are subject to  
neutral  interpretation and enforcement;  democratic  legislation requires  a  meaningful  connection 
between political system and public sphere; entrenched basic rights, finally, guarantee individual free-
dom, subject to the condition that it does not interfere with the freedom of  another person or a  
compelling public interest.
How does European integration affect constitutionalism so understood? The problem is that 
regardless of  how one prefers to construe the nature of  the status quo, it will be impossible to find  
it consistent with the principles just listed. Consider first the position of  the academic mainstream.  
From the perspective of  the heterarchical approach, the Union order itself  should guarantee the 
rule of  law, democratic legislation, and basic rights protection. This, I will argue, is wishful thinking.  
First, in one significant respect, the rule of  law is weak. European institutions often exceed the  
powers, which the member states have vested in them under the treaties. Second, integration under -
mines democratic legislation: power migrates from national parliaments to a Union decision making  
process that is unmoored from the public sphere. Third, integration deforms basic rights protection. 
Of  course, European law guarantees individual freedoms. But it does so in a manner that affords  
4judges outsize power relative to elected politicians. None of  these findings will unsettle the adher-
ents of  the FCC jurisprudence. According to them, member state high courts are going to invalidate  
Union measures whenever the latter run afoul of  values protected under the domestic fundamental 
order. National constitutionalism, goes the reasoning, is therefore safe against European incursion. 
Yet this claim, it will become evident, is just as fanciful as the belief  in a working heterarchical sys-
tem.
To be sure, the diagnosis presented here is not altogether original. My argument builds on exist-
ing scholarship when I suggest that under the status quo, the rule of  law, democratic legislation, and 
basic rights protection are deficient. One purpose of  the dissertation is to defend these critiques  
against rosier perspectives on integration. But the main contribution is a different one. I ascribe the 
shortfall on all three dimensions to a common cause: the tension between the international organiz-
ation features of  the EU and its federal traits. This finding has a crucial implication for reform: a 
structural problem requires a structural solution. I therefore contend that in order to overcome the  
present legitimation crisis, a political decision to move beyond the hybrid status quo is needed. Un-
der the current regime, the constitutionalism deficit cannot be fixed. For this reason, the dissertation 
will make a case for European federalism.
Many oppose this idea on the grounds that subjugation of  the member states to a central gov-
ernment is undesirable. Yet my concern is not to make the EU still mightier. Brussels has awesome 
power even now. The trouble is that Union governance lacks a proper constitutional framework. In 
the wake of  the recent woes of  the Eurozone, this problem has become all the more urgent. To sta-
bilize the joint currency, the member states were compelled to deepen integration further, and this  
process looks set to continue in the future. Monetary union, the crisis has made all too clear, must 
go along with deeper political integration. Against this background, the best route forward is to 
5build a genuine federal order. Such a reform, it is crucial to understand, does not have to entail the  
creation of  a state. Historical federations have sometimes maintained a coequal relationship between 
units and center, leaving open which legal order is supreme. Contrary to what the critics of  the Ger -
man jurisprudence believe, the EU does not fit this model yet. But I will argue that it should be pur -
sued in the future.
The case for such fundamental reform is predicated on the belief  that we need to care about 
the fate of  liberal and democratic constitutionalism. Gradual erosion of  legal and democratic re-
straints on public power is foremost a moral problem. Yet there are prudential considerations, too. 
Peace in Europe has come to be taken for granted – its preservation is no longer reason enough for  
citizens to support whichever policies emanate from Brussels. Nor can we expect that Union gov-
ernance will generate sufficient economic spoils to ensure its popular acceptance through “output” 
alone. Against this background, liberal and democratic constitutionalism has a central role in ensur-
ing the continued health and survival of  the integration project. Its ongoing demise leads to a wide -
spread sense of  citizen disenfranchisement that promotes euroskepticism and nurtures authoritarian 
political attitudes. Halting these trends, the dissertation will argue, is a goal important enough to 
warrant an institutional overhaul of  the EU.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. Part I sheds light on the constitutionalism deficit. I begin 
with the dispute over the nature of  the status quo. Are the proponents of  the heterarchical vision 
right to criticize the judicial defense of  national sovereignty? The first issue here is whether one can,  
in principle, conceive a political form between federal state and international organization. To make 
this plausible, it will not be enough to characterize the EU as sui generis – the idea of  a coequal rela-
tionship between units and center within a federal system is older than European integration. At 
various moments in the history of  constitutional thought, legal thinkers have examined how we 
6might distinguish such an order from both state and treaty organization. The canonical representat -
ive of  this discourse is Carl Schmitt who called the phenomenon in question a Bund.5 While schol-
ars are right to point out a resemblance of  the EU to this political form, one can make just as strong  
a case that it remains an international organization. This creates a predicament for national high  
courts. A tribunal embracing the heterarchical conception of  the status quo would have to overlook 
that residual international organization features prevent the full realization of  the rule of  law, demo-
cratic legislation, and basic rights protection in the Union sphere. To be sure, at present, most high 
courts follow the lead of  the FCC and reject the idea of  an independent transnational constitution,  
equal in rank to the domestic fundamental order. But this doctrinal stance comes likewise at a price.  
It forces judges to obscure that Union governance, where it operates in a federal mode, undermines 
the legitimation of  public power through national higher law. To sum up, no matter through which 
prism we see the European order, the state of  constitutionalism is poor.
Part II considers possible future reform. I will argue that heterarchical federalism is the best  
route forward. The EU is not a Bund yet, but a renewed attempt to provide it with an explicit con -
stitutional foundation should follow this model. Such a reform would enable the diverse peoples of  
the continent to retain their independent political existence, while also partaking in a common fun-
damental order. A European Bund, if  well designed, could strengthen the rule of  law and overcome 
the current structural deficit in the realm of  basic rights protection. Whether democratic legislation 
is workable in a heterarchical context is a somewhat more difficult question. Most observers believe  
that a bicameral process, mediating between an overarching continental  demos and the member 
state peoples,  would be the right solution.  Yet such “dual legitimation”,  it  will  become clear,  is  
bound to remain elusive. If  that is so, how else might citizens hold the federal government account-
5 The term is best translated as “federation.” To underline the difference to a federal state, I leave the German expres-
sion untranslated.
7able? For a heterarchical EU, I suggest, enhanced oversight from domestic legislatures is the most  
suitable device to guarantee adequate democratic participation. Under this scheme, the Parliament in 
Strasbourg might still perform a useful supporting role. Direct elections, however, should be abol-
ished. The dissertation closes with a discussion of  how a shared higher law might be ratified. Past 
experience with integration referendums has been rather disappointing. In light of  this,  national 
conventions, similar to the to the state assemblies that ratified the US constitution, are preferable.
What is the Nature of  the Union Order?
By way of  introduction, let us now examine the dispute over the status quo in some more detail. I  
will summarize the German jurisprudence and present the alternative understanding of  the Union 
order favored by the academic mainstream. Our first question is whether one side gets it right. Many  
will naturally seek the answer in positive law, be it the European treaties or the domestic constitu-
tions. Yet I will conclude my exposition of  the issue stating that a textual solution is not available.  
The problem at hand requires a judgment of  constitutional theory.
In Defense of  Member State Sovereignty
Despite the uproar of  protest, the central aspects of  the Lisbon ruling cannot have surprised legal  
scholars. The FCC simply reiterated its previous stance and elaborated on the concrete implications.  
For our purposes, a brief  summary of  this doctrinal approach will suffice; it has been discussed at  
length elsewhere.6 At first glance, such an exclusive focus on the German jurisprudence might seem 
too parochial.  But even if  there is a great deal of  variation in detail, the rulings of  the FCC have 
6 Dieter Grimm, a former judge on the FCC, provides the best overview. See Dieter Grimm, "Defending Sovereign 
Statehood against Transforming the Union into a State," European Constitutional Law Review 5, no. 3 (2009a).
8been rather influential with high courts across Europe.7 For this reason, the following discussion is 
relevant far beyond its local context.
The core tenet of  the Lisbon decision is that all public power emanates from the German 
people, and hence the Union legal system has to remain a derived order, whose application is gov-
erned by the domestic constitution.8 This does not call into question the “primacy” of  European 
law, which requires that lower German courts grant it precedence over conflicting domestic norms. 
Yet the FCC reserves the right to examine if  Union measures conform with the Basic Law. To be  
sure, the principle of  “European law friendliness” limits such review to exceptional situations, for 
the judges recognize an imperative to protect the homogeneity and effectiveness of  the Union or-
der.9 Nonetheless, the claim that German constitutional law remains supreme defies the position of  
the European Court of  Justice (ECJ), which holds that a domestic norm can never trump a transna-
tional one.
How precisely  does  the  FCC seek  to  defend  the  Basic  Law?  The  judges  point  out  three 
grounds, based on which a European norm can be found invalid (Table 1). First, the member states 
have to remain the “masters of  the treaties.” Sovereignty, as the judges understand it, does not re -
quire that a state exercise all public power within its territory. Delegation of  competences to interna -
tional bodies, in particular the EU, is possible – the Basic Law actually encourages it. Yet such a  
transfer of  power presupposes an explicit legislative grant. Hence the “principle of  conferral” stipu-
lates that changes of  European primary law presuppose the approval of  the German parliament,  
even when the treaties do not require it. Furthermore, delegation must always be revocable. Given 
the past tendency of  EU organs to extend their competences through a liberal interpretation of  
their mandate, the court emphasizes that it will admit  ultra vires complaints alleging that an EU 
7 Peter Michael Huber, "Vergleich," in Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum. Band II, ed. Armin von Bogdandy, et al. 
(Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2008), 412-414.
8 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, paras. 228-232.
9 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, paras. 240-241.
9measure has transgressed the parameters of  delegation set forth in the relevant national ratification 
statute.10
Second, to preserve the identity of  the Basic Law, a set of  “core state functions” must remain 
at the domestic level. In particular, the judges prohibit excessive outside regulation in the following 
areas: the penal law, disposition over police and military, the tax system, social policy, and fields with  
a strong cultural aspect such as family law, education, and religious policy. Beyond this protected 
sphere, the weaker and mediated legitimation of  transnational governance is acceptable. Yet within 
the realm of  core state functions, the FCC will interpret the competences of  European organs in a  
restrictive manner and prohibit broad delegation of  power to Brussels.11 The rationale behind this 
doctrine is that Union governance remains undemocratic. For one thing, the judges note that des-
pite the gradual emergence of  a continental public sphere, the perception of  political issues and per-
sonnel  remains  connected  to  linguistic,  historical,  and  cultural  patterns  specific  to  the  member 
states.12 But the main argument is that “excessive federalization” violates the “one person, one vote” 
principle. Relative to population size, small countries and their citizens wield disproportionate influ-
ence within the EU organs, which is true in particular for the Parliament. For this reason, the FCC 
does not regard the latter as the voice of  a European demos. We should rather understand it to rep-
resent the member state peoples as collective entities. In doing so, the Parliament supplements na -
tional legislative control of  executive leaders and their actions on the European stage, which remains 
the most important channel of  democratic input.13
Third, all grants of  power to international bodies are subject to the rights protected under the 
German constitution. External delegation of  competence, goes the argument, is a mere extension 
of  the institutional scheme of  the Basic Law. Therefore, agencies so empowered cannot escape the  
10 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, paras. 226-243.
11 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, paras. 219, 244-272.
12 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 251.
13 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, paras. 261-297.
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restrictions of  the latter. The FCC, to be sure, holds that, at the moment, European law offers equi-
valent protection of  individual freedom, and hence the judges will, for the time being, not review  
acts of  the EU on this basis. Yet the court pledges to resume hearing complaints if  the required 
minimum standard is no longer satisfied (the Solange doctrine).14
Ultra vires control The FCC will strike down European measures that are not authorized by 
the treaties (as construed in light of  the German ratification law).
Identity protection In the realm of  core state functions, the FCC will restrictively interpret  
the authority of  European organs, and it will prohibit broad delegation of  
power.
Solange doctrine The  FCC  will  review  European  measures  for  conformity  with  basic 
rights, if  the general standard of  protection guaranteed by the EU is no 
longer sufficient.
Table 1: Mechanisms to protect the German constitutional order
In embryonic form, this conception of  the EU as a derived and subordinate legal order has  
already been present in the  Solange decisions of  1974 and 1986.15 These rulings superseded an 
earlier judgment, according to which the “special nature” of  European law did not allow German 
courts to second guess Brussels.16 The FCC reversed this position in Solange I, noting that domestic 
application of  external norms is subject to constitutional review.17 In particular, the judges at the 
time held that German state organs must not enforce a European measure, if  the latter violates fun-
damental rights guaranteed in the Basic Law. The ECJ henceforth sought to demonstrate greater re -
spect for individual freedom. In the Solange II decision, the FCC acknowledged this effort, ruling 
that it would cease to review European measures, “so long as” the effective protection of  rights is 
14 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 191.
15 For a detailed analysis of  how the German EU jurisprudence developed over time see Karen Alter, Establishing the  
Supremacy of  European Law. The Making of  an International Rule of  Law in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 64-123.
16 BVerfG, 1 BvR 248/63, 216/67.
17 BVErfG, 2 BvL 52/71.
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“generally” ensured.18 Despite making this concession, the FCC did not renounce the supremacy of  
the Basic Law. It rather affirmed the notion that, at least in principle, European measures can be  
subject to domestic constitutional limits. When the court approved the Maastricht treaty in 1993, it  
forcefully restated this point. The judgment once again emphasized the right of  the FCC to enforce  
basic liberties against the EU; it also vowed to uphold the principle of  conferral and mentioned for  
the first time that certain core state functions are nondelegable.19
What is new about the Lisbon decision, apart perhaps from its sharper tone, is a more detailed 
enumeration of  the fields, in which competence transfer is problematic. The court moreover ex-
presses greater skepticism regarding the Parliament, which it had previously described as capable of  
further evolution toward a genuine democratic legislature. Finally, the Lisbon judgment declares that 
so long as the Basic Law is in force, the German state will remain sovereign. This represents another  
shift from the Maastricht ruling, which seemed more open to future developments. According to  
the current doctrine, a new domestic constitution would need to replace the Basic Law before the  
German state can participate in some form of  European federation. To accomplish this, posits the 
FCC, the people itself  would have to exercise its constituent power and endorse the transformation 
of  its political existence through a referendum.20
18 BVerfG, 2 BvR 197/83.
19 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92.
20 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 179. Art. 146 Basic Law explicitly allows for such a constitutional replacement.
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The Heterarchical Approach
The numerous critics of  the Lisbon decision reject its hierarchical perspective.21 These authors be-
lieve that, in actual fact, the member states and the EU have gone a long way toward becoming co -
equal partners. Hence the critics suggest to accept the irrevocable loss of  exclusive national sover -
eignty. This, goes the reasoning, does not mean that the EU itself  is now a state. We should rather  
understand the relationship between the domestic constitution and Union law as “heterarchical.” 
This idea entered the academic debate around the time of  the Maastricht decision, prior to which 
most scholars believed that domestic courts had an unconditional obligation to enforce European  
norms, regardless of  possible conflict with domestic law.22 The FCC had already signaled its opposi-
tion to this narrative in the Solange I case. But the real shock came in 1993, when the court put for-
ward a comprehensive account of  the EU as subordinate to the German constitution. Faced with  
the Maastricht judgment, the college of  European lawyers had to save the notion that Union norms 
are not simple international law. A new paradigm became dominant: “constitutional pluralism.”
21 In response, Andreas Voßkuhle – the current President of  the FCC and coauthor of  the Lisbon decision – pub-
lished an article, in which he claimed that it would be false to read a hierarchical approach into the judgment. Ac-
cording to Voßkuhle, terms like “equal footing” or “supremacy” are unhelpful – we should rather focus on specific  
“techniques of  cooperation” used by national and European courts. See Andreas Voßkuhle, "Multilevel Cooperation 
of  the European Constitutional  Courts.  Der europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund,"  European Constitutional  
Law Review 6, no. 2 (2010). This rhetorical shift is quite surprising – the Lisbon decision makes it rather clear that 
from its perspective, the domestic constitution is superior to European norms. But, in substance, Voßkuhle does not  
question the doctrine of  the judgment: since Union law remains a derived order, its enforcement can be subject to  
domestic review. Perhaps it is an oversimplification to call this situation “hierarchical.” Yet the fact remains that a 
European norm is valid or invalid, depending on whether it passes muster under the domestic constitution. In prac -
tice, this does of  course not preclude a “cooperative” approach. The FCC has never found a Union measure in out-
right conflict with the Basic Law. But if  that is so, can we believe the court that it makes a serious effort to protect  
the legitimation framework of  the domestic fundamental order? Or is something else going on? Chapter 3 will ad-
dress this question.
22 Julio Baquero Cruz, "The Legacy of  the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement," European Law Journal 14, 
no. 4 (2008).
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The intellectual father of  this concept is Neil MacCormick.23 In a 1995 article, he notes that 
domestic and Union law represent “distinct but interacting” legal orders. Each system determines its  
own content and scope, but implementation of  European norms relies on member state organs. 
This creates a potential for conflict because domestic judges must enforce two separate legal orders,  
which might overlap. In such a case, there is no ultimate instance that can decide which norm is ap-
plicable. According to MacCormick, this implies that sovereignty has nothing more than a symbolic  
meaning in Europe today: “there are special reasons of  constitutional rhetoric that require a Ger-
man court to [assert the] sovereignty of  the people that the [...] Constitution postulates as funda-
mental to itself.”24 The use of  this language, goes the argument, does not change the fact that Union 
law, too, asserts the right to the ultimate decision. While this claim is otherwise equivalent to that of  
a domestic legal system, the Luxembourg court need not employ the term “sovereign” because the 
EU never understood itself  as such. MacCormick concludes that simultaneous assertion of  suprem-
acy means that neither legal system is actually sovereign, even if  national judges hold on to a differ -
ent rhetoric.
But this reasoning is too facile. The empirical coexistence of  multiple supremacy claims has no 
direct bearing on how the European order works in practice. Since the enforcement of  Union meas-
23 Neil MacCormick, "The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now," European Law Journal 3, no. 1 (1995). See also Mat-
tias Kumm, "Who is the Final Arbiter of  Constitutionality in Europe?,"  Common Market Law Review 36, no. 2 
(1999), Neil Walker, "The Idea of  Constitutional Pluralism," Modern Law Review 65, no. 3 (2002), Miguel Poiares 
Maduro, "Contrapunctual Law. Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action," in Sovereignty in Transition, ed. Neil 
Walker (Oxford: Hart, 2003). Other authors use different terminologies to advocate a similar conception of  the 
Union order. Daniel Halberstam employs the language of  “heterarchy.” See Daniel Halberstam, "Constitutional Het-
erarchy. The Centrality of  Conflict in the European Union and the United States," in Ruling the World? Constitu-
tionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff  and Joel P. Trachtman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,  2009). Ingolf  Pernice speaks of  “multilevel constitutionalism.” See Ingolf  Pernice,  
"Constitutional Law Implications for a State Participating in a Process of  Regional Integration. German Constitu-
tion and 'Multilevel Constitutionalism'," in German Reports on Public Law. Presented to the XV. International Con-
gress on Comparative Law, Bristol 26 July to 1 August 1998, ed. Eibe Riedel (Baden-Baden: NOMOS, 1998). Joseph 
Weiler has coined the term “constitutional tolerance.” See Joseph Weiler, "Federalism without Constitutionalism:  
Europe's Sonderweg " in The Federal Vision. Legitimacy and Levels of  Governance in the United States and the  
European Union, ed. Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
24 MacCormick, "The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now," 265. We are left in the dark about what the special reasons  
are.
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ures depends on member state cooperation, national high courts are, in principle, free to impose  
their  preference. On the face of  it,  the situation is therefore no different from the relationship  
between domestic and regular international law. The latter also construes itself  as supreme over the  
former, while local enforcement in fact depends on a municipal incorporation act. In the case of  the 
EU, then, everything hinges on member state judges. A genuine heterarchical constellation will not 
emerge until national high courts embrace pluralism or, in other words, until these tribunals recog-
nize that European norms can sometimes trump the domestic constitution because the two orders  
are coequal. Scholars have put forward different theories of  how such a jurisprudence should look  
like.25 Their shared prescription is that national high courts abstain from review of  Union measures, 
unless  the  latter  jeopardize  a  central  value  of  constitutional  government  itself.  The conditional 
nature of  this deference, goes the expectation, will motivate the ECJ to engage in conflict avoidance  
on its part as well.
Of  course, this position stands and falls with the assertion that the EU has a constitution in the 
same manner as the member states do. What evidence can be adduced here? The EU lacks a formal  
constitutional  document.26 But one cannot dispute  that  it  operates based on – as  Hans Kelsen 
would put it – a “material” constitution: European law sets forth “rules, which regulate the creation 
of  general legal norms, in particular the creation of  statutes.”27 It also explains in detail how these 
norms will be interpreted and enforced. The Union legal order, then, is a “functional” constitution  
in the sense that it enables the effective use of  public power.28 Yet is that sufficient to elevate it to 
25 See for example Kumm, "Who is the Final Arbiter of  Constitutionality in Europe?," Maduro, "Contrapunctual Law.  
Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action," ———, "Courts and Pluralism. Essay on a Theory of  Judicial Adju-
dication in the Context of  Legal and Constitutional Pluralism," in  Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, Interna-
tional Law, and Global Governance, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff  and Joel P. Trachtman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009).
26 At least, the European treaties do not advertise themselves as “constitutional.” This, I will argue in Chapter 3, is a 
rather significant fact.
27 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of  Law and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945), 124.
28 Türküler Isiksel, "On Europe's Functional Constitution. Toward a Constitutional Theory of  Specialized Interna-
tional Regimes," Constellations 19, no. 102-120 (2012).
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coequal status with national higher law? The answer should be obvious. More or less any interna-
tional regime has some form of  functional constitution. Unless one wants to argue that judges must 
grant all of  them equal footing with the domestic order, pluralism cannot rest on this factual obser -
vation alone.
To solve the puzzle of  when the heterarchical approach is justified, we rather need to make a 
normative assessment. Our question should be the following: which features of  a constitution vin-
dicate its claim to represent the supreme law of  the land?29 At the most general level, the answer is 
that a fundamental order establishes a structure for the legitimate exercise of  public power. Coer -
cion is acceptable, so long as it takes place within this framework. External norms, then, pose a 
prima facie challenge. The constitution has to assimilate them, before it can authorize implementa-
tion, and norms that fail to survive this procedure should be void. But what if  an external regime le -
gitimates public power in the same manner as the domestic constitution. Under these circumstances,  
it would indeed appear unjustified to insist on a hierarchical relationship. So when does such a scen -
ario obtain? To approach this question, let us consider which specific traits of  a fundamental order  
render state coercion acceptable to citizens. One standard explanation refers to “constituent power”, 
or the will of  a particular collective to give itself  a higher law: norms that emanate from this frame -
work are legitimate, given that one can trace them back to the initial popular founding. A second ra-
29 Miguel Maduro proposes a different approach. According to him, one should accord Union law coequal status with  
domestic constitutional norms because it performs three important functions. First,  it gives European citizens a  
voice in the policies of  each member state, which might affect the entire continent. Second, it empowers the mem-
ber states to address problems that none of  them could solve alone. And third, Union law imposes external con -
straints on domestic governance that correct for institutional pathologies such as irrational path dependence or in -
terest  group capture. See Miguel Poiares Maduro, "Three Claims of  Constitutional Pluralism," in  Constitutional  
Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, ed. Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek (Oxford: Hart, 2012). But this line 
of  argument misses the point. Maduro presents a valid rationale for the existence of  the European order, yet he  
does not establish that it merits coequal status with the member state constitutions. Suppose the President of  the 
Commission declared himself  a benevolent dictator who is legibus solutus. In this case, the Union system could still  
fulfill all three roles listed above. But without popular support for such a transformation, and given the abolishment 
of  limited government, the new order could not legitimate public power or even provide much of  a “functional” 
constitution. Hence Maduro cannot be right. A normative rationale for the heterarchical approach must be found 
elsewhere.
16
tionale points to the substantive limits that a constitution imposes on public power. In the case of  a  
liberal and democratic fundamental order, these include the principles mentioned earlier: the rule of  
law, democratic legislation, and basic rights protection. For the moment, we need not examine how 
such a framework makes coercion acceptable (I shall address this question in Chapter 1). But it 
should be clear enough that adherents of  liberal and democratic constitutionalism will embrace this  
or a similar account of  legitimate rule.
Does the Union order meet either or both of  the above criteria? Few believe that it  has a  
foundation in constituent power (although there have been attempts to defend such a claim, as  
Chapter 2 will discuss). Most proponents of  the heterarchical approach refer instead to the second 
yardstick, noting a “constitutionalization” of  European law over time: landmark rulings of  the ECJ  
have turned Union norms into binding obligations, subject to neutral interpretation and enforce-
ment; citizen participation has been enhanced, in particular through making the Parliament a strong  
legislative institution; and European law has come to protect a comprehensive set of  individual  
freedoms. Therefore, it might seem as if  the EU implements the rule of  law, democratic legislation,  
and basic rights protection. If  that is so, runs the argument, one can disregard the fact that interna-
tional  treaties  remain the ostensible basis  of  integration.  What matters  is  that  – in substance – 
Union law guarantees the same values that a domestic constitution embodies and guarantees. But is  
that in fact true? And can a fundamental order legitimate coercion when it lacks a basis in constitu-
ent power? The persuasiveness of  the heterarchical approach is at stake here. We shall return to 
these questions.
The FCC, of  course, does not accept the constitutionalization argument. Its approach to do-
mestic review is therefore, at least on the face of  it, more aggressive than pluralism would permit.  
To begin with, ultra vires control goes against the presumption that one can trust the European rule 
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of  law. Constitutional identity protection is likewise incompatible with pluralism. From the perspect-
ive of  the heterarchical approach, domestic and Union norms have, or at least might acquire, equi-
valent democratic pedigree – there is hence no a priori reason to place a list of  “core state func-
tions” beyond the reach of  integration. The sole element of  the German jurisprudence that does  
not stand in evident tension with pluralism is the Solange doctrine: it offers the EU a carte blanche, 
so long as it refrains from systematic and egregious basic rights violation.
In other words, there is a significant doctrinal rift between the Lisbon decision and the heter-
archical approach. To be sure, for reasons that will become clear later, this will make little or no  
practical difference. Regardless of  whether Union organs heed the limits set forth in the ruling, we 
can expect the FCC and other high courts to remain on the sidelines. The threat to intervene is just 
not credible. Still, the academic reaction to the Lisbon decision has been livid. In the eyes of  its crit-
ics, the FCC says “Ja zu Deutschland” but not to European integration.30
A Judgment of  Constitutional Theory
The preceding has suggested that in order to referee between FCC doctrine and the heterarchical  
approach, we need to undertake a conceptual investigation as to whether the European order can le -
gitimate public power in the same manner as the constitutions of  the member states. At this point,  
one might object that it would be more appropriate to consult the positive law first. Yet a textual  
analysis will not yield a definitive result. Why is that so? The European treaty framework remains 
ambiguous  concerning its  own nature (I  elaborate  in  Chapter  2).  Irrespective  of  this,  domestic 
courts must first look to their own constitution. But here textual guidance is scant as well. While  
some member states regulate EU membership in their higher law, these provisions – with the excep-
30 Daniel Halberstam and Christoph Möllers, "The German Constitutional Court says 'Ja zu Deutschland!'," German 
Law Journal 10, no. 8 (2009).
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tion of  the Dutch case – leave the proper relationship question to judicial interpretation.31 This of  
course opens the door for complex doctrinal argument. Consider, for illustration, the following two 
positions in the academic debate around the German jurisprudence.
Matthias Kumm claims that Art. 23 of  the Basic Law mandates the heterarchical approach:  
“With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of  Germany shall participate in 
the development of  the European Union […]. To this end the Federation may transfer sovereign 
powers by a law with the consent of  the Bundesrat.” This clause is the result of  a 1992 constitu-
tional amendment, passed before ratification of  the Maastricht Treaty. Yet the goal of  a united con-
tinent already featured in the original preamble of  the Basic Law. Kumm understands this formula  
to demand a European constitution that is coequal to the domestic fundamental order. Hence, goes  
the argument, the FCC must not review Union acts unless a particular measure violates a basic prin -
ciple  of  constitutionalism itself.32 Art.  23,  on this  view,  stipulates  a  wholesale  incorporation of  
European norms into the German legal system. In other words, their force does not derive from le-
gislative ratification of  each new set of  treaties.33 Kumm therefore denies that German courts have 
the power to examine whether the EU has acted ultra vires.
Udo di Fabio puts forth a competing view. He claims that Art. 20 (2) – an unamendable provi-
sion  of  the  Basic  Law  –  implies  a  conception  of  statehood  that  requires  the  stance  of  the 
Maastricht decision. The first sentence of  Art. 20 (2) reads as follows: “All state authority is derived  
from the people.” According to di Fabio, this language refers to the enlightenment idea of  the state 
as based on the free association of  individuals who endow a government with the power to regulate  
their collective life. This mandate, he elaborates, is limited by universal human rights, but otherwise, 
the people, as represented in parliament, can legislate whatever it deems appropriate – external re-
31 Huber, "Vergleich," 420-421.
32 Kumm, "Who is the Final Arbiter of  Constitutionality in Europe?," 378.
33 ———, "Who is the Final Arbiter of  Constitutionality in Europe?" 382.
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gimes must not permanently circumscribe this freedom. The EU, then, cannot move beyond the in-
ternational organization model, unless it becomes a federal state. Di Fabio considers such a develop-
ment undesirable because he finds the linguistic and cultural differences within Europe too large. In  
any case, as the founding of  a new state would eliminate the constituent power of  the German 
people, it would require a popular decision to replace the Basic Law.34
Di Fabio is right to lift the issue to the plane of  philosophical argument. Neither the authors of  
the German constitution nor the parliamentarians who voted for the new Art. 23 had made up their  
mind as to the precise nature of  European integration. Kumm fails to acknowledge this. He reaches  
his conclusion through a rather too ambitious reading of  the text, which does not rest on historical 
proof  that Art. 23 has in fact been understood to affirm an independent European constitution,  
equal in rank to the Basic Law. That is not surprising – such evidence would be hard to find. As so 
often in constitutional jurisprudence, we can therefore not answer the question based on the text 
and its legislative history. The issue rather turns on our theoretical assumptions regarding the nature 
of  a fundamental order.
Di Fabio approaches the subject at this level, but he fails to make a persuasive case. His view is  
that a democratic constitution presupposes a sovereign state. But this line of  reasoning does not  
take into account that popular government and the state form might have been linked due to con-
tingent factors. Indeed, there are political theorists who believe that in the age of  globalization, 
democratic principles call for the integration of  existing states into new constitutional frameworks.  
For di Fabio, this could only mean the reproduction of  the state form at larger geographical scale.  
But he provides little justification as to why popular government requires traditional sovereignty, ex-
cept that in the past, these phenomena have occurred together. Unless a deeper conceptual nexus is  
shown, the democratic idea cannot bar a pluralist conception of  the relationship between domestic  
34 Udo di Fabio, "Der neue Art. 23 des Grundgesetzes," Der Staat 32, no. 2 (1993).
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and Union norms. However, another concern of  di Fabio remains valid: would a decision to estab-
lish a genuine transnational higher law eliminate the constituent power of  the German people? And, 
if  that is so, would such a step not presuppose a referendum to supersede the Basic Law? These  
questions are still going to concern us.
Di Fabio sat on the bench when the FCC decided the Lisbon case. As we have seen, the judg-
ment follows in the tracks of  his 1993 article. Making a disputable understanding of  constitutional-
ism axiomatic, the court ignores the possibility of  a middle ground between sovereign nation states 
and one single continental Leviathan. Thus it fails to engage a large share of  the relevant academic  
discourse.35 We should instead take the heterarchical approach seriously. But, as I have suggested,  
there remain doubts as to whether its proponents have a convincing argument. While the idea of  
constitutionalism as such might not rule out the existence of  a heterarchical order, the latter cannot 
emerge from thin air. How would a political system based on a coequal relationship between units  
and center look like? We need a precise answer in order to find out if  the European integration pro-
cess has created such a regime.
 
Chapter Outline
Chapter 1 develops a conceptual framework to assess the nature of  the status quo. I elaborate a par -
ticular  understanding of  liberal  and democratic  constitutionalism,  which leads  us  to  distinguish 
among three possible forms of  a layered political structure: a federal state has a single higher law; 
the center is sovereign. In contrast, an international organization does not have a constitution in the 
emphatic sense; here the units are sovereign. Beyond this classical distinction, we can distinguish a  
35 That is all the more surprising, given that in a 2001 article, di Fabio has argued in favor of  a stateless constitution for  
Europe. See ———, "A European Charter. Towards a Constitution for the Union," European Law Journal 7, no. 1 
(2001). Against this background, one would have expected the Lisbon judgment to explain why the EU does not  
have such a fundamental order at the moment.
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third political form. The Bund is a heterarchical system: both units and center have a fundamental 
order that legitimates public power; the question of  the ultimate decision remains therefore open.
Chapter 2 shows that aspects of  the present institutional structure are consistent with the Bund 
ideal type. Yet the EU also retains important traits of  an international organization. In other words, 
neither the academic mainstream nor the FCC is quite right about the nature of  the Union order.  
Our initial puzzle, it turns out, has no straightforward answer – the status quo remains a bewildering 
hybrid.
Chapter 3 then argues that we should be concerned about this fact. Proponents of  the heter-
archical approach claim that, at present, European public power is, or could in principle become,  
just as legitimate as its domestic counterpart. This, I will show, is not so: residual international or-
ganization features undermine the rule of  law, democratic legislation, and basic rights protection.  
The FCC and its followers meanwhile believe that judicial review in the member states will com-
pensate for the deficit at the Union level. But making good on this promise, it will become clear,  
would subvert European governance where it operates in a federal mode. No member state high 
court will be prepared to incur such a cost. To sum up the current predicament: since the EU is a 
hybrid between international organization and Bund, it  cannot fulfill  the normative demands of  
either model.
Chapter 4 begins the discussion of  possible future reform. Some believe that modest institu-
tional adjustments would enable adequate legitimation of  Union policies along the lines of  the inter-
national organization model. Others want to slice the Gordian knot and create a federal state. Yet  
the best route forward is to establish a genuine Bund. Under this political form, the member state  
peoples retain their independent political existence, while also partaking in a common fundamental  
order. A heterarchical federation, then, can preserve valuable traditions of  domestic constitutional 
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practice; it also has the potential to overcome the shortfalls of  the status quo. Does this prospect  
warrant the cost and risk of  a drastic institutional overhaul? The chapter will argue that, in addition 
to the moral case for reform, there are prudential reasons to embark on this path. Under the status 
quo, citizen disenfranchisement promotes euroskepticism and nurtures authoritarian political atti-
tudes. Resolving the constitutionalism deficit is therefore an urgent concern.
Chapter 5 investigates how democratic legislation could work in a European Bund. I criticize  
the mainstream position that Union governance must be subject to “dual legitimation.” On this  
view, the Parliament should represent European citizens, while national deputies hold their respect-
ive government accountable for its actions in Brussels. The problem here is that turning the Stras-
bourg legislature into an effective voice of  a continental demos would require much stronger com-
petition among transnational parties than we see at present. How to make this happen seems to be a  
riddle without a good solution. Therefore, I suggest to focus on the domestic legitimation channel,  
whose potential for enabling democratic participation has so far been somewhat neglected. In this  
scenario, the Parliament could still have a useful supplemental role. Direct election of  its members, 
though, should be abolished.
Chapter 6 (which is coauthored with Jeffrey Lenowitz) concludes the dissertation with a pro-
posal as to how a federal compact should be ratified. While the member states peoples have to en -
dorse such a document, a referendum or a legislative vote are unsuitable procedures to render the 
decision. The chapter recommends instead that, similar to the American precedent, ratification pro-




Constitutionalism and Layered Political Structures
How should one construe the relationship between the domestic constitution and European norms? 
I have argued that, in the absence of  an unambiguous textual solution, the answer turns on a theor-
etical investigation as to whether the European order merits coequal status with national higher law. 
This chapter establishes a conceptual framework that will enable us to address this question. Here is  
the scheme in a nutshell: within a layered political structure, the center can be sovereign, the units 
can reserve the ultimate decision, or the issue remains open.1 Three kinds of  relationship between 
unit and center law are hence conceivable: subordination of  the former (monism), subordination of  
the latter (dualism), and heterarchy (pluralism). Each option corresponds to a respective ideal type 
of  political form: federal state, international organization, and Bund.
This framework, it will become clear, presumes an understanding of  constitutionalism that we 
have inherited  from the revolutions  in  America  and France.  I  shall  refer  to  it  as  the  “classical 
paradigm.” On this view, the constitution legitimates public power in a twofold sense. For one thing,  
it has popular sanction: the higher law rests on “constituent power”, or a decision of  the people to 
give itself  a fundamental order. At the same time, the constitution implements a certain understand-
ing of  how a legitimate government needs to operate. In combination, these factors make the fun-
damental order the supreme law of  the land. But this outlook is controversial today. According to  
some, the classical paradigm has become obsolete. Faced with the emergence of  transnational gov-
ernance regimes, the critics seek to reconceptualize the legal world. Their suggestion is to abandon 
1 With the term “layered political structure”, I refer to a system, in which at least two different units govern their in-
ternal affairs, while also being subject to common rules that emanate from a central governance mechanism. This 
definition, of  course, includes a wide range of  different phenomena. What it does not cover is a unitary state, in  
which the sole or main function of  local government is to implement laws made at the national level.
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the idea of  constituent power: for a legal system to legitimate public power, it should be enough that 
it operates according to certain principles; whether one can ascribe its existence to a collective de -
cision to establish or sustain a constitution is irrelevant. From this perspective, all public legal orders  
can function as supreme law, and therefore, pluralism is the sole permissible relationship between 
domestic and external norms.
I will reject the above criticism of  the classical paradigm. Yet this does not mean that a heter-
archical system is unthinkable. To be sure, the classical paradigm has long been understood to entail  
that within a layered political structure, either the units or the center must be sovereign. But this  
view is misleading. The historical practice and theory of  federalism indicate that one can imagine a 
middle ground between sovereign state and treaty organization. In such an order, both units and  
center have a constitution that legitimates public power – the relationship between them is therefore 
coequal. Carl Schmitt introduced the term “Bund” to refer to this political form. Recent scholarship 
has given renewed attention to his account of  heterarchical federalism because there seem to be par -
allels with the present Union system. I agree – the Bund model can be a useful conceptual tool for  
understanding the European constellation. Yet in order to find out whether the status quo does in 
fact represent an instance of  heterarchical federalism, we need a complete institutional description 
of  the ideal type.
The goal of  the chapter is to develop such an account of  the Bund and to contrast it with the  
federal state and the international organization. My analysis proceeds as follows. First, the chapter 
will elaborate on the meaning of  the classical paradigm. Second, I defend the latter against its critics.  
Third, the chapter reconstructs past discourses on heterarchical federalism, focusing in particular on  
Schmitt and the application of  his ideas to the EU. Fourth, I juxtapose the institutional features of  
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the Bund model to those of  the federal state and the international organization. The final section of  
the chapter discusses the epistemological function of  the resulting classification scheme.
The Classical Paradigm
The late 18th century inaugurated a new understanding of  legitimate government, which one might 
refer to as “constitutionalism.” Both American settlers and the French third estate sought to de-
throne princes who justified their rule based on divine right. Against this idea, the revolutionaries 
put forward the notion that public power stems from a positive constitution that trumps all other  
internal or external law. In the course of  the 19th century, this view prevailed in a struggle against the 
old regime. Today it has become universal, forming the basis of  legitimate rule almost everywhere.2
But what gives the constitution its exalted status? The discourse of  the Western revolutions 
provides a twofold answer. First, the special nature of  the fundamental order is ascribed to its popu -
lar  origin:  “We the  People”  have  exercised  our  pouvoir  constituant.  Yet  neither  American  nor 
French revolutionaries believed that popular origin is all  that matters.  On their view, the special  
nature of  the constitution is just as much the result of  its substance: the fundamental order should 
prevent the arbitrary exercise of  power, enable the formulation of  the popular will, and protect indi-
vidual rights. Around these principles developed a practice of  constitutionalism that is best called 
“liberal and democratic.” This regime is now hegemonic in large parts of  the world, but it has not  
achieved universal acceptance. The Iranian constitution, for example, implements a theocratic sys-
tem; under the Chinese fundamental order, legitimate rule is party dictatorship. What unites these 
cases with the Western tradition of  constitutionalism is a reference to popular origin. As Dieter  
Grimm points out, most existing states claim that their higher law is based on a democratic choice  
2 Dieter Grimm, "The Achievement of  Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World," in The Twilight of  
Constitutionalism, ed. Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010a), 3-5.
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of  the people.3 Yet not all of  them embrace the same view as to what makes the exercise of  public 
power good and just. In this regard, different communities have adopted different solutions, ranging 
from the liberal and democratic model in the West to the more authoritarian practice of  countries  
such as Iran or China. Still, the general pattern is similar: the peculiar status of  the constitution is  
derived from its supposed popular origin and the appropriateness of  its content. This dual rationale 
is what I refer to as the “classical paradigm.”
For the purposes of  investigating the European constellation, we can disregard variants of  con-
stitutionalism that do not fit the approach practiced on the continent. Our sole concern, in other 
words, lies with the liberal and democratic model. Below I will summarize this conception of  legit-
imate government in three tenets: the rule of  law, democratic legislation, and basic rights protection. 
From the perspective of  the classical paradigm, a liberal and democratic fundamental order should 
have a basis in constituent power and realize these principles. Some theorists, as we noted, disagree:  
these authors contest the notion that higher law derives its status from both popular origin and sub-
stantive content. From their perspective, constituent power discourse is a dangerous relic of  19 th 
century political romanticism. We can dismiss the concept, goes the reasoning, because the institu -
tional substance of  liberal and democratic constitutionalism is sufficient to legitimate the exercise of  
public power. I reject this position as incoherent. Let us, however, begin with a more detailed ac -
count of  the classical paradigm. The following will first elaborate on the idea of  constituent power,  
and examine when one can regard a legal order as having popular origin. Second, I flesh out the lib-
eral and democratic account of  legitimate government. Third, we shall discuss the implications of  
the classical paradigm for the relationship between unit and center law in a layered political struc-
ture.
3 ———, "The Achievement of  Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World," 9. It is true, however, that  
borderline cases and exceptions remain. The Iranian constitution, in fact, leaves it ambiguous whether it derives 




Constituent power is the power of  a people to determine its own constitution.4 The idea emerged in 
reaction to the demise of  religious justifications for political order. Once there is no longer a tran-
scendent source of  legitimate rule, the subjects of  public power must themselves establish the rules 
for its exercise. According to this view, the people alone can invest a set of  norms with the status of  
higher law, whose function is both to regulate the process of  normal legislation and to limit its per -
missible content. The constituent power stands therefore in opposition to the “constituted power” 
of  public organs that perform the work of  government. These bodies derive their competences  
from the people and must heed the limits the latter has set on them.
On closer examination, the idea of  constituent power turns out to harbor several paradoxes. To 
begin with, there is the question as to who belongs to the people: what gives a particular collective 
the right to include some persons, who might prefer not to be members, and to exclude others, who 
might in fact wish to join? A full discussion of  this problem is beyond our scope here. Suffice it to  
note that for popular constitution making to be possible at all, some boundaries will have to be  
drawn. These will be rightful in some cases, and less so in others. For our purposes, though, the is -
sue of  boundaries has little relevance. Let us rather focus on three further paradoxes of  constituent  
power that will emerge as more pertinent to assessing the European status quo. The first is that a 
people is an amorphous multitude before it has a constitution. As such, one might argue, it cannot  
resolve to create a higher law because collective action presupposes an existing decision procedure.  
If  that is so, how can we speak of  a democratic choice to establish a fundamental order? A second  
puzzle is whether a founding that occurred long in the past can legitimate a fundamental order in  
the present. Is, for example, the manner in which the US constitution was adopted still relevant 
4 For a historical synopsis and a review of  the literature see Jeffrey Lenowitz, "Why Ratification? Questioning the Un -
examined Constitution-Making Procedure" (Columbia University, forthcoming).
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more than 200 years later? A third problem is that a significant number of  democratic states never 
experienced a popular founding. Instead, their constitution has been imposed through an undemo-
cratic process, or there is no written higher law at all. Does this mean the legal order in question is  
illegitimate, regardless of  how well it functions in practice?
The first of  these paradoxes directs our attention to the procedural aspect of  constitution mak-
ing. In some cases, it will be plausible to impute the ultimate outcome to the will of  the people,  
while in other cases, this will not be so. Andrew Arato lists the features that lend a framing process a  
democratic character: wide pluralistic inclusion, consensus decision making to the largest extent pos-
sible, openness to public oversight and input, scrupulous adherence to rules defined at the outset,  
elections as soon as possible after the constitution has been established, and the attempt to operate 
under a “veil of  ignorance” concerning the distributive implications of  the new order.5 This ap-
proach demystifies the idea of  constituent power. It acknowledges that imputing the constitution to  
the people relies on an institutional approximation that can never be perfect. But this fact, Arato im-
plies, should not lead us to throw our hands up and discard the aspiration of  popular constitution  
making altogether. Rather the goal should be to devise procedures that make the higher law as legit -
imate as it can be under the particular circumstances of  a given historical situation.
The second and third paradoxes lead us to consider  what happens to the constituent power, 
once a higher law has entered into force. Does it disappear until the people gives itself  a new consti -
tution, or does it somehow remain active? Here it is crucial to recognize the significance of  acquies -
cence. Citizens who make use of  a constitution that a group of  framers has created behave as if  the 
collective had given itself  fundamental norms, to be followed because of  their popular origin. In 
other words, so long as the higher law remains accepted in practice, we can impute democratic pedi-
5 Andrew Arato,  "Conventions,  Constituent  Assemblies,  and Round Tables.  Models,  Principles,  and Elements  of  
Democratic Constitution Making," Global Constitutionalism 1, no. 1 (2012), 197.
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gree to it. This of  course means that, in a sense, constitution making is a permanent exercise. Com-
pliance with the higher law and its further development signal identification of  the current genera-
tion with the initial founding – the citizens of  the present come to participate in the act, which is  
not finished until their shared fundamental order ceases to exist. Once we adopt this perspective, it  
does not matter when the framers established the constitution. What is more, even lack of  a proper  
founding in the past  need not preclude the existence of  a legitimate fundamental  order in the  
present. Take the German example. The 1949 convention that wrote the Basic Law did not aspire to  
channel the constituent power of  the people. As the country was divided and under tutelage of  for-
eign powers, the framers aimed to create a provisional order, intended to last until the political situ -
ation allowed for a more democratic process.6 Yet in the aftermath, the Basic Law acquired general 
support due to its successful operation. Today it stands undisputed as the constitution of  the Ger -
man people, regardless of  its peculiar genesis. Similar considerations pertain to countries that lack a 
written higher law altogether.7 In the few polities that fall into this group, custom and legal preced-
ent make up an effective fundamental order, which regulates the day to day working of  public or-
gans. So long as the people accept this framework in practice, we can regard it as based on constitu -
ent power.
Of  course, there remain a lot of  difficult questions here. In particular, we need to know the 
precise meaning of  “accept.” How much approval does a constitution require? What is a valid ex-
pression of  support? Are there reasons that warrant entrenchment of  the fundamental order against  
future majorities? But for the course of  the present investigation, these and other puzzles will be ir -
relevant. What matters is that we have defined general criteria to examine if  a given order has a basis 
in constituent power. That is the case if  there has either been a genuine popular founding, or if  cit -
6 David P. Conradt, The German Polity, 9th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2008), 15.
7 This group includes Israel, New Zealand, and the UK.
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izens have, over time, come to accept the order as their legitimate constitution. For our examination 
of  the European status quo (see Chapter 2), this level of  abstraction will suffice.
Liberal and Democratic Constitutionalism
The purpose of  a liberal and democratic constitution is the simultaneous realization of  private and 
public freedom.8 In other words, the higher law creates a sphere of  individual protection from state 
interference, but it also sets up a structure for collective action that enables the formulation of  pop -
ular will. Just like the notion of  constituent power, this ideal reflects the lack of  a transcendent 
power, which all members of  a collective recognize as sovereign over their affairs. Liberal societies  
rather consider each person as free to develop and pursue her own conception of  the good life. Re-
garding matters of  collective interest, there is hence nothing but an immanent guide – free and equal 
individuals must come together to work out their differences and find solutions that everyone can 
live with.
The first countries to replace monarchical regimes with liberal and democratic constitutions 
were the United States and France. To be sure, revolutionaries in both cases drew on earlier tradi-
tions: ancient republicanism inspired the quest of  the founding fathers to counteract the danger of  
mob rule and chart a more secure path to the common good; at the same time, the liberties con-
tained in the Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme would have been inconceivable without the long-
standing practice of  enforcing individual privileges based on social group affiliation in more or less 
independent courts. But we should nonetheless recognize the late 18 th century as the historical wa-
tershed that it was. Modern liberal and democratic constitutionalism enlisted older concepts and in-
stitutions to pursue a new goal – equal freedom in a disenchanted world. Much of  the subsequent 
political development in the West and elsewhere can be understood to reflect a struggle for this  
8 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 84-104.
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ideal, in the course of  which, progress had to be wrested from the social forces that opposed this  
modern Weltanschauung.
If  this narrative is right, the task of  normative constitutional theory becomes to work out how 
a liberal and democratic fundamental order can best achieve its purpose – the simultaneous realiza-
tion of  private and public freedom. One central problem here is to delineate these spheres from 
each other. Prima facie, private and public freedom stand in tension: each citizen has a right to pur-
sue her own happiness without political meddling, but the people is free to regulate its collective life.  
An account of  liberal and democratic constitutionalism has to work out the specific content of  
these desiderata, and it has to explain how to mediate the tension between them. I shall draw here  
on a particular response to this challenge: the “discourse theory of  the democratic constitutional  
state”, which Jürgen Habermas developed in his seminal work Between Facts and Norms. To struc-
ture the discussion, let us distinguish three core tenets of  liberal and democratic constitutionalism:  
the rule of  law, democratic legislation, and basic rights protection. The following will set out a spe-
cific interpretation of  each principle that will inform our investigation later on.
The rule of  law (in the narrow sense I use the term) implies that public power must operate 
based on formal norms that are subject to neutral interpretation and enforcement. At the most basic 
level, this presupposes a “separation of  powers”: executive organs implement statutes, the legislature 
writes them, and the courts ensure the correct and impartial application of  the law. There is a lot to  
explain here. What features define each branch? What is a statute? What does “correct and impar-
tial” application mean? Yet our investigation can leave these issues aside. Let us rather focus on an  
more basic question: which reasons demand that state organs respect the parameters of  their legal 
competence? For one thing, of  course, the rule of  law makes the exercise of  public power foresee-
able. Private actors know which norms to follow and can expect impartial treatment. A degree of  
33
such legal certainty is an indispensable prerequisite for social coordination. But the rule of  law also  
serves the end of  public freedom. If  the people is to govern itself  through democratic legislation,  
the implementation of  the latter must be as faithful as possible to the text. This holds a fortiori with 
regard to the constitutional norms that divide powers among the branches of  government and geo -
graphic units. Who should decide what is always controversial. A fundamental order embodies a 
judgment of  the people, resolving this question. The purpose of  judicial review is to preserve the  
resulting scheme. If  this framework has to be changed, the proper route is a constitutional amend-
ment.
Democratic legislation is the main vehicle of  public freedom. Law should express the popular 
will. This abstraction, to be sure, has little content apart from the particular reading that we give to 
it. For Habermas, a genuine popular will has to emerge from rational deliberation over the common 
good, which lends collective decisions a moral claim to bind citizens who oppose the ultimate out-
come. This neorepublican account is of  course not undisputed. It differs in particular from “elite”  
theories, for which electoral selection of  political leaders is sufficient, and “economic” perspectives 
that put the optimal aggregation of  private interests center stage.9 Here I will not defend the Haber-
masian view against the competing paradigms. Let us rather consider some main features of  this ap-
proach, which shall later be relevant to our assessment of  the European status quo.
Rational discourse, according to Habermas, produces norms that all  whom these will affect  
should be able to endorse. For this to be the case, deliberation has to remain free from illegitimate 
domination: no participant should exert force, except that of  the better argument.10 The reasons put 
forward must furthermore transcend private interests and values. Such “public justification”, to use 
a term John Rawls coined, might refer to universal moral demands; it might appeal to the specific  
9 For a comparison among the main strands in contemporary democratic thought see James Bohman and William 
Rehg,  "Introduction," in  Deliberative Democracy,  ed.  James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge,  MA: MIT 
Press, 1996).
10 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 305-306.
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ethos of  the collective in question; or it might advance a particular account of  how the world func -
tions (based on scientific evidence).11 To be sure, on all three dimensions, consensus will for the 
most part prove elusive. When a decision is needed, voting brings an end to discussion, at least for  
the time being. But while engaged in deliberation, the participants should make a good faith effort  
to find the most persuasive solution.12 All of  them have then rational grounds to accept the out-
come, for the latter will be the best current approximation of  the common good, while the losers 
retain the option to challenge the result in the future.13
How should we imagine the practical realization of  this ideal? Modern societies cannot imple-
ment the ancient Greek model, under which all citizens assemble to deliberate. Habermas instead 
suggests that participation should occur primarily at the stage of  public opinion formation. Citizens  
must hence be free to receive political information and to address others. The sum total of  such 
communication is the “public sphere.” Habermas believes that deliberation within this arena can 
lead citizens to adopt rational opinions about the content of  the shared interest, which should in 
turn influence political decision making. Ideally, then, legislative debate pits those reasons against  
each other that have found the most support in the public sphere.14
Let me insert a caveat here. Statutes are not the sole form of  important collective decisions. In 
modern states, the executive can often make autonomous policies. Growing functional demands on 
the welfare state have amplified this power, which now reaches far beyond traditional fields of  exec-
utive prerogative. Legislatures were forced to delegate a multitude of  tasks to regulatory bodies that  
11 ———, Between Facts and Norms, 108.
12 Habermas is of  course not oblivious to the fact that interest assertion is a pervasive feature of  democratic politics.  
He even argues that for some questions, bargaining among social groups is the best mechanism to work out the con-
tent of  the public interest (so long as there is an appropriate legal framework to ensure fairness).  See ———,  
Between Facts and Norms, 165-167. In general, the notion of  the common good must be understood as a regulative 
ideal, whose realization depends on both institutional design and the political culture.
13 ———, Between Facts and Norms, 305-306.
14 ———, Between Facts and Norms, 354-359.
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need significant independence to fulfill their mandate.15 Sometimes this means the complete isola-
tion from political influence, as for example in the case of  central banks. The justification for such  
bureaucratization is that with regard to certain state functions, parliaments are ill positioned to make  
good choices – legislators might lack expertise, fall victim to irrational mood swings of  the elector -
ate, or succumb to excessive interest group pressure. When that is the case, administrative delegation 
is consistent with the principle of  democratic legislation as understood here: if  the ultimate end of  
all exercise of  state power is to realize the common good, parliaments should take a backseat where 
bureaucrats stand a much better chance to accomplish this.
Given the relentless expansion of  the administrative state, democratic societies have made con-
siderable efforts to give citizens a voice in this sphere. Some even argue that such direct participa -
tion is now a more important form of  democratic  input than traditional representative govern-
ment.16 This claim, however, is exaggerated. Legislatures remain central from both an empirical and 
normative perspective. It would be absurd to maintain that general statutes have become irrelevant – 
such laws continue to shape the general direction of  policies, even if  details are often left to bureau -
crats. We should also keep in mind that representation via a parliament is usually more inclusive than 
direct participation, which tends to empower organized interests that have an immediate stake in a  
given issue. Against this background, I submit that popular government is unthinkable without tra-
ditional parliamentarism. The most important question for a conception of  democratic governance 
remains therefore how public opinion can influence legislative deliberation.
Habermas elaborates a set of  conditions for such a nexus to emerge. Consider first the level of  
the public sphere. Democratic opinion formation, it will be obvious, presupposes freedom of  asso-
ciation, speech, and press.17 But legal rights are not enough. Habermas notes that robust political 
15 Peter L. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 61-90.
16 See for example Mark Bevir, Democratic Governance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
17 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 368-369.
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discourse also requires a vibrant realm of  civil association, composed of  groups that bring concerns  
of  possible collective relevance to the attention of  the public.18 Moreover, there must be a media in-
frastructure that permits the dissemination of  information and moderates a rational debate among  
different views.19
Consider next the level of  the political system. Even the most vibrant and sophisticated public  
discourse about the shared interest is of  little value, if  decision making fails to reflect it. Here insti-
tutional architecture matters. At the most fundamental level, it has to enable policies based on the 
common good. This means in particular that factional interests need to be prevented from holding  
the process hostage – constitutional  design has to limit  veto points within the decision making 
structure.20 Politicians must furthermore be forced to engage with public opinion. That is one main  
purpose of  elections: voters should evaluate in how far parties and individual leaders represent their 
considered preferences and deliver on their promises. To the extent that is the case, politicians who 
desire to remain in office must either follow public opinion or seek to influence it.21
To meet the Habermasian ideal, both the public sphere and the political system depend on two 
further background conditions. First, social power must be neutralized. Each citizen should have a  
fair chance to exert influence. This requires adequate social and economic rights, which allow every-
one to make use of  their political freedom.22 In addition, suitable regulation should prevent that 
special interests bypass the court of  public opinion and exert direct control over elected leaders.  
Second, democratic legislation feeds, to some extent, on political virtue. Both the general population 
and elites have to share in a culture accustomed to freedom and oriented toward the common good.  
18 ———, Between Facts and Norms, 367.
19 ———, Between Facts and Norms, 378.
20 That is a direct and more or less obvious implication of  the concept of  a rational legislative discourse, even if  
Habermas does not make this point explicit in Between Facts and Norms. I bring it up here, because the issue will 
turn out to be significant for us later on.
21 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 487-488.
22 ———, Between Facts and Norms, 417-418.
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When citizens never transcend their private interest, public opinion formation cannot be rational in  
the sense defined earlier. And when politicians always cater to their clients, even the most rational 
public opinion will have little effect. To be sure, Habermas argues that political virtue should be “ex-
acted in small increments.”23 His conception, it is true, asks less of  the individual than ancient re -
publicanism in the vein of  Aristotle or Cicero. Nonetheless, the roles envisaged for the normal cit -
izen and the statesman impose profound ethical demands.
Basic rights protection guarantees individual freedom, subject to the condition that it does not 
interfere with the liberties  of  another citizen or a compelling public  interest.  Constitutional en-
trenchment of  rights forbids majorities from imposing unacceptable rules on minorities, and it pre-
vents state officials from abusing their power. This serves both private and public freedom: the  
former is established through basic rights that guarantee the greatest possible freedom of  individual  
action; the latter is protected through basic rights that create equal opportunities to participate in  
public opinion and will formation. To ensure the fair value of  both civil and political liberties, cit-
izens moreover need to have basic rights to adequate social and economic living conditions.24
There is a paradox here: entrenchment of  individual freedom is  prima facie inconsistent with 
the  principle  of  democratic  legislation  –  guaranteed  liberties  circumscribe  the  freedom of  the 
people to govern itself. Can the tension be reconciled? In  Between Facts and Norms,  Habermas 
places this question at the heart of  the argument. His answer is that democratic legislation and basic  
rights protection presuppose each other.25 What does this mean? As mentioned above, democratic 
legislation requires, on the one hand, freedoms that secure the public sphere, and on the other hand, 
participation rights, such as, for example, the franchise. We also noted that political freedom de-
pends on social and economic liberties, which give each citizen a fair chance to exert influence. The 
23 ———, Between Facts and Norms, 487.
24 ———, Between Facts and Norms, 118-131.
25 ———, Between Facts and Norms, 82-131.
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supportive relationship between civil rights and popular government is less obvious. Private freedom 
can seem like an irreconcilable antagonist of  democratic legislation. But Habermas points out that 
modern subjects develop and flourish in the sphere of  free personal choice – without protection of  
such a realm, the basis of  the entire constitutionalist project would disappear. In this sense, private  
freedom is a precondition of  popular government, not a constraint on it. At the same time, the 
whole system of  basic rights relies on the democratic process to legitimate its specific content. Con-
stitutional freedoms can take different legal shapes – particular communities must therefore fill in  
the blank. That is true, in particular, when reasonable people disagree over the proper implementa -
tion of  a right. Such argument will often arise when liberties collide with each other or undermine a  
justified public interest. Habermas insists that – as for all important political controversies – the  
democratic process has to resolve the dispute.
This perspective would seem to allow court supervision of  the executive, but militate against 
judicial review of  statutes: in the face of  reasonable disagreement, one might argue, legislatures 
should elaborate the content of  rights because this procedure is more representative than a court 
decision.26 But even so, judicial review still has an important role. Majority rule carries the risk of  
minority oppression. Politicians have little incentive to heed concerns of  people that will not vote  
for them, and they might deliberately choose to violate individual rights. Or they can simply fail to 
anticipate the violation of  a protected freedom, which might result from the concrete application of  
a general statute. Either case must be distinguished from bona fide disagreement about the inter-
pretation of  fundamental liberties. High courts should act if  legislators trample freedom, or if  a 
statute raises an unforeseen constitutional problem. Yet judges should not have the last word in a 
genuine controversy over the meaning of  a right.
26 The most prominent advocate of  this position is Jeremy Waldron. See Jeremy Waldron, "The Core of  the Case 
Against Judicial Review," Yale Law Journal 115 (2006).
39
How does this principle translate into practice? Of  course, it is impossible to distinguish  ex 
ante when courts or politicians are better placed to decide. Any system of  judicial review will there-
fore enable high courts to rule on questions better left to democratic legislation. Since the demarca -
tion line will always be fluid and contested, the appropriate stance for judges is to engage with pub-
lic opinion and elected representatives, when the content of  a right is not obvious. This will happen  
more often, if  constitutional amendment is a realistic option, because judges need then to anticipate  
that an unpopular decision might be overruled. Yet courts should also react to other forms of  polit -
ical intervention.27 If  elected representatives persist in challenging doctrine, judges should eventually 
relent. As Habermas puts it: “The [high] court must not assume the role of  a regent who takes the 
place of  an underage successor to the throne. Under the critical gaze of  a robust legal public sphere,  
[it] can at best play the role of  a tutor.”28 Real world judges, of  course, might not see their role in 
such modest terms. For evident reasons, courts are prone to exaggerate the rationality of  the legal  
process, relative to democratic will formation. But even when judges perceive themselves as philo-
sopher kings, public opinion and political intervention can represent factual limits to their power.  
Insofar as written law is able to accomplish this, the constitution should therefore establish a proper  
balance among these forces, such that rights do not open the door to juristocratic domination and 
can instead become the vehicle of  a collective learning process.
The Problem of  the Ultimate Decision
Let us next consider in  how far the classical  paradigm is  relevant for the main subject  of  this  
chapter: the relationship between unit and center law in a layered political structure. To elucidate this 
27 Potential “curbing” devices include legislative override, withholding funds from the court system, jurisdiction strip-
ping, court packing, and replacement of  judges that hold a particular legal view. These mechanisms have been stud-
ied in particular with reference to the power of  the judicial branch in the Unites States. For a review of  the literature 
see Daniel  Kelemen, "The Political Foundations of  Judicial Independence in the European Union,"  Journal  of  
European Public Policy 19, no. 1 (2012), 44-45.
28 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 280.
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connection,  we need to examine what it  means for a  state to be sovereign.  Under the classical  
paradigm, this concept has a particular meaning. A constitutional state claims supreme power over  
its territory, both against domestic contenders and outside actors. Sealing off  the domestic realm 
guarantees the legitimate exercise of  public power. Just like a challenge against the state from the in-
side, obedience to an external actor would undermine the aspiration of  holding public power ac-
countable to one higher law. For this reason, there must be no foreign interference with the do -
mestic affairs of  a sovereign state. This does not mean that international law can never bind. States  
are free to accede to treaties, and international custom reflects their implicit consent to a certain set 
of  rules. But in either case, local enforcement of  an international norm must not violate the do-
mestic constitution. The latter remains the source and framework of  all public power in the land.29
To be sure, some aspects of  the present global order are in obvious tension with the stylized 
picture I have just drawn. The shell of  territorial sovereignty is not impenetrable anymore. For one  
thing, states cannot exit from the UN collective security regime, which is empowered to authorize  
interventions against delinquent parties. Certain  jus cogens norms furthermore limit the domestic 
jurisdiction of  governments.30 These developments are significant, but one should not forget that 
enforcement is rather haphazard, and that it concerns, for the most part, a limited number of  weak 
and failing states. Meanwhile, the bulk of  international law retains its traditional character.
Where does this leave us with regard to the classification of  layered political structures? On the 
one hand, we can imagine a hierarchical resolution of  the question as to who shall render the ulti -
mate decision: either the center is sovereign, or the units are. In the former case, the order is a fed -
eral state. There is just one legal system, composed of  multiple subparts. Since an overarching con-
29 Dieter Grimm, Souveränität. Herkunft und Zukunft eines Schlüsselbegriffs (Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2009b).
30 Jus cogens is usually considered to include the prohibition of  international aggression, genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, war crimes, apartheid, slavery, torture, and piracy. These norms are understood to be valid independent of  
treaty codification or customary status. Some progress has been made toward establishing universal enforcement 
mechanisms, notably the creation of  the International Criminal Court.
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stitution establishes the units, their law remains subordinate to it; we might describe the relationship 
as “monist.” The converse scenario is that independent states cooperate through a treaty organiza-
tion. Such a regime belongs into the realm of  international law, and hence domestic enforcement of  
common rules is subject to each respective constitution. The legal orders remain separate and stand  
in a hierarchical relationship; “dualism” is the pertinent term of  art.31,  32 In the dispute over the 
European  status  quo,  that  is  the  ostensible  position  of  the  German  jurisprudence  (see 
Introduction).
But do the state and the international organization exhaust the universe of  possibilities? A two-
fold scheme has without doubt intuitive appeal. The modern idea of  sovereignty emerged during a  
time of  internecine conflict. Hence political thinkers advocated the creation of  a single power cen -
ter to adjudicate disagreement and maintain the peace. This conceptual genesis, it seems, lies behind 
the refusal of  some theorists to allow for a via media between state and international organization.33 
Yet is a clear decision as to which level is sovereign really a prerequisite of  proper constitutional  
rule? I submit that it is not: one can imagine a layered political structure, in which unit and center  
law are coequal. The heterachical nature of  such an order implies a relationship between the levels,  
31 To be sure, in a small number of  jurisdictions, all international norms trump domestic law (the Netherlands provide  
a textbook example). But this form of  “monism” remains at heart still dualist: the higher status of  the outside norm 
is a postulate of  the domestic constitution (which is subject to amendment); it does not follow from the nature of  
international law as such.
32 Hans Kelsen famously challenged the distinction between monism and dualism. He claimed that every legal norm is  
part of  just one global system. According to him, international law authorizes the creation of  domestic legal systems, 
which remain subordinate to it. See Kelsen, General Theory of  Law and State, 363-388. H.L.A. Hart rejected this 
claim, arguing that Kelsen was guilty of  a non sequitur: the fact that international law treats domestic legal systems 
as continuous with itself  does not establish the objective reality of  this situation. Hart maintained instead that legal 
systems with different “rules of  recognition” must be understood as separate. See H.L.A. Hart, "Kelsen's Doctrine 
of  the Unity of  Law," in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). This dis-
pute still haunts legal theorists – see for example Alexander Somek, "Monism. A Tale of  the Undead," in University 
of  Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-22 (Iowa City: The University of  Iowa College of  Law, 2010) –  but I 
will not pursue it here. From a pragmatic viewpoint, the question is simply irrelevant. Courts must decide between 
domestic and external norms whenever there is a conflict. Maybe a coherent explanation of  their authority to make 
this decision requires that one attribute it to decentralization within one global system of  law. Yet that is not going to 
change the outcome. What does affect the result is how judges view the relationship. Monism, dualism, and plural-
ism are significant at this level of  interpretation. Whether Kelsen or Hart is right about the objective nature of  law is  
a philosophical riddle we can ignore here.
33 See for example Grimm, Souveränität. Herkunft und Zukunft eines Schlüsselbegriffs.
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which one might characterize as “pluralism.” As we recall, that is how the academic mainstream de-
scribes the European status quo (see Introduction).
How can one reconcile this idea of  a heterarchical order with the notion that a constitution de -
rives from (and makes) a sovereign people? The decisive conceptual move here is to acknowledge 
that in a layered political structure, both units and center can have a fundamental order that rests on 
constituent power. The historical practice and theory of  federalism suggest that such a regime – 
which one might call a Bund – is feasible.34 Yet before I can make this argument, let us consider a 
fundamental objection to the classical paradigm itself.
The Classical Paradigm Under Attack
It has for some time been a mantra of  contemporary legal scholarship that our understanding of  
constitutionalism should be adjusted to a changing political world. Governance is more and more 
privatized and transnationalized, which calls into doubt that it is still possible for a single higher law 
to regulate all public power within a particular territorial realm.35 Here our focus lies on the second 
development – the proliferation of  law beyond the state. In response to globalization, a plethora of  
new governance structures has emerged, some of  which are said to have undergone a process of  
“constitutionalization.”36 What does this term refer to? The expansion of  public power beyond the 
state went hand in hand with legalization.  International  regimes now often make binding rules,  
whose interpretation is delegated to dispute resolution bodies that look more and more like actual  
34 Jean Cohen has pointed me toward the insight that heterarchical federalism and constitutional pluralism are related  
ideas. She elaborates her own version of  this argument in a recent book: Jean Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty.  
Rethinking Legality, Legitmacy, and Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
35 Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin, "Introduction," in  The Twilight of  Constitutionalism, ed. Petra Dobner and 
Martin Loughlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
36 As Turkuler Isiksel observes: “International institutions ranging from the UN to the WTO, NAFTA, IMF, and IC-
SID, human rights regimes including the UDHR and the ECHR, juridical constructs such as jus cogens, transna-
tional contract law, and treaties from the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties to the New York Convention 
on the Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards have all been considered forms of  constitutional order at one point 
or another.” See Türküler Isiksel, "Europe's Functional Constitution. A Theory of  Constitutionalism Beyond the  
State" (Yale University, 2010), 6.
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courts. Furthermore, present day international regimes often allow for some form of  citizen parti -
cipation, and several international courts protect individual liberties. Does this mean the rule of  law, 
democratic  legislation,  and basic rights  protection have transcended their  origins within the do-
mestic realm?
Some theorists believe that such a trend undermines the privileged status of  national higher 
law.  Constitutionalization,  goes  the  claim,  abolishes  the  rationale  for  a  hierarchical  relationship 
between domestic and international norms. Matthias Kumm has articulated the most developed for -
mulation of  this view.37 He argues that constitutional legitimation does not presuppose that we can 
link higher law to a particular collective. Rather, all  public legal orders have latent constitutional 
status, which becomes actual once the regime in question meets certain substantive criteria. In other 
words, constituent power is irrelevant; a particular institutional constellation is sufficient to legitim-
ate public  coercion.  From this  perspective,  a  threefold classification scheme of  layered political  
structures is anachronistic: heterarchy would be universal, pluralism the only game left in town.
Let us consider this argument in some more detail. Kumm suggests nothing less than a “Coper-
nican revolution” in jurisprudence. He elaborates a new “cognitive frame”: when domestic courts  
face a decision about enforcing an outside norm, the judges should not use the dualist test as to  
whether the norm is properly authorized and consistent with constitutional law. “[T]he basic point 
of  reference for the construction of  legal authority” ought rather to be a “complex standard of  
public reason.”38 One can summarize its criteria as follows:
Legal norms from a relatively higher level must be accorded precedence over norms from a local sys-
tem unless the local court is able to show a violation of  1) subsidiarity: norms must be made at the 
37 Mattias Kumm, "The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism. On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in 
and beyond the State," in Ruling the World. Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, ed. Jef-
frey L. Dunoff  and Joel P. Trachtman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), ———, "The Best of  Times 
and the Worst of  Times. Between Constitutional Triumphalism and Nostalgia," in The Twilight of  Constitutional-
ism, ed. Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
38 ———, "The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism. On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and bey-
ond the State," 268.
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level,  which can “best” regulate  the subject in question;  2)  due process:  norms must  be  created 
through a transparent procedure, allowing for the fullest participation of  those affected, which is pos-
sible under the circumstances; 3) basic rights: norms must conform with basic rights.
These  rules  supposedly  do not  create  a  monist  scenario,  under  which  international  law always  
trumps domestic norms.39 Kumm would rather like to offer a “cosmopolitan pluralist” stance. From 
the perspective of  this approach, international regimes have prima facie the same status as the do-
mestic constitution, but judges can still set aside external norms, if  the regime in question fails to 
meet the above criteria.
Kumm maintains that cosmopolitan pluralism so understood has begun to replace the classical  
paradigm. This approach, he argues, is “better able to make sense of  contemporary public law prac-
tice, [it] fits that practice and shows it in the best light.”40 I will discuss in a moment whether “fit” is 
the right yardstick to use here. But we should first note that Kumm treads shaky ground when ar -
guing that cosmopolitan pluralism is more or less the established practice. One problem is that his  
evidence is rather thin. He focuses on the  Bosphorus judgment of  the ECtHR, and the ECJ de-
cision in Kadi. A persuasive generalization about international law would require supporting mater-
ial from regions other than Europe (and we should entertain some doubt that it can be found). Yet 
even Bosphorus and Kadi are no perfect exemplars of  cosmopolitan pluralism. Both judgments put 
forward a version of  the Solange principle: an external measure will not be subject to review, so long 
as the protection of  individual freedom under the outside regime is overall acceptable. This doctrine 
is indeed akin to the third part of  the cosmopolitan pluralist standard. But Kumm fails to demon-
strate that courts also use the other two criteria.
39 Somek, however, argues that Kumm is a “closet monist” because the “complex standard of  public reason” integrates 
all domestic and international law. See Somek, "Monism. A Tale of  the Undead," 33.
40 Kumm, "The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism. On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and bey-
ond the State," 262.
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We should furthermore question the methodological appropriateness of  a fit investigation.41 
Kumm sees the global practice of  public law as one integral whole striving for coherence: judges 
need to examine what other courts do and fit their rulings into the existing landscape. Perhaps, that  
is a valid demand for rendering judgment within a legal system. But from the viewpoint of  the clas-
sical paradigm, precedent from other jurisdictions has no binding effect on domestic courts: how 
judges structure the relationship with external legal orders should depend on criteria internal to their  
respective constitutional system. Therefore, a fit argument cannot be a strong rationale for cosmo-
politan pluralism – it must fail to persuade an adherent of  the classical paradigm that her position is  
incoherent.
Yet the main thrust of  the case for the new cognitive frame is anyway different. Kumm main-
tains that cosmopolitan pluralism is superior from a moral point of  view: courts should embrace the  
paradigm change because dualism has never been compatible with the equal freedom of  individuals 
– the core value animating constitutionalism in the Western tradition. Needless to say, it smacks of  
philosophical imperialism to build normative principles of  global law on this foundation (a charge 
Kumm seems prepared to accept).42 The classical paradigm allows for diverse political ideologies – 
each people has the right to determine its own system of  government. Cosmopolitan pluralism, in  
contrast, presumes a universal commitment to liberal and democratic values. One can debate if  that 
is the appropriate starting point for a general account of  the relationship between domestic and in -
ternational law. But I will leave this problem aside here. The goal of  the following discussion is 
rather to show that cosmopolitan pluralism fails by its own lights: even the legal system of  a liberal  
and democratic state should not adopt such a stance toward outside norms.
41 The concept of  “fit” was introduced by Ronald Dworkin. See Ronald Dworkin, "Hard Cases," Harvard Law Review 
88, no. 6 (1975).
42 Kumm, "The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism. On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and bey-
ond the State," 316-320.
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The first shortcoming of  the suggested cognitive frame is that, as the proposal stands, it would 
destabilize political order. Abandoning the idea that specific collectives establish their own supreme 
law empowers courts below and above the state to use the cosmopolitan pluralist standard.43 Under 
this scenario, the principle of  subsidiarity becomes dynamite. How to allocate competences over dif-
ferent levels of  governance is often enough a controversial question, which does not have a single 
rational answer. The classical paradigm solves this problem: the constitution defines which state or -
gan has which power, subject to dispute resolution in a court of  last instance. In contrast, discretion 
for all judges is a recipe for chaos. I take it, however, that Kumm does not intend to advocate such a  
radical decentralization of  judicial power. He rather seems to believe that application of  the cosmo-
politan pluralist standard would remain limited to the high courts of  states and international re -
gimes. Such a rider could mitigate the diagnosed problem, yet it seems inconsistent with his overall  
approach.
For the sake of  argument,  let us assume that one can somehow circumvent this  challenge.  
Should we then embrace cosmopolitan pluralism as the proper default stance? In defending his ap -
proach, Kumm focuses on the claim that national judges must not be allowed to undermine solu-
tions to international collective action problems. Under the classical paradigm, a national high court  
is able to set aside an external norm that is seen to violate the constitution, regardless of  whether 
the subject matter is “best” regulated at the domestic level, and even if  the norm fulfills the due  
process and basic rights criteria. Kumm believes that such review privileges a narrow local interest 
over the more inclusive concern for effective transnational governance. The ideal of  equal freedom,  
he objects, does not permit exclusion of  this kind. Subsidiarity is hence not just a technical criterion  
43 Alexander Somek makes a similar point. SeeSomek, "Monism. A Tale of  the Undead," 36-39.
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but a moral demand as well: it guarantees representation to everyone who is affected by a collective  
action problem, regardless of  their nationality.44
This argument, I submit, remains unpersuasive. If  domestic courts adopted the proposal, inter -
national cooperation would probably not improve much. The main obstacle to finding collective 
solutions for global problems such as carbon emissions, financial regulation, or poverty is not that  
judges stand in the way. Rather, national governments are unwilling or incapable to negotiate work -
able compromises. A judicial paradigm shift will not change this. It would, however, strip constitu -
tional law of  its democratic pedigree. For Kumm, it does not matter whether citizens have endorsed 
a particular order as their higher law. According to him, judges should have the power to grant or 
withhold this status. Such a regime, I believe, would erode constitutionalism. As the following will  
argue, the proposed subsidiarity criterion would undermine the rule of  law; the due process stand-
ard remains a far cry from genuine democratic legislation; and transnational basic rights protection 
is not equivalent to its counterpart in the domestic realm.
Consider first the rule of  law: under the classical paradigm, national judges have the right to en-
force the mandate that an international regime has received from the domestic legislator. Such ultra  
vires control safeguards the principle that all exercise of  public power requires a legal basis. Modern  
constitutions permit the government to delegate competences to an international regime, which of -
ten presupposes the assent of  the national parliament. Via the delegation act, the external order be-
comes part of  the domestic scheme of  competence distribution. If  that is so, the national high 
court must be able to enforce the terms of  conferral. Kumm wants to replace this constraint with  
his subsidiarity test. The interesting point here is that he does not attempt to persuade us that inter -
national regimes can safeguard the rule of  law on their own, such that domestic courts need not in -
44 Kumm, "The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism. On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and bey-
ond the State," 296-301.
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tervene. In fact, the cosmopolitan pluralist standard does not evaluate if  a regime establishes, for in -
stance, a proper separation of  powers. Nonetheless, it seems fair to assume that Kumm would like 
international bodies to make norms that are binding and subject to neutral interpretation and per -
haps enforcement. Legalization in this sense permits effective governance, for it stabilizes expecta -
tions about the content of  binding rules. But, according to Kumm, the reach of  positive law should 
end there. Under cosmopolitan pluralism, the substantive jurisdiction of  an international regime is  
not subject to prior determination. That is because, for Kumm, there are no collective entities that  
could establish such a mandate. Instead, cosmopolitan pluralism derives the competences of  a re-
gime from its supposed fitness to regulate a particular field. Judges, goes the reasoning, should have  
the right to make this assessment.45
Why should high courts not wield such a power? Above I have noted that a constitutional divi-
sion of  labor represents a considered judgment of  the people as to who should exercise what kind 
of  competence. The modification of  this scheme via delegation to an international regime should 
again have democratic sanction – hence the requirement of  legislative ratification under the classical  
paradigm.  Kumm would like  to avoid this  hurdle,  for he  assumes that  domestic  politicians will 
pander to selfish interests of  their voters, whereas judges will safeguard the more inclusive transna-
tional interest. That is a rather pessimistic outlook on democratic politics, and it might well be a too  
optimistic  view of  courts.  Kumm also ignores the  potential  for  reasonable  disagreement  about  
whether a competence should be exercised at the domestic or international level. For example, social  
democrats often fear that economic regulation above the state will undermine their political values.  
45 Note here that cosmopolitan pluralist subsidiarity is rather different from the subsidiarity principle that has long  
been part of  European law. The latter is laid down in a treaty and it refers only to the question as to when the EU  
can exercise a competence shared with the member states (see Chapter 2). Cosmopolitan pluralist subsidiarity, in  
contrast, is a doctrinal invention that gives judges more or less unlimited power to decide at which geographical level 
a given issue should be regulated.
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Is that a legitimate reason against delegation to an external regime? To resolve this question, a rep-
resentative procedure is adequate; judicial discretion, in contrast, would have an oligarchical flavor.
Consider next the principle of  democratic legislation: under the classical paradigm, a domestic  
court can find that an international regime must not exercise a particular competence, if  its gov-
ernance procedures do not meet democratic criteria. This test might affect the interpretation of  a  
mandate the national parliament has ratified, or it can lead a high court to strike down a delegation  
of  power as unconstitutional. Kumm is concerned that such review will frustrate international co-
operation. He suggests that courts use instead the less demanding standard of  due process: so long 
as an external regime allows for the greatest feasible citizen participation, it has sufficient legitima -
tion of  its own. One problem is the rather nebulous character of  this formulation – Kumm offers 
no criterion to assess what counts as feasible. But I also submit that an international regime must re -
main so far below the standard of  a constitutional state that we should maintain a categorical dis-
tinction between them. Recall  the Habermasian prerequisites of  democratic  legislation:  (1) indi-
vidual rights that safeguard the public sphere, (2) a vibrant realm of  civic association, (3) sufficient  
media infrastructure, (4) legislative institutions that can adopt policies based on the common good,  
(5) incentives for politicians to engage with public opinion, (6) tamed social power, (7) and virtuous 
dispositions on the part of  citizens and elites. Governance beyond the state fails to meet most of  
these criteria.
Regarding prerequisite (1), let us make the – often unrealistic – assumption that domestic gov-
ernments respect freedom of  association, speech, and press, such that citizens might in principle 
join a transnational conversation. Even then, development of  a robust transnational public remains 
improbable. Outside the domestic realm, civil society is much weaker than within states. Condition 
(2), in other words, is at least problematic. To be sure, in some issue areas, transnational NGOs 
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bring together citizens from different countries and formulate relevant shared concerns. Still, one 
must be skeptical as to whether these groups provide adequate representation of  their supposed 
constituents. Prerequisite (3) is likewise hard to meet in the transnational realm. At present, there is  
little media infrastructure that could foster genuine discourse across borders.
Once we move from the level of  the public sphere to the level of  the political system, matters  
look even worse. Governance beyond the state does not fulfill condition (4), as the procedures of  
international bodies are inimical to a common good orientation. In particular, the decision rule of  
most regimes is unanimous consent, such that states able to withstand collective pressure can block 
action for selfish reasons. Prerequisite (5) is not met either: politicians lack a strong incentive to en-
gage with public opinion, insofar as it can be said to exist. There are no elections that hold a particu-
lar actor responsible for the policies of  a regime. Indirect legitimation of  governments via the na-
tional parliament cannot quite make up for this deficit because international regimes work, for the 
most part, based on secret negotiation, such that domestic voters have little information about the 
performance of  their representatives.
Furthermore, beyond the state, the background conditions for rational opinion and will forma-
tion do not exist. Regarding prerequisite (6), it should be noted that unequal power remains more or 
less untamed. There is no welfare state to guarantee the fair value of  civil and political rights. It  
would also be false to claim that each person has equal representation via his respective government:  
powerful states command better staff  and expertise, and sometimes their governments have formal 
privileges such as greater voting weight. In addition, diplomatic blackmail is a normal feature of  in-
ternational politics. Rule enforcement often enough depends on whether a delinquent state is unable 
to resist. Finally, transnational governance can empower private interests that have direct access to  
negotiations, which remain otherwise intransparent to the public. As for condition (7), we must also  
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conclude that it does not hold: an international regime is unable to count on political virtue (and it  
does not seek to). Participants in an intergovernmental negotiation are expected to maximize their  
own utilities, even if  that prevents a better outcome for the collective. Contrast this with politics in a  
state. Here citizens and, in particular, officials are supposed to further the public interest. This atti -
tude is rooted in imagined belonging to a demos, engaged in “social cooperation from one genera-
tion to the next.”46 To be sure, even if  such a collective is perceived to exist, political virtue is often 
a scarce good. Yet the situation beyond the state is of  a different kind altogether. In the case of  a re -
gime, whose legal order is not seen to constitute a specific collective, orientation toward the public  
weal does not even have a referent. There is neither an expectation that citizens and officials will 
pursue the common interest, nor the attempt to induce such a disposition.
Of  the preceding, Kumm acknowledges the weak development of  the global public sphere and 
the lack of  elections beyond the state. But, as we have seen, the gulf  between the domestic and the 
transnational realm is much wider. The differences listed above provide good reasons for domestic 
courts to police the delegation of  power to external regimes. Sometimes the latter might still be de-
fensible on balance.  Yet we should not consider “fullest  possible participation” as equivalent to  
democratic participation in a constitutional state.
Consider last the principle of  basic rights protection: under the classical paradigm, national 
high courts must review if  an external norm upholds the rights protected under the domestic con-
stitution. Kumm instead recommends deference whenever the international regime provides its own 
check that individual freedom is not being violated. According to him, it does not matter which 
court safeguards rights, as long as one does. But is he correct? Earlier we noted that judges should 
not have exclusive power to determine the meaning of  individual freedom. Where reasonable dis-
agreement persists, courts should enter a dialog with elected politicians. In the domestic realm, a 
46 This phrase was famously coined by John Rawls.
52
proper balance of  power between judicial branch and legislature can enable such a relationship. But,  
as the preceding discussion has suggested, an international regime does not allow for genuine demo-
cratic will formation – hence there can be no interaction between courts and the institutionalized 
voice of  the people. This, to be sure, does not matter so long as a regime limits itself  to protecting  
rights with more or less straightforward content. Yet the situation is different when international 
judges rule on disputed questions such as the proper balance among conflicting liberties or the right  
equilibrium between individual freedom and legitimate public interests. Here, a national high court  
might have good reason to second guess an external ruling.
In sum, cosmopolitan pluralism, as Kumm describes it, remains an unpersuasive attempt to re-
volutionize our understanding of  the relationship between domestic and international norms. This 
and potential other efforts to imagine supreme law apart from a specific collective suffer from a  
fatal defect. Once the people is denied the power to to make its own fundamental order, the sub -
stantive principles of  liberal and democratic constitutionalism lose much of  their legitimating force.  
First, the rule of  law will be deficient, if  we do not think of  competence as a popular grant of  
power, whose terms need to be enforced against those entrusted with its exercise. As soon as one 
severs this link between democratic constitution making and legitimate rule, the sole recourse left is  
the alleged wisdom of  judges, lending them special insight as to who is “best” placed to decide a  
particular issue. Second, democratic legislation, too, presupposes an institutional setting geared to-
wards equal freedom within a circumscribed group, whose members commit to a shared political  
life. Of  course, individuals can “participate” where this condition is not met, but their input will fail  
to lead to the implementation of  a common good – the fundamental purpose of  all popular govern-
ment. Last, if  basic rights should not crowd out politics, their elaboration has to occur in dialog with  
democratic will formation. Where that is not possible, judges will again have more power than is de -
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fensible. Against this background, I suggest that we maintain a clear distinction between the higher  
law of  a particular collective, to which one can impute a decision to establish or sustain a framework 
to govern itself, and the various forms of  legal order that exist in the transnational realm. Other -
wise, the danger is that we overstate the significance of  “constitutionalization.” To be sure, legaliza -
tion, citizen participation, and rights protection are often desirable for governance beyond the state.  
But  their  implementation  does  not  warrant  coequal  status  between  domestic  and  international  
norms. At best, such institutional reforms create a pale shadow of  liberal and democratic constitu-
tionalism. The real thing cannot exist within the transnational realm.
Does this mean that a heterarchical constellation is undesirable in principle? The remainder of  
the chapter will show that it remains a valid option. But pluralism should not ensue from a “Coper-
nican revolution” in jurisprudence. Coequal standing of  unit and center law is rather appropriate if  
both levels have a genuine constitution in the sense of  the classical paradigm. How would such an  
order look like? The historical practice and theory of  federalism provide a starting point to address  
this question.
A Third Way Between State and International Organization
Unions of  states existed already in ancient Greece. Yet the federal idea was not a subject of  theoret-
ical reflection until the modern concept of  sovereignty emerged around the 17 th century. The advent 
of  this idea provoked much debate as to whether the right to make the ultimate decision is divisible  
among the several organs of  a political system. Most theorists, however, soon agreed that it could 
not be shared across multiple levels of  governance: within a layered structure, either the units or the  
center had to be sovereign. The problem of  this binary classification has always been that it failed to  
capture the empirical reality of  federalism. Hence at various moments, challenges against the ortho-
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dox view emerged, suggesting that a third way is possible. This story has been recounted elsewhere  
– a brief  survey of  the central episodes will therefore suffice here.47 Once I have sketched the his-
torical background, we can turn to the most important modern advocate of  the via media in consti-
tutional thought: Carl Schmitt. His account of  the Bund will help us to evaluate the dispute about 
the proper relationship between domestic and European law.
The Idea of  Heterarchical Federalism
Samuel von Pufendorf  was the first writer to distinguish a political form between state and treaty  
organization.48 The early theorists of  sovereignty, notably Jean Bodin and Althusius, had emphas-
ized the importance of  concentrating power in one center. That is not surprising, given that an im-
portant motivation behind their doctrines was to propose a solution for the violent religious con-
flicts pervasive in 17th century Europe. In several places, the consolidation of  a centralized state was 
in fact underway, but the federal structures of  Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the Holy Roman 
Empire resisted classification within the new conceptual scheme. These polities were neither states,  
in the same way as, for example, absolutist France nor simple alliances, which is how the school of  
indivisible sovereign power conceived them. Pufendorf  makes the difference quite clear:
“The other kind of  system is that which consists of  several states bound to each by a perpetual treaty,  
and  which  is  usually  occasioned  by  the  fact  that  the  individual  states  wished  to  preserve  their  
autonomy, and yet had not sufficient strength to repel their common enemy. […] simple treaties have  
usually before their eyes only the particular advantage of  the different states, as it happens to coin-
cide, and do not produce any lasting union in matters which concern the chief  object of  states. The 
case is entirely different with the treaties that appear in systems, the purpose of  which is that distinct  
47 The following relies in particular on Murray Forsyth, Unions of  States. The Theory and Practice of  Confederation 
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1981). See also Christoph Schönberger, "Die Europäische Union als Bund," 
Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts 129 (2004), Olivier Beaud, Théorie de la fédération (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2007).
48 Forsyth, Unions of  States. The Theory and Practice of  Confederation, 73-85.
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states may intertwine for all time the prime interests of  their safety, and on that score make the exer -
cise  of  certain  parts  of  the  supreme  sovereignty  depend  upon  the  mutual  consent  of  their 
associates.”49
Permanence is hence the first mark of  such an order, setting it apart from a treaty or alliance, which 
provide a temporary framework to pursue a narrow shared purpose. The second distinctive feature 
is the creation of  a sphere, in which the units cannot act without the center. Given the partial char -
acter of  the union, this mandate remains limited to a specific range of  powers. A third characteristic  
of  a Pufendorfian “system” is that it deals with the political “chief  object” – survival of  the parti-
cipating states.
The issue of  heterarchical federalism came up again in the context of  American political devel-
opment.50 Writing as “Publius”, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison argued that under the 1787 
constitution, both the states and the national government were sovereign within their domain: since 
the competences of  each were clearly defined, two layers of  supreme power could exist without 
contradiction. Yet The Federalist Papers left important questions open: who interprets the extent of  
the unit and central sphere? Can the states invalidate federal laws held to be unconstitutional? Are  
the states permitted to secede from the union? These were the issues that John Calhoun, the great  
defender of  state rights, raised in the 1840s. Calhoun denied the Supreme Court – whose national  
character he emphasized – the right to adjudicate competence disputes between the states and the 
central government. Furthermore, he considered nullification of  federal laws possible and insisted 
on the right of  the states to secede. Of  course, proponents of  a strong national government, led by  
Daniel Webster, disputed each of  these claims. Which side was right? Mere recourse to the text of  
the constitution could not answer this question – the conflict was rooted in a disagreement over the 
49 Andreas Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, trans. C.H. Oldfather and W.A. Oldfather, vol. 2 (Lon-
don: Clarendon Press, 1934), 1046-1047.
50 Forsyth, Unions of  States. The Theory and Practice of  Confederation, 105-132.
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nature of  the union. Webster presumed that one American people had established the constitution, 
whereas his opponent maintained that it represented a compact among independent states. The dis -
pute was not resolved until the Civil War, which established the federal government as the ultimate 
sovereign.
Somewhat later,  German theorists  engaged in a  similar  debate.51 Here  the  historian Georg 
Waitz advocated the doctrine of  The Federalist Papers, whereas Max von Seydel emerged as the de-
fender of  Bavarian “state rights.” Just like Calhoun, von Seydel argued that coequal sharing of  sov-
ereign power was a paradoxical notion: a layered political structure must be either a  Bundesstaat 
(federal state) with a sovereign center or a  Staatenbund (confederation), based on a treaty among 
states. According to von Seydel, the Second Empire of  1871 belonged into the latter group. This 
claim met near universal rejection – most legal thinkers now placed the German federation in the  
state rubric, contrasting it with the Bund of  1815, which in their view represented a confederation. 
Von Seydel, then, stood alone with his interpretation of  the status quo. But his theoretical categories 
turned into textbook wisdom that such giants of  legal thought as Georg Jellinek, Otto Gierke, or  
Louis Le Fur would propagate. As a result, the idea of  federalism became assimilated into the state  
model. No longer was it open to a coequal relationship between units and center; theorists now un-
derstood federalism as one more instrument to disperse power in a single constitutional order.
Carl Schmitt
The  most  significant  challenge  against  this  orthodox view came from a  somewhat  unexpected 
corner. Readers of  Carl Schmitt will associate with him the belief  that stable political order presup-
poses a clear decision as to who is sovereign. But there is an exception to this most “Schmittian im-
51 ———, Unions of  States. The Theory and Practice of  Confederation, 133-146.
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perative.”52 At one point in his work, Schmitt argued that federations of  states can, under auspicious 
circumstances, leave the question open. The participants in the German debate of  the 1870s missed  
this insight, he maintains, because of  their polemical rather than scientific motives. Legal theorists,  
goes the claim, opted for a twofold classification scheme in order to make as clear a distinction as  
possible between the 1871 constitution and the Bund of  1815. This permitted them to emphasize 
that, at last, national unification had been achieved. From a more disengaged perspective, Schmitt 
holds,  one would have to acknowledge the  need for a  conceptual  middle  ground.53 In the  last 
chapter of  his  Constitutional Theory, he therefore developed a systematic description of  a heter-
archical federation or, as he calls it, a Bund.54 This political form is defined in a Pufendorfian vein as 
a permanent union among states, which pool certain sovereign powers in order to guarantee their  
survival. The units retain their own independent constitution, but the center also has a fundamental  
order, distinct from international law. Insofar as the paradox of  coequal status is concerned, Schmitt  
offers the following resolution: while a heterarchical federation harbors an obvious tension, conflict  
need not break out – so long as that is the case, the question as to which level is sovereign can re -
main undecided.
To make sense of  this argument, we have to understand the conceptual background. Schmitt 
views sovereignty as the factual power to decide an existential conflict, which for him means dis-
agreement over who counts as friend and enemy. This kind of  dispute is not amenable to a legal an -
swer – the person or institution with the greatest political strength is going to assert their will. But 
Schmitt points out that, for the most part, the exercise of  public power operates through legal chan-
nels, which is possible in the absence of  existential struggle in the sense just defined. Federalism per  
se does not disturb this mechanism, despite the fact that it might entail the lack of  a predefined ulti -
52 I borrow this formulation from Jan-Werner Müller. See Jan-Werner Müller,  Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 127.
53 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 384.
54 ———, Constitutional Theory, 379-408.
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mate arbiter. Schmitt argues that units and center can differ about a legal question if  neither raises  
the dispute to fundamental significance. Such “disagreements [can] be mediated by [prudent] and 
just persons in good conscience.”55 A stable Bund must therefore be homogeneous to some degree. 
Here Schmitt does not have in mind a single cultural or ethnic nation; a heterarchical federation is 
rather a union of  separate peoples. But these communities should not disagree about questions that 
permit of  no compromise. If  there is such a dispute – for instance over a basic moral issue – the 
problem of  the ultimate decision becomes acute, it must be determined who is sovereign, and the  
union comes to an end, at least in its present shape. A heterarchical federation is therefore a fragile  
construct. Nonetheless, Schmitt implies that historical instances of  this model have endured long  
enough for it to represent a discrete political form.
The Renaissance of  Schmittian Federal Thought in EU Scholarship
Schmitt failed to make a dent in the canonical status of  the “federal state” versus “confederation”  
antithesis. One reason is perhaps the general odium that would soon surround the “crown jurist” of  
the Third Reich; another impediment might have been his controversial definition of  what it means 
to be sovereign. The immediate postwar era also came to be a golden age of  the nation state, which  
made the issue of  federalism at larger geographical scale less urgent.56 Whatever the correct explan-
ation, the view that one should distinguish among three, not two, possible forms of  layered political 
structures  remained marginal.  A problematic  consequence  is  that,  from a doctrinal  perspective,  
some historical federations are indistinguishable from alliances or specialized international organiza-
tions. So long as the power of  the center to render an ultimate decision is not established, both uni-
ons of  states and much looser forms of  political association belong into the “confederal” rubric.
55 ———, Constitutional Theory, 389. The translation puts “astute” instead of  “prudent”, which is a somewhat im-
precise rendering of  the original “klug.”
56 Michael Zürn and Stephan Leibfried, "Reconfiguring the National Constellation," in Transformations of  the State?, 
ed. Stephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn (2005).
59
European integration brought this classification issue to the fore again. While the ECJ once 
called the legal system of  the Communities a “new order of  international law”, the judges in Lux-
embourg soon dropped this phrase, failing to offer a clear alternative description. Meanwhile, law-
yers across the continent embraced the notion that European norms are supreme, as if  there was an 
overarching sovereign (of  course no one would put it as blunt). The German Maastricht judgment  
exposed the illusory character of  this “fable.”57 It described the EU along the lines of  the confed-
eral model, accepting the blurred distinction to an international organization. Neither view seems 
quite right: the EU, it should be evident, is not a federal state, but the judicial defense of  the sover-
eign nation state is likewise questionable.
Already in 1966, Heinhard Steiger used the Schmittian Bund concept to escape the impasse.58 
But this approach did not gain a foothold until the 2000s. In a recent book, Olivier Beaud provides  
a historical reconstruction of  the via media in constitutional thought.59 He speculates that it might 
offer a useful template to describe the EU, but he does not take a definitive stance. Others have  
been less circumspect: these authors believe there is good reason for us to think of  the status quo in 
terms of  the Bund model.60 However, it remains an open question if  this assessment is correct. 
Those who consider the EU a heterarchical federation point to certain features that are, without  
doubt, reminiscent of  this political form. Yet the literature is still missing a comparison with a full  
57 Baquero Cruz, "The Legacy of  the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement," 389-391.
58 Heinhard Steiger,  Staatlichkeit und Überstaatlichkeit. Eine Untersuchung zur rechtlichen und politischen Stellung  
der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1966), 143-186.
59 Beaud, Théorie de la fédération. See also Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty. Rethinking Legality, Legitmacy, and  
Constitutionalism, 80-158.
60 Hauke Brunkhorst, "A Polity without a State," in Developing a Constitution for Europe, ed. Erik Odvar Eriksen, et 
al.  (London:  Routledge,  2004),  Schönberger,  "Die  Europäische  Union  als  Bund.",  Matej  Avbelj,  "Theory  of  
European Bund" (European University Institute, 2009), Stephan Leibfried and Karin van Elderen, "'And They Shall 
Beat their Swords into Plowshares.' The Dutch Genesis of  a European Icon and the German Fate of  the Treaty of  
Lisbon," German Law Journal 10, no. 8 (2009), Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism. The Chan-
ging Structure of  European Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Rainer Wahl, "Die Schwebelage im Ver-
hältnis von Europäischer Union und Mitgliedstaaten.  Zum Lissabon-Urteil  des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,"  Der 
Staat 48, no. 4 (2009), Ulrich K. Preuß, "Is There a Constituent Power in the European Union?," in Le Pouvoir Con-
stituant et l'Europe, ed. Olivier Cayla and Pascale Pasquino (Paris: Dalloz, 2011). Habermas, too, views the EU in 
terms of  heterarchical federalism, even though, as I discuss below, he tries to distance himself  from Schmitt. See Jür-
gen Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011).
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institutional account of  the ideal type. Such an investigation, though, has the potential to be quite 
fruitful. The advantage of  a Schmittian approach is that it precludes a premature classification of  
the European constellation as heterarchical. Analysis of  the EU faces the same pitfall as the dis-
course about transnational constitutionalism in general. Sure enough, we can observe the presence  
of  legalization, citizen participation, and rights protection. Yet that is not sufficient to establish co-
equal status with the domestic constitution. As I have shown above, the crucial question is whether  
a transnational order embodies the higher law of  a genuine political union. Most arguments for a 
heterarchical understanding of  the European order disregard this point (see Introduction). Using 
the Bund concept will prevent us from making the same mistake.
The Ideal Typology
Let us summarize what has been established so far. A layered political structure that divides compet -
ences between units and center can take three forms: 1) It can be a federal state, which is a frame-
work through which a single people, spread across multiple geographical units, governs itself. Here 
the center is sovereign. 2) It can be an international organization that provides a means for states to 
cooperate with regard to a narrow purpose. Here the units are sovereign. 3) Or it can be a Bund,  
which is a constitutional union of  independent states, established to realize important shared goals. 
Here the question of  the ultimate decision remains open.
The political logic that underlies each ideal type is associated with particular institutional fea-
tures. As for the federal state and the international organization, these should be more or less famil -
iar. I recapitulate the distinction in order to bring the traits of  a Bund into sharper relief. Our dis -
cussion of  the latter will, to a significant degree, follow Schmitt. This raises an obvious question: can 
we draw from this author, given his problematic theoretical commitments?
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For Schmitt, as we have seen, the tension inherent to the heterarchical model is that both units 
and center can decide questions of  existential importance. This creates a latent potential for conflict, 
and hence, Schmitt believes, there must be consensus over the distinction between friend and en-
emy. If  political actors within the federation agree on this matter, the question as to which level is  
sovereign can be left open. Schmitt, it bears emphasis again, does not think that Bund citizens form 
a single nation – in fact, the point of  creating a shared order is to enable different peoples to remain  
distinct from each other. This, goes the argument, presupposes consensus over basic political values:  
a theocratic state, for example, could not federate with liberal and democratic republics. So far, it  
would be hard to disagree with Schmitt. More worrisome, though, he goes on to maintain that na -
tional “kinship” is the best guarantee that existential conflict does not arise. However, the same pas -
sage acknowledges that a federation might be homogeneous in other regards: its population could  
share the same “civilization” (a rather malleable criterion), religious views, or it might define itself  in  
class terms.61 The basic claim here is that a Bund cannot survive when a conflict among the member 
states becomes so intense that dissolution of  the union or even internal war seem adequate means  
to settle the matter. This, of  course, is more or less a truism. We can accept the point and still dis -
agree with Schmitt about the importance of  ethnic or cultural likeness for a stable and lasting feder-
ation.
One further problem, though, still remains: the constitution of  a state claims to be supreme 
over external norms, regardless of  whether an existential question is at stake or not. If  our goal is to  
use the idea of  the Bund to understand the European constellation, we must therefore consider how 
judges can enforce federal norms that stand in tension with the domestic higher law. That is pos-
sible, I submit, if  the Bund fulfills the same standard of  constitutionalism that governs public power  
at the unit level. Unlike in a “cosmopolitan pluralist” scenario, the fundamental order of  a heter-
61 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 388-396.
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archical federation has democratic sanction. With the decision to join the Bund, a member state 
people establishes the law of  the center as part of  its total constitution, together with the existing  
domestic order (see below). Hence the sole remaining question is whether both levels espouse the  
same fundamental principles of  legitimate rule. Insofar as that is the case, there is no unbridgeable 
tension between unit and center law. Should conflict arise over a particular question, it will be inter -
pretive disagreement, rather than a conflict about basic axioms. With regard to the European case,  
this means that a member state court should be able to recognize a federal measure, so long as the  
latter has been enacted in accordance with the rule of  law, democratic legislation, and basic rights 
protection. Domestic judges interpreting domestic law might still reach a different result, but en-
forcement of  the Union norm would not undermine the project of  constitutionalism as such.
Although Schmitt fails to address this particular dimension of  the heterarchical paradox, his ac-
count of  the Bund is still relevant for us. To be sure, the infamous advocate of  populist dictatorship 
has little concern for the principles of  liberal and democratic constitutionalism as we have defined  
them. Yet he responds to a more fundamental question: in what sense can the units of  a layered  
structure remain independent states, while also forming a genuine political union? As we have seen, 
the existence of  the latter is the conditio sine qua non for the proper realization of  the rule of  law, 
democratic legislation, and basic rights protection. Since Schmitt resolves the tension between inde-
pendent peoplehood and loyal participation in a federal scheme, we can glean from his discussion at  
least the basic contours of  how a genuine fundamental order beyond the state could look like. For  
this reason, the idea of  the Bund remains useful. However, we must go beyond Schmitt in some re -
spects. One point that requires further elucidation is the nature of  the federal collective referent. For 
Schmitt, a Bund is a union of  states, not of  citizens. Yet some theorists of  heterarchical federalism 
have argued that it contains both elements. Another question we need to grapple with is the rela-
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tionship of  individual citizens to the federal order, which Schmitt leaves unexamined. Below is an 
overview of  the classification scheme that I propose (Table 1). The following discussion will elabor-
ate on each typological dimension in turn.
Federal State Intl. Organization Bund
Legal basis Constitution Treaty Constitutional treaty
Permanence Yes No Yes
Amendment rule Majority Unanimous consent (Majority)
Jurisdiction Limited/ original Limited/ delegated Limited/ original
Supremacy Yes No Undecided
Direct effect Yes No Yes
Enforcement Yes No (Yes)
Citizenship Yes No Yes (tiered)




Subject of  intl. law Yes No Yes
Table 1: The Ideal Typology
Legal Basis
A federal state is founded on a constitution that prescribes a distribution of  competences between 
the central government and geographical units. Even so, the decision to establish the fundamental  
order is attributed to the constituent power of  a single people. The purpose of  the higher law is to  
enable this collective to pursue its common good. In contrast, an international organization is based  
on a treaty among states. This agreement does not establish a political union. Its goal is rather to 
empower the member states to cooperate insofar as each of  them has an interest to do so – com-
mon policies must therefore lead to a Pareto improvement.62
62 Pareto improvement is a concept in economics. It refers to a change in a given allocation of  goods that makes at 
least one actor better off, while making no one worse off.
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The legal basis of  a Bund is a “constitutional treaty”, or a hybrid between a constitution and an  
international agreement. Its contracting parties are peoples that retain an independent political exist-
ence but, at the same time, change their previous fundamental order. The resulting federal compact  
is the higher law of  the union; it also becomes part of  each member state constitution. 63 To enter 
such a federal compact is hence a decision that one must attribute to the constituent power of  the  
respective member state people. This act founds an overarching political union: a Bund is the refer-
ent of  a shared interest, whose pursuit goes beyond Pareto optimization. However, the exact nature  
of  this collective referent is disputed. Schmitt conceives of  the Bund as a union of  peoples; accord -
ing to him, there is no federal demos of  individuals. But other theorists believe that a heterarchical 
order is a union of  states and citizens. One author who favors such a bipartite understanding of  the 
federal subject is Habermas. Following Madison, he argues that a heterarchical system is based not  
just on the constituent power of  each member state people, but also on that of  the federal citizens 
who form an overarching demos.64 Of  course, this conception does not make a great practical dif-
ference with regard to the founding moment. If  all member state peoples agree to a federal com-
pact, it follows that a majority of  individual citizens support the decision to found a Bund. The dis -
agreement about the nature of  the federal subject is nonetheless significant – it leads to divergent 
views about democratic representation in the normal legislative process. We return to this point be-
low.
Permanence
The federal state is a political order aiming for permanence. Secession of  a unit is illegal, and when  
it occurs, it will often involve violent rebellion. Why is that an important feature of  the ideal type?  
63 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 385.
64 Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas, 62-69.
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The unlimited duration of  the state enables solidaristic redistribution among the units. Transfer of  
resources is considered to profit the whole, and present recipients can be expected to provide their  
share  in  the  future.  In  contrast,  an international  organization  permits  unilateral  termination  of  
membership. Since the regime has been created to pursue a specific overlapping interest, states can 
exit, if  participation is no longer useful to them. Here the Bund is distinct from the international or-
ganization because it represents a genuine political union. To be sure, the partial character of  the lat -
ter limits the extent of  possible redistribution. Yet in order to reach a better outcome for the whole,  
federal policies will often disregard the particular interests of  the units. A possible threat of  seces -
sion would undermine such an orientation toward the common good. Unilateral exit of  a member  
state is hence not foreseen.65
Amendment Rule
The constitution of  a federal state is amendable through popular decision, which means in practice  
a legislative vote or a referendum. Sometimes, there is a minimum number of  units that must vote in 
favor to pass a change. In contrast, amending the ground rules of  an international organization re -
quires unanimous consent among the member states. The rationale here is that a treaty does not cre -
ate a collective subject, which can henceforth make autonomous decisions. Rather each member 
state retains its full independence, and therefore all of  them have to sanction a change of  the initial  
agreement.
What kind of  amendment rule is suitable for a Bund? On the one hand, the federal compact es-
tablishes a political subject that can make autonomous decisions. But this collective is unable to ex-
ercise constituent power independent from the will of  the member state peoples. Since each do-
65 Schmitt,  Constitutional Theory, 385. Note that Schmitt does not explicitly mention the link between permanence 
and solidarity.
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mestic fundamental order changes along with that of  the Bund, all unit communities must consent 
to a significant reorganization of  the federal system. Yet note that even in a state, amending the  
higher law does not have to involve the constituent power of  the people. Schmitt, at least, holds that 
changes, which respect the applicable legal procedures, can be understood to result from the consti -
tuted power of  legislative organs.66 To be sure, gradual expansion of  central power via this route 
might transform a Bund into a state. Such a misuse of  the amendment mechanism has to be preven-
ted because it would negate the aspiration of  the unit peoples to determine the nature of  their polit -
ical existence.67 The aspects of  the federal order that define its heterarchical character should there-
fore be protected from amendment based on majority decision.
However, even with such a proviso in place, the problem is not quite resolved: could one not  
imagine amendments  that  leave political  form untouched,  but which are nonetheless  significant 
enough to implicate the exercise of  constituent power? For example, some consider the New Deal  
in 1930s America to represent a moment, during which the people itself  has updated the higher  
law.68 A fundamental change of  this kind would seem impermissible for a Bund, unless all member 
states consent to it, even despite the fact that a transformation of  the relationship between state and 
market need not affect the heterarchical character of  the federation. The crux here is that it would 
be rather difficult to rule out such a transformation through a formal limit on the use of  the regular  
amendment mechanism. This problem underlines the inherent challenge of  making good on the 
promise of  the Bund to uphold the independence of  its units. Success will depend in some measure  
on the readiness of  political actors to honor the commitment.
66 ———, Constitutional Theory, 150-158.
67 ———, Constitutional Theory, 402-403.
68 Bruce Ackerman, We the People. Foundations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 3-33. For Schmitt, 
in contrast, genuine decisions over the fundamental order are limited to the establishment of  a new form of  govern -
ment or accession to a Bund. See Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 75-77.
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Jurisdiction
In a federal state, the constitution distributes competences among units and center. This division of  
powers reflects a decision of  the people to design their fundamental order in a particular manner  
(and it can be revoked through a constitutional amendment). Since no external agent has bestowed  
it, the jurisdiction of  the federal government is original. The competence of  an international organ -
ization, in contrast, is delegated: the member states grant the organization powers over a narrow 
field, which it must not exceed. Since domestic law regulates the act of  conferral, the ratification 
statute and pertinent constitutional norms remain the ultimate measure for adjudicating possible 
conflict about the precise meaning of  the delegation. The mandate of  a Bund will be less circum -
scribed, although it will tend to be not as wide as that of  a federal state. Unlike the mission of  a typ -
ical international organization, the tasks of  the federation will often have a direct bearing on the sur -
vival of  each unit. The jurisdiction of  the center is moreover original. As we have seen, the right of  
the Bund to govern within the federal competence sphere derives from the constituent power of  the 
member state peoples. Disagreement regarding the precise extent of  this mandate can still arise. But 
the yardstick here is the federal compact; domestic norms are irrelevant to the question.69
Supremacy
The constitution of  a federal state is the supreme law of  the land. Its provisions always trump con-
flicting norms from the lower tiers of  governance, and so do acts of  the central government. The 
rules of  an international organization claim to stand in a similar relationship to domestic law, but  
member state courts will often not enforce them in case of  a collision, in particular when the latter 
involves constitutional norms. A Bund, in contrast, leaves the precise relationship between unit and  
69 Schmitt does not analyze the nature of  jurisdiction in a Bund. This ought not to surprise us, given that he does not  
consider the risk of  norm collision to be an important aspect of  the “federal antinomy.”
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center level open. While the federal order is, for practical reasons, often allowed to override local 
norms, an ultimate hierarchy does not exist.70 This becomes clear if  we bring to mind what it means 
that national constitution and federal compact make up equal parts of  the fundamental order within  
a member state. National high courts determine the meaning of  the former, yet their power does  
not extend to interpretation of  the latter. The federal compact rather establishes a separate judicial  
system. As the relationship between the orders is coequal, there is no institution that could reconcile  
conflicting appraisals of  the same situation, which might arise if  both levels claim jurisdiction.
Direct Effect
The central government of  a federal state can impose rights and obligations on individual citizens.  
In contrast, an international organization regulates the behavior of  governments. The absence of  an 
unmediated legal relationship between individuals and the regime limits the influence of  adjudica-
tion on legal evolution. Independent judicial norm creation would be problematic, because the ideal  
type prescribes that each member state assent to a common decision (see below). To the extent that  
courts develop norms, this principle is undermined. Hence the role of  judges must remain limited 
to dispute settlement among governments.  This  does not altogether rule out that a regime will 
evolve in a direction the principals have not foreseen. But when court access is restricted to govern -
ments, judges will less often have the chance to influence the content of  the law than in a situation 
where private actors have standing to litigate. A Bund, in contrast, abolishes the categorical distinc-
tion between internal and external norms. Uncontrolled legal evolution is therefore less of  a con-
cern. The judicial system of  the center has the same constitutional legitimation as its domestic coun-
terpart. In particular, the federal courts operate within a separation of  powers framework, which is 
70 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 397-399.
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designed to prevent excessive latitude in judicial lawmaking. Against this background, direct effect is 
unobjectionable and indeed crucial to effective discharge of  the federal mandate.71
Enforcement
A federal state monopolizes legitimate violence within its realm. The center has either direct control  
over the execution of  its policies, or it might supervise local government, whose compliance it can  
exact through force. An international organization, in contrast, does not have access to instruments  
of  coercion. It might be able to “shame” delinquent parties or impose penalties on them, but it can-
not use violence to assert its will. The Bund occupies a position in the middle. It needs to oversee 
the implementation of  federal policies within the units, and it requires means of  intervention to re -
act to violations.72 Yet, unlike a state, the Bund does not monopolize legitimate violence, since this 
would contradict the aspiration of  the units to remain independent outside the federal sphere. Each 
local  government therefore retains its own coercive potential.  This means that even though the 
member states commit to a permanent union that can punish rule violation, a measure of  doubt as 
to the effectiveness of  the shared order might linger. If  an existential question is at stake, a unit  
could decide to resist the center. Provided the former has enough wherewithal, such an attempt to 
dodge a federal obligation might succeed.
Citizenship
The constitution of  a federal state defines who is a citizen and establishes their basic rights and ob-
ligations. As we discussed earlier, the objective here is to guarantee equal civil, political, social, and 
economic freedom. Rights set forth in the higher law constrain both the federal government and the 
71 ———, Constitutional Theory, 398.
72 ———, Constitutional Theory, 387.
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unit authorities. Furthermore, the member states have to afford each citizen the same treatment, re -
gardless of  where in the federation she hails from. In contrast, there is no individual membership 
status within an international organization. Does it exist in a Bund? Schmitt leaves this question un-
examined. For him, the Bund is a union of  states; he does not address the issue of  citizenship. Yet  
Christoph Schönberger has shown that real world federations give member state nationals two char-
acteristic privileges: free movement and some degree of  equal treatment.73 What does this mean? 
Everyone can move to and reside in any place within the federal realm; there she partakes in at least  
some of  the rights and obligations that national citizens have. In other words, borders within the 
federation become porous. The precise meaning of  this aspiration will of  course be subject to dis -
pute. To what extent can the host government still impose conditions on newcomers from other  
member states? How far does equal treatment go – should it also include welfare entitlements or the 
right to vote and stand for office? Such questions concern what Schönberger refers to as the “hori -
zontal” aspect of  federal citizenship – the rights and obligations of  individuals against the member 
states. The “vertical” dimension is the relationship between the citizen and the Bund itself. Individu-
als require a legal guarantee that federal public power will respect and seek to promote civil, polit -
ical, social, and economic freedom. This, however, generates a peculiar tension. The enumerated 
powers of  the Bund limit its potential to realize the promise of  equal rights and opportunities for all 
citizens.  It  must leave enough freedom for the member state communities  to pursue their  own 
course toward this end within their respective sphere. But this means that federal citizens can never 
be quite equal, for each member state will establish a different set of  rights and obligations. The  
more the Bund seeks to harmonize, the less space each unit people has to express its own demo-
cratic preferences. Another riddle of  Bund citizenship is the nature of  its political aspect. Should 
73 Christoph  Schönberger,  "European  Citizenship  as  Federal  Citizenship.  Some  Lessons  from  Comparative 
Federalism," European Public Law Review 19, no. 1 (2007).
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representation at the federal level occur through member state governments? Or should individuals 
have a more direct voice? If, as we shall discuss in a moment, one adheres to the bipartite under -
standing of  the overarching subject, a mixture of  both would seem to be the right solution. But 
again, we have to keep in mind that empowering the federal citizen means reducing the collective  
freedom of  the member state peoples. In sum, then, one can think of  citizenship in a Bund as 
tiered. Each individual has a full set of  rights and obligations at the unit level, and there will be sig -
nificant variation regarding its precise content across the member states. On top of  this, the federa-
tion establishes a second tier of  citizenship, subdivided into horizontal liberties that individuals have 
against member states other than their own, and vertical liberties, which individuals have against the  
central  government.  Both bundles of  rights  contain just  a  subset  of  the comprehensive list  of  
freedoms that make up the privileges of  citizenship in a state.
Legislative Process
The legislative institution of  a federal  state is  a bicameral  parliament.  While the lower chamber 
speaks for the whole people, representation of  the units in the upper chamber ensures that political 
will formation takes into account local preferences. In contrast, an international organization legis-
lates through a conference of  the parties. As mentioned earlier, rules agreed here should make all  
member states better off. No government can therefore be obligated against its express will – the 
decision rule is unanimous consent.
The design of  the legislative process in a heterarchical federation depends on how its collective 
referent is understood. If, as Schmitt believes, the Bund is a union just of  states, its legislative organ 
must be a diet, which consists of  instructed delegates from the member state governments.74 Since 
consensus rule would impede the formulation of  policies based on the common good, decision  
74 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 400-401.
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making in such an institution will often be majoritarian. The purpose of  this setup is to determine a 
federal public interest, based on fair compromise among the member state preferences. Yet, as we 
noted, there is another view of  the Bund as a union of  both states and individuals. Similar to a fed -
eral state, legislative power must then be vested in a bicameral parliament. The diet becomes the up-
per chamber, whereas the lower chamber represents the overarching demos. Political will formation 
under this arrangement is supposed to mediate between the public interests of  the member state  
peoples and that of  the federal citizens.
There is disagreement in the literature, we should note, as to whether the second approach is  
still consistent with the heterarchical model. Murray Forsyth agrees with Schmitt that a Bund is fore-
most a union of  states. According to him, it cannot seek to represent a demos, although the latter 
might of  course emerge over time and claim institutional representation. But this process, Forsyth 
believes, amounts to a transformation into a federal state.75 Olivier Beaud, in contrast, holds that a 
Bund committed to democratic governance cannot but establish a federal parliament that gives a 
direct voice to individual citizens.76 His central example is the American case: the founders created 
an order that, at the outset, resembled a Bund more than a state, and which established a popular 
chamber at the federal level. To be sure, in the course of  its political development, the United States  
departed from the heterarchical model and established a sovereign center. Yet the initial constella -
tion lasted for almost eight decades, before the Civil War undid it.
Neither position in this debate is quite persuasive. Forsyth, as the American example suggests, 
is wrong to argue that a heterarchical system cannot, in principle, go together with a popular cham-
ber at the federal level. The creation of  such an institution is hence not tantamount to a transition 
from a Bund to a state. At the same time, Beaud is wrong that a federation committed to democratic  
75 Forsyth, Unions of  States. The Theory and Practice of  Confederation, 7.
76 Beaud, Théorie de la fédération, 380-384.
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governance must establish a popular chamber. At least in principle, we can imagine a diet scheme 
that derives its legitimation from democratic processes at the unit level. Such a constellation, to be 
sure, has little historical precedent. Past heterarchical federations that governed through diets alone 
were predemocratic (Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the German Bund of  1815) or, at best, pro-
todemocratic (the United States under the Articles of  Confederation). Nonetheless, Chapter 5 will  
argue that in the specific case of  the EU, it is both possible and desirable that a future Bund operate 
without a federal popular chamber.
Subject of  International Law
States are the main addressees of  international law and participate in making it. An international or-
ganization is likewise subject to treaties and custom, but it cannot author legal rules (at most, it 
provides a forum through which the member states generate them). The Bund, in contrast, has full  
international legal subjecthood – it represents the union against the external world insofar as the  
constitutional treaty so envisages. Yet the member states retain competence over the fields that re-
main outside the federal mandate, and therefore hold international legal subjecthood as well. 77 This 
distinguishes the units of  a heterarchical federation from regional and municipal organs within a  
state, which are neither direct addressees of  international law nor participate in making it.
The Epistemological Function of  the Ideal Typology
What do we gain from this classification scheme? And why this particular typology in the first place? 
There are of  course other ways of  telling apart layered political structures. For instance, one stand-
ard distinction in comparative political science is based on how fiscal authority and electoral control 
are distributed. The “unitary state” monopolizes fiscal resources and the people as a whole elects its 
77 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 396.
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leaders; in a “union”, the center has exclusive fiscal authority, but representatives of  the units make  
up the central government; a “federal state” divides fiscal authority and electoral control; the “con-
federation” remains in both aspects dependent on the units.78 Further definitions and categories 
abound. The crucial point here is that no such scheme is “right” in general. We should rather evalu-
ate the different approaches relative to their stated analytical purpose.
Our eventual goal is to address a problem of  constitutional theory: what is the proper relation-
ship between domestic and European norms? The suggested typology is adequate to examine this 
question. Monism, dualism, and pluralism exhaust the range of  possible answers: in a layered struc-
ture, unit law may either be subordinate to center law, the reverse may be the case, or the relation -
ship is  coequal.79 This chapter has suggested that each relationship corresponds to a respective 
political form: state, international  organization,  or Bund. Which ideal  type fits a given structure  
ought to determine the relationship between unit and center norms.
But why should empirical match with a theoretical construct lead to such a conclusion? To 
make this plausible, I have to elaborate on how the notion of  an ideal type is used here. Max Weber  
developed the concept for application in empirical sociology. He proposed to arrange concrete indi -
vidual phenomena into a unified analytical construct, making relevant similarities among them evid-
ent. For him, the ultimate goal of  ideal type formation is to describe a context, in which certain ac -
tions make sense, while others do not. This allows the scientific observer to understand social phe-
nomena. For example, in a setting where the “Protestant ethic” is prevalent, individuals will consider  
it rational to defer consumption and to save. According to Weber, the advent of  this mindset in the  
wake of  the Reformation accounts for the emergence of  capitalism. The concept of  the Protestant 
78 Pablo Beramendi, "Federalism," in  The Oxford Handbook of  Comparative Politics,  ed. Charles Boix and Susan 
Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
79 It might be objected that, instead of  discrete categories, one could imagine a continuum between centralization and 
decentralization. But this notion is unhelpful for doctrinal purposes. A continuous scale has an infinite number of  
points, and hence it cannot provide much specific guidance concerning the relationship of  unit and center law.
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ethic is an ideal type. Its explanatory power does not stem from the fact that all or most people in  
early modern Europe subscribed to precisely the same ethical system. The idea rather emphasizes 
certain shared aspects of  the prevalent value orientations, which are germane to understanding the 
capitalist transformation.80
However, we are not engaged in sociological explanation – our question is normative: how 
should one construe the relationship between unit and center norms in a given layered structure?  
The Weberian notion of  contexts of  meaningful action, though conceived for the purpose of  em-
pirical investigation, can help us to disentangle this puzzle as well: state, international organization,  
and Bund each have an underlying political logic, which makes it appropriate for courts at the unit  
level to deal with the legal system of  the center in a particular manner. For us, then, the point of  
drawing up a classification scheme is not to understand how judges behave in fact, but rather to de -
termine which doctrinal stance would be appropriate from a theoretical standpoint.
Of  course, the conceptual matrix we have developed to address this question is not neutral: it 
derives from what I call here the liberal and democratic reading of  the classical paradigm – a specific 
philosophical account of  constitutionalism. The chapter has furthermore argued for the unortho-
dox position that within this framework, it is possible to conceive of  a heterarchical system that 
leaves the question of  the ultimate decision open. One might reject this claim or adhere to a differ -
ent understanding of  constitutionalism altogether. But if  the chapter has succeeded in developing a 
plausible ontology of  layered political structures, the puzzle becomes an empirical one: which ideal 
type fits the structure under investigation? Sometimes, this will not be obvious because the system in 
question is a hybrid. When that is the case, ideal types can turn into polemical weapons that inter -
ested parties use to advance their preferred reading of  the status quo. All we can then do is to evalu -
80 Oswald Schwemmer, "Idealtypus," in  Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, ed. Jürgen Mittelstrass 
(Mannheim: J.B. Metzler, 1984).
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ate which camp has the better of  the dispute. Yet it might be that a clear answer is not possible. The  
EU poses such an intractable conundrum, or so the next chapter will argue. But this does not make 
our classification scheme useless. Rather it points to a state of  crisis. But let us not get ahead of  the 
story.
Chapter 2
The Hybrid Status Quo
What is the political form of  the EU? A plain reading of  its foundational documents does not lead  
to an immediate answer. Consider Art. 1 TEU: “By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties estab-
lish among themselves a European Union […] on which the Member States confer competences to 
attain objectives they have in common.” So far, there is nothing that points to the existence of  an  
federal constitution. “High contracting parties” – a term characteristic of  international treaties – en-
acted the agreement in order to delegate certain powers to a designated agent. Yet the text then 
continues in language that is reminiscent of  the US constitution: the treaty, we learn, “marks a new 
stage in the process of  creating an ever closer union among the peoples of  Europe.” This formula-
tion might well be understood to suggest the existence of  a Bund or even of  a federal state.
Pointing out the sui generis character of  integration does nothing to resolve the puzzle. The 
status quo must fit somewhere into the classification scheme from the previous chapter. As we have  
seen, this analytical framework exhausts the set of  possible constitutional relationships within a 
layered political structure. The following analysis will therefore use the proposed threefold heuristic 
to assess the present European system. I conclude that a straightforward classification remains elu-
sive. The EU, it should be obvious, is not a federal state. But whether the current institutional struc -
ture fits the international organization or the Bund model is a more complex issue. The 1957 Rome 
Treaty created a regime that approximated the former in most respects. What is more, politicians or  
voters rejected several explicit proposals to establish a federal system. Nonetheless, over time, a 
gradual process of  evolution and reform created a framework that resembles a Bund up to a point.  
Some features of  the EU, though, still cohere with the international organization model. In sum,  
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the continent has made important steps toward heterarchical federalism, but the present constella-
tion remains a hybrid.
The Status Quo and its Evolution
Our main focus is on the EU after Lisbon. But given the mixed character of  the status quo, it will  
be useful to consider the history of  integration as well: does it show an unequivocal, if  still incom-
plete movement from one ideal type to another? It will become clear that even here, the evidence is  
ambiguous. While the EU has evolved to match the Bund model in certain respects, some more re-
cent institutional changes hark back to its roots in the sphere of  international relations. To assess  
the present constellation and, where relevant, its historical evolution, let us consider each dimension 
of  our classification scheme in turn.
Legal Basis
The EU is based on the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of  
the European Union (TFEU).1 This body of  “primary law” is the result of  a standard treaty making 
procedure. National governments negotiated its content; once agreement had been reached, the 
outcome was ratified in each member state. To be sure, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe (TCE) of  2004 deviated somewhat from this pattern: a transnational convention worked 
1 This legal framework has emerged through a complex process. In 1957, the Rome Treaty established the European  
Economic Community (EEC), whose internal market regulation became the centerpiece of  the integration project.  
At the same time, the original six member states created the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). 
Six years earlier, the history of  integration had begun with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The  
three Communities later merged their institutions. In 1986, the first major amendment of  the treaties took place: the 
Single European Act (SEA). Under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (the TEU), the European Communities became the  
first pillar of  the newly created EU; its second pillar was Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), and its third pillar the  
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Both JHA and CFSP built on previous cooperation outside the Com-
munity framework. Maastricht also renamed the EEC as European Community (EC). The TEU and the treaties pre-
ceding it were amended further at Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001). In 2004, the member states signed the TCE,  
which consolidated European primary law into one document. Ratification failed, however. The Lisbon reform of  
2007 retained the old multipronged structure. It amended the TEU and the EC Treaty, which became the TFEU (the 
ECSC Treaty had expired in 2002; EURATOM remains a separate organization).
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out a draft text and then submitted it to an intergovernmental conference tasked with the negoti-
ation of  the final document. Yet, after ratification had failed, the member states reverted to the old 
way of  doing things when negotiating the Lisbon Treaty. This genesis implies that the EU does not  
have a constitution in the same manner a state does. But its treaty framework might still represent a 
federal compact in the Schmittian sense. We should hence ask if  one can ascribe to the member 
state peoples a decision to join a Bund. To answer this question, one must know what it means that  
participation in a federal union has popular sanction at the unit level.2 In the previous chapter, I 
have suggested that a legal regime is founded on constituent power, if  there has either been a genu-
ine democratic founding, or if  citizens have, over time, come to accept the order in question as their 
legitimate higher law. Hence a federal compact might result from an explicit constitution making 
process, in which a foundational document is proposed for ratification in each member state, be it 
through a legislative vote, a popular referendum, or a national convention (Chapter 6 will examine 
the relative merits of  these options). But one can also imagine a process of  gradual evolution. Cit -
izens might over time adopt the view that an erstwhile international order has become a federal sys -
tem.
The EU, it should be evident, did not have a “constitutional moment” of  the first kind, for the  
member state peoples never adopted a formal federal compact. National parliaments, to be sure, 
have ratified each successive amendment of  the treaties. But these were understood as international  
agreements – there was no public declaration of  constitutional significance. John Erik Fossum and 
Agustin Menéndez nonetheless believe that a founding of  sorts took place.3 According to them, the 
1957 Rome Treaty marked a “synthetic constitutional moment.” The original six member states,  
goes the argument, rejected the immediate creation of  a federal system. Instead, national leaders en-
2 Schmitt himself  does not consider this question.
3 John Erik Fossum and Agustin Menéndez, The Constitution's Gift (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 78-85.
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visaged the piecemeal development of  a common fundamental order. Their objective, Fossum and 
Menéndez claim, was a gradual merger of  the domestic constitutions into a European higher law, or 
at least the Rome Treaty “struggled to express” this idea. What is more, the project of  synthesis had  
indirect popular authorization, insofar as five of  the six national founding texts included clauses  
that opened the respective state toward European integration.4
How persuasive is this account? From a historical perspective, the notion of  a synthetic consti -
tutional moment is rather fanciful. The authors provide no direct evidence of  their assertion that 
participants in the negotiations leading to the Rome Treaty wanted to fuse domestic norms into a  
shared fundamental order.5 But what about the anticipation of  the integration process in domestic 
higher law? There is no doubt that greater European cooperation was an issue of  the greatest im-
portance for the postwar generation. The first half  of  the 20 th century witnessed the most violent 
conflict in history, and unrestrained Westfalian sovereignty had been a structural cause. Against this 
background, the new constitutions of  European states permitted and encouraged the transfer of  
competences to international organizations. The existence of  such provisions, however, does not 
establish that national founders intended to build a shared fundamental order for the continent. As 
Peter Lindseth has shown in a recent book, the relevant clauses are better interpreted to envisage 
4 Fossum and Menéndez refer to provisions that allow the government to transfer sovereign powers to international  
organizations. Some of  these clauses make an explicit reference to the goal of  peace on the continent. But no do -
mestic constitution envisages a European fundamental order in so many words.
5 Even as description of  what happened after 1957,  the notion of  synthesis is  problematic. One might consider  
European law to build on member state traditions of  balancing individual rights with each other and the public in -
terest. Yet in how far a combination of  these disparate bodies of  law has in fact taken place, or is even possible, re-
mains questionable. Hence the authors must argue that synthesis is about drawing the “best reasons” from the over-
all doctrine pool. See Fossum and Menéndez, The Constitution's Gift, 172. This presupposes an epistemological as-
sumption that genuine and reasonable disagreement over rights does not occur, or at least not often. From such a  
perspective, constitutional jurisprudence aims for a progressive movement toward the most rational pacification of  
social conflict. For understandable reasons, this view is popular among scholars of  jurisprudence. Yet in rights dis -
pute, a single best answer remains often elusive – which solution to adopt is then not simply a matter of  legal ration -
ality, but a political question, to which different communities will find different solutions. Insofar as the ECJ makes 
these  decisions,  domestic  higher  law  is  replaced,  and  not  in  some  alchemical  way  preserved  (see  Chapter  3). 
Moreover, we should note that a constitution does not just serve to protect rights. It also establishes an institutional  
framework for the exercise of  public power. Regarding this aspect, Fossum and Menéndez concede that it would be 
misleading to describe the European system as the product of  a synthesis. See ———, The Constitution's Gift, 53.
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“administrative governance” beyond the state. This, at least, is how most of  the 1957 drafters un -
derstood their mandate.6
What does the notion of  administrative governance entail? Lindseth notes that in the 20 th cen-
tury, the ideal of  parliament enacting all important political decisions through general legislation 
turned out to be impracticable. Increased functional demands on the state motivated the delegation 
of  power to regulatory agencies, which needed significant independence to fulfill their task. This, in 
turn, led to a new constellation of  public law that he refers to as the “administrative governance set-
tlement.” Under this framework, executive oversight and, less often, parliamentary intervention en-
sure that bureaucrats remain accountable to elected leaders. In addition, judicial review prevents 
transgression of  the delegation mandate and violation of  individual rights.7 According to Lindseth, 
the European Communities represented a transnational manifestation of  this new paradigm. The 
new regime was created, because the member state governments believed that experts (meaning the  
Commission) should make enforceable regulation to promote economic growth across the contin-
ent. One underlying motivation for this project was to build a stable peace that was expected to res -
ult from commercial integration. How did the drafters of  the Rome Treaty plan to get there? Ac-
cording to Lindseth, the answer was intelligent administration, not a federal constitution. Of  course, 
it is up for debate whether the subsequent progress of  integration did in fact follow a path of  bur -
eaucratic  delegation.  Lindseth  believes  this  has  been  the  case:  the  administrative  governance 
paradigm, he argues, remains the best framework to understand the EU, and future reform should 
begin from this insight. Here I disagree with him (see Chapter 4). But for now, the crucial point is  
that it would be false to see 1957 as a moment of  constitutional founding.
6 Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy, 107-120.
7 ———, Power and Legitimacy, 61-90.
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If  that is so, we still need to examine whether European citizens have, over time, come to think 
of  the Union order as their shared higher law. The answer to this question is rather straightforward.  
When faced with a choice, voters and elected leaders have time and again rejected the idea of  a  
transnational constitution. Ingolf  Pernice counts three attempts to establish an explicit higher law 
for the EU.8 None of  these efforts aimed to create a single European Leviathan. Rather the pro-
posal was to establish a federal compact among states, which retain an independent political exist-
ence. But the undertaking failed each time. In 1984, Altiero Spinelli prepared a constitutional draft  
for the Parliament, but it could not garner enough political support. The member states instead 
chose to adopt the Single European Act (SEA), which remained within the symbolic framework of  
international law. Ten years later, the Parliament submitted the Herman Report, another constitu-
tional blueprint. Yet, once more, the member states ignored the proposal and negotiated the Ams -
terdam Treaty. The furthest advance came with the TCE, which the heads of  government signed in  
2004. A new drafting method as well as form and content of  the document signaled that it was 
again time to take a stand on the nature of  the European legal order. Sixteen national parliaments  
and referendums in Spain and Luxembourg confirmed the document, but Dutch and French voters 
rejected it, and the ratification effort was then abandoned. While the subsequent Lisbon reform 
kept most of  the envisaged institutional changes, it returned to the symbolism of  international law.
In sum, the European order neither had a constitutional moment at the outset, nor have mem-
ber state citizens recognized it as their shared higher law over time. Pernice, I should mention, does 
not agree with the latter half  of  this conclusion.  For him, the failure of  the TCE was a close  
enough miss to warrant treating European norms as proper higher law:
“the very process of  drafting a Constitution in a manner as open as that of  the Convention, the [...]  
debating  of  ratification in  national  parliaments  and referenda,  and [...]  reflecting  upon the  con -
8 Pernice, "The Treaty of  Lisbon. Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action," 354-359.
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sequences of  the rejection of  the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of  Lisbon, has raised public  
awareness, stimulated discourse, and formed minds about the Union, its institutional framework, its 
powers, and its goals.”9
That is without doubt true. But the fact remains that Dutch and French voters rejected the TCE, or  
at least considered its fate less important than showing dissatisfaction with their national leaders.  
What is more, referendums scheduled in Ireland and the UK were expected to yield similar out -
comes. One should also note that most successful ratifications occurred through a simple legislative 
vote, which raises the question if  the support of  the political class alone is sufficient to make a de -
cision of  such fundamental importance (see Chapter 6). Against this background, it would be inap-
propriate to characterize EU membership as resting on constituent power at the unit level – the cur-
rent legal framework remains an international agreement; it does not represent a federal compact.
Permanence
Art. 50 TEU guarantees a right of  unilateral exit. Member states that wish to leave must inform the  
European Council. The next step is negotiation of  a termination agreement, which defines the fu -
ture relationship between the state seeking to withdraw and the EU. Both parties have to accept this  
agreement, but if  no deal has been struck until two years after the initial request, the treaties cease 
to bind the state in question. This set of  rules is an innovation of  the Lisbon reform. Before 2009,  
most legal scholars believed that unilateral exit would be prohibited in more or less all conceivable  
scenarios.10 The new regime upends this doctrinal position. Some authors, to be sure, consider the 
obligation to negotiate withdrawal conditions as proof  that national governments lack sovereign 
9 ———, "The Treaty of  Lisbon. Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action," 359. Jürgen Habermas, it seems, shares this 
viewpoint.  He wants to undertake a “rational reconstruction” of  the integration process, so as to lend credence to 
the idea that European law has a foundation in constituent power. See Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas, 61.
10 Phoebus Athanassiou, "Withdrawal from the EU and EMU. Some Reflections," in  European Central Bank Legal  
Working Paper Series (Frankfurt: European Central Bank, 2009), 18-22.
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control over their membership status.11 But this argument, I submit, is a somewhat disingenuous at-
tempt to save the idea that European law is a proper constitution in all significant respects. The fact  
that after two years, exit negotiations end with automatic termination of  membership means that, in 
effect, member states face no real legal obstacle to withdrawal. In this regard, the EU fits the inter -
national organization model.
Still, it might be objected that leaving the EU is a rather unrealistic prospect, so that Art. 50 has 
little practical meaning. The political cost of  withdrawal is without doubt considerable. Nonetheless,  
there are several member states where euroskeptic forces, some of  which advocate wholesale exit,  
have gained significant clout.12 Against this background, scholars have argued that a threat of  with-
drawal might be realistic enough to influence the dynamic of  intergovernmental negotiation within 
the Union decision making process. If  this were true, the new Art. 50 would make it more difficult  
the European common interest against the preferences of  individual member states.13 But even if  
that is not the case, there remains the symbolic dimension of  the exit clause, which underlines that 
integration has not yet created a genuine federal system.
Amendment Rule
Changing the European treaties requires the unanimous agreement of  the member states.14 Na-
tional  governments,  the  Commission,  and the Parliament  have the  right  to propose a revision. 
Minor changes that do not increase EU competence can pass through a consensus vote in the 
European Council. To implement more significant amendments, the member states can either es-
tablish a convention (similar in design to the precedent of  2002) that will draft the terms of  refer-
11 See for example Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas, 71.
12 Thomas Oberkirch and Joachim Schild, "Wachsender Euroskeptizismus. Anatomie eines Phänomens," in Working 
Papers on European Integration (Trier: Universität Trier, 2010).
13 Susanne Lechner and Renate Ohr, "The Right of  Withdrawal in the Treaty of  Lisbon. A Game Theoretic Reflection 
on Different Decision Processes in the EU," European Journal of  Law and Economics  (forthcoming).
14 Art. 48 TEU.
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ence for a subsequent intergovernmental conference or call for the latter without a prior conven-
tion. In both cases each national government has to endorse the amended legal text before ratifica -
tion procedures begin at the domestic level. This categorical requirement of  unanimous consent re-
mains unchanged since 1957; it fits the international organization model.
Jurisdiction
The powers of  the EU are enumerated – it can act where the member states have delegated such 
competence to it.15 One can distinguish between its remit of  internal governance and the mandate 
to formulate a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Let us begin with the former aspect. 
Here the EU has three main goals.16 First, it seeks to establish an internal market, based on the free 
movement of  goods, services, capital, and labor (this objective shall not come at the expense of  so-
cial, cultural, and environmental interests). Second, the EU will pursue an economic and monetary 
union. Third, it aspires to create an “area of  freedom, security, and justice”, based on the abolition  
of  internal frontiers, an external border regime, and cooperation in law enforcement. To realize  
these goals, the EU has exclusive, shared, and supporting competences. Powers in the first group 
are narrow and specific:  Brussels governs customs regulation, competition rules of  the internal  
market, monetary policy for the Eurozone, marine conservation, and trade policy.17 Competences 
of  the second kind are held concurrent with the member states. The powers in this group serve 
foremost the internal market, or, in other words, the twin goals of  eliminating hindrances to cross -
border economic interaction and regulating it in line with the public interest. Further shared com-
petences include the common agricultural policy (CAP), the promotion of  regional development, 
energy governance, and the field of  judicial and police cooperation.18 An important question here is 
15 Art. 5 TEU.
16 Art. 3 TEU.
17 Art. 3 TFEU.
18 Art. 4 TFEU.
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when the EU can exercise a concurrent power, and when it must leave the field to national regula -
tion. The principle of  subsidiarity provides the answer. Since the broad objectives of  integration of -
ten permit a wide reading of  Union competence, the legislative organs have been obliged to explain 
why a particular issue requires a common solution. Brussels should act if  the member states cannot  
achieve a particular objective to a sufficient extent, and if  joint regulation is expected to fare much  
better.19 Consider last the supporting competences. Powers in this group cover a wide range of  is -
sue areas. The EU, however, cannot use them to make law; its role is rather limited to advice and co-
ordination. In particular, Brussels has the right to issue guidelines for harmonizing economic gov-
ernance, employment rules and social policies within the Eurozone countries20
One notable characteristic of  EU jurisdiction is the option of  selective exit. Several member 
states have negotiated to remain exempt from certain aspects of  the treaties. The most important 
example  is the permanent waiver of  the obligation to adopt the Euro for Denmark, Sweden, and 
the UK.21 As a consequence of  the ongoing debt crisis, this integration gap has widened further. To 
begin with, the Eurozone countries had to set up a bailout fund to prevent that governments must  
default on their obligations.22 A second pillar of  the crisis response has been to strengthen the com-
mitment of  national governments to the budget deficit limit and maximum permissible debt level 
set forth in the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).23 To accomplish greater spending discipline, 
the member states, with the exception of  the Czech Republic and the UK, adopted the Fiscal Com -
19 Art. 5 TEU.
20 Art.  5-6  TFEU. Further  areas  of  supporting  competence  include:  “(a)  protection and improvement  of  human 
health; (b) industry; (c) culture; (d) tourism; (e) education, vocational training, youth and sport; (f) civil protection; (g) 
administrative cooperation.”
21 Seven further countries have not yet introduced the Euro, but must join when meeting the criteria for accession. 
Further opt outs include the following: Ireland and the UK are not obliged to participate in police and judicial co-
operation and remain outside the Schengen agreement to abolish border controls within the EU; Denmark has with-
drawn from defense cooperation; Poland and the UK have not ratified the Charter of  Fundamental Rights.
22 The permanent rescue fund is known as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which can provide loan guaran-
tees up to €500 billion. It will begin operations in 2013. The ESM is not an official EU institution, but the TFEU has 
been amended to permit its establishment (Art. 136 TFEU).
23 The SGP is laid down in Art. 121 TFEU, Art. 126 TFEU, and Protocol No. 12 on the excessive deficit procedure.
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pact.24 This agreement strengthens the hand of  Brussels in an “excessive deficit procedure” against 
a delinquent government and requires the signatories to enshrine a balanced budget rule in the do-
mestic constitution. Furthermore, a large number of  member states joined the so called Euro Plus 
Pact.25 This instrument makes use of  the Open Method of  Coordination (OMC), whose purpose is 
to align national policies in fields that do not fall under the mandate set forth in the treaties.26 The 
Pact stipulates that governments will negotiate benchmarks with regard to labor market policies, 
education and research, financial regulation, social insurance, and taxation. National legislation will  
then seek to implement the agreed upon criteria. The new regime aims foremost to address the  
problem of  disparate policies within the monetary union, which has been identified as one import-
ant cause of  the present crisis. Six member states outside the Eurozone participate as well; the UK,  
Sweden, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have not joined the Pact, though. One striking aspect of  
the new mechanism is of  course the sweeping breadth of  its mandate, which intrudes on fields long 
seen as vital to member state independence. Another crucial feature is that it stands outside the reg -
ular framework of  Union lawmaking and enforcement. We shall return to this point below.
Insofar as its mandate of  internal governance requires external action, the EU represents the 
member states on the international stage. Brussels also coordinates the overall foreign and security  
policy of  the member states.27 CFSP, as this regime is known, has a separate procedural framework, 
distinct from the normal legislative process (which I describe below). The national heads of  state or  
government establish broad strategic guidelines. On this basis, the Council decides on joint action 
or a common position of  the member states. The voting rule at both stages is unanimous consent.  
24 The Fiscal Compact is a regular international agreement outside the framework of  the European treaties. Nonethe-
less, Union organs, in particular the Commission and the ECJ, will participate in the implementation of  the new 
rules. The Compact will enter into force in 2013.
25 See European Council Conclusions, 24/25 March 2011.
26 The OMC was introduced in 2000, and it has since been applied within the fields of  employment, social policy, and 
health. For an overview see Luc Tholoniat, "The Career of  the Open Method of  Coordination. Lessons from a  
'Soft' EU Instrument," West European Politics 33, no. 1 (2010).
27 Art. 23-41 TEU.
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But there is also an element of  supranational leadership. A High Representative chairs deliberation 
in the Council, speaks on behalf  of  the EU where a common stance has been agreed upon, and 
presides over a transnational diplomatic service. The substantive reach of  this coordination is wide:  
the EU is supposed to act whenever a shared interest is at stake. CFSP has even a defense arm. The 
member states coordinate development of  their military capabilities (on a voluntary basis), and the  
Council can initiate armed missions, using earmarked national force contingents.
Does the limited jurisdiction of  the EU fit the international organization or the Bund model?  
We have seen that scholars and practitioners disagree on whether Union competence is delegated or  
original. Some national high courts believe that it remains subject to construction under domestic 
higher law, whereas the academic mainstream holds that European norms delimit their own sphere.  
In light of  the fact that no constituent act invested Brussels with supreme power over its sphere of  
competence, the former position can at first sight appear more plausible. But we should note that  
since the beginning with joint coal and steel regulation, the substantive ambit of  integration has be -
come vast. This, in turn, implies that it makes little practical sense to conceive of  Union power as  
the delegated mandate of  an international organization – given the wide jurisdiction of  the EU, do-
mestic courts are no longer able to enforce the terms of  conferral (see Chapter 3).
The expansion of  transnational competence has been a unidirectional and permanent develop-
ment. Each amendment of  the treaties gave Brussels a stronger grip over economic regulation. 
What is more, the makeshift character of  the most recent crisis responses forebodes another signi -
ficant integration push, when the inevitable successor of  the Lisbon Treaty is negotiated. Police and  
judicial cooperation has likewise seen continuous growth since the outset in 1975.28 It now com-
prises border control and immigration policies, concerted efforts against organized crime and ter -
28 Police and judicial cooperation began with TREVI – an intergovernmental forum outside the Community frame-
work, which sought to coordinate terrorism and crime policing. The Maastricht Treaty turned this regime into the 
JHA pillar of  the EU.
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rorism, as well as significant collaboration among national law enforcement or judicial bodies. Even 
CFSP has expanded over time, despite the undeniable centrifugal forces that militate against its suc-
cess. To be sure, decision making under the current regime still has the intergovernmental character 
of  the first coordination mechanism set up in 1970.29 But the creation of  the High Representative, 
who disposes of  an ever growing bureaucratic apparatus, has lent greater momentum to finding a 
shared voice on the international stage.
This inexorable jurisdictional expansion has made the EU quite different from a standard inter -
national organization. The reason is not just the sheer number of  Union competences. In the previ-
ous chapter, we have noted that a central purpose of  federalism is to ensure the survival of  each 
member state. The EU is now vital in this regard: the chances for sustained economic growth hinge 
on effective administration of  the internal market and the monetary union, police and judicial co -
operation is essential to internal order, and CFSP is responsible for the geopolitical posture of  the  
continent. To be sure, one can debate the extent of  European control over each domain. In particu-
lar, does Brussels limit national independence when the decision rule is consensus? Regardless of  
the answer, the overall substantive reach of  the EU is consistent with the Bund model.
Supremacy
Whether the domestic constitution, European law, or neither should be understood as supreme is 
the puzzle, from which our investigation took off. Hence it will not be a surprise that primary law  
does not provide a clear solution. In the Costa judgment of  1964, the ECJ asserted that European 
norms supersede conflicting national law, including constitutional norms.30 This ruling complemen-
ted the Van Gend en Loos case, which established their direct effect. I will discuss the impact of  
29 The Maastricht Treaty established CFSP as the third EU pillar. Before 1993, the member states coordinated their 
foreign and security policy through the informal European Political Cooperation mechanism.
30 ECJ case 6/64.
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this judicial revolution in a moment. But for now, let us observe that until the Lisbon reform, the  
supremacy doctrine had no textual basis. Even the TCE fell short of  an unambiguous codification.  
Rather it stated that European law has “primacy” over domestic norms within its realm of  applica-
tion.31 This of  course skirts the issue, as it leaves open who draws the line between domestic and  
European law. Whatever the precise meaning of  the provision, it never entered into force. At Lis-
bon, the member states took an even more guarded approach, relegating the new language to a de -
claration in the unbinding annex.32 The treaties, we must conclude, offer just as little textual guid-
ance on the problem of  the ultimate decision as domestic constitutional law (see Introduction).
Direct Effect
European law has direct effect in member state courts: private legal actors can seek to enforce the  
treaties and secondary legislation, if  the norms in question meet certain requirements. Courts in the  
member states rule on these claims, but when the meaning of  European law is unclear, national  
judges must consult the ECJ via the “preliminary reference mechanism.”33
The Luxembourg court invented the principle of  direct effect in the  Van Gend en Loos de-
cision of  1963.34 It, too, had no textual basis in the Rome Treaty (nor was it codified in a sub-
sequent amendment). The ECJ instead put forward a teleological argument: the internal market has  
a better chance of  realization, if  private actors can make use of  transnational norms in domestic  
courts. Combined with the supremacy doctrine, the assertion of  direct effect marked a fundamental 
change in the working of  the European order: treaties and secondary legislation turned from a dip-
lomatic commitment into enforceable law. This judicial revolution is often claimed to have estab-
lished a transnational constitution. It would, however, be more accurate to think of  it as a sweeping 
31 Art. I-6 TCE.
32 Declaration No. 17 Concerning Primacy, annexed to the Treaty of  Lisbon.
33 The procedure is laid down in Art. 267 TFEU.
34 ECJ case 26/62.
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legalization of  European governance. Public power in the member states became subject to an ad-
ditional set of  binding rules, which are subject to neutral interpretation and enforcement. But such 
legalization alone does not yet make a genuine constitution, or so I have argued in the previous  
chapter. Nonetheless, the significance of  the ECJ jurisprudence from the 1960s cannot be over-
stated. It amplified the impact of  the European order far beyond what the architects of  the Rome 
Treaty had imagined. Countless private actors came to monitor compliance and to seek an interpret-
ation of  the law that suits their preference. If  standing to litigate were confined to governments and 
Union organs, transnational norms would be much less consequential.
This increase of  effectiveness, we should note, brought with it a much greater role for judges. 
The never ebbing stream of  references from domestic courts enables the ECJ to address numerous  
questions that treaties or secondary legislation have left open. Thus it has become an important  
source of  “political” decisions, alongside Commission, Parliament, and Council. Such an empower -
ment of  the judicial branch stands in tension with the international organization model, for it disen-
franchises the member state principals. The Bund model, in contrast, permits a strong federal court 
system, because here judicial norm making can occur within a proper separation of  powers frame-
work. Is that rationale available to legitimate the powerful role of  the Luxembourg court? The next 
chapter will raise significant doubts in this regard. But justified or not, direct effect is part of  the  
European status quo. On this dimension, the latter fits the ideal type of  heterarchical federalism.
Enforcement
The EU does not wield means of  violence to enforce its policies. Despite this, the record of  mem-
ber state compliance is better than even in the German federal system, let alone the WTO – a clas-
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sical international organization.35 One main reason is that domestic courts do most of  the enforce-
ment work. The bulk of  European litigation pits individuals against member states. This kind of  
lawsuit is brought at the domestic level first. The ECJ will not be involved until a national judge de -
mands a clarification of  European law. We shall return to the motivation of  domestic courts to em -
brace this role as executor of  the Luxembourg tribunal. The important point here is that member  
state compliance is to a large extent a result of  the fact that national governments will be reluctant  
to disregard instructions from their own court system. But we should also note that compliance is  
high for disputes where the ECJ has original jurisdiction. National governments almost never sue  
each other for a violation of  European law, but the Commission often brings infringement cases 
against member states. Of  course, the EU has no physical means to coerce a government to imple-
ment the ruling in such a lawsuit. But since the Maastricht Treaty, the ECJ can fine a member state  
that ignores a decision.36 Continued refusal to implement the law or failure to remit the fine might  
jeopardize EU membership in good standing – a cost that, up to now, no government has been will-
ing to incur.
This enforcement regime would appear to locate the status quo in the Bund rubric. Yet it is im-
portant to emphasize that some European rules are not subject to ECJ jurisdiction. This holds true 
in particular for the SGP, the Fiscal Compact, and OMC instruments such as the Euro Plus Pact. 37 
In the case of  the SGP and the Fiscal Compact, rule violation can lead to public censure or a fine. 
But this decision is reserved for the Council, which has so far been hesitant to use its power – the 
political cost of  punishing a peer government has proven too high.38 It remains to be seen whether 
35 Michael Zürn, "Introduction. Law and Compliance at Different Levels," in  Law and Governance in Postnational  
Europe, ed. Michael Zürn and Christian Joerges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
36 Art. 260 TFEU.
37 CFSP, too, is for the most part beyond ECJ jurisdiction (Art. 24 TEU).
38 France and Germany breached the SGP criteria several years in a row, without sanction. Proceedings against Por -
tugal (2002) and Greece (2005) took place, but they did not lead to fines. In 2009, it turned out that Greece had ma -
nipulated data to prove its compliance. Perhaps implementation of  the SGP will be more effective in the future: 
since 2011, the decision on sanctions is subject to “reverse QMV.” If  the Commission recommends a fine, a quali -
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the member states will heed their assurances to be more vigilant regarding enforcement in the fu -
ture. The Euro Plus Pact has even less teeth. Here the Commission will report on member state 
compliance, but neither it nor other actors can sue for breach. There is no sanction for rule viola-
tion beyond public contempt. 39 In other words, SGP, Fiscal Compact, and OMC norms have what 
one might call a low degree of  legalization: these rules are not justiciable and will therefore be less  
binding and precise.40 Such “soft law” is characteristic of  an international organization. The EU, we 
must conclude, remains a hybrid on the dimension of  enforcement.
Citizenship
Member  state  nationals  have  fundamental  rights  under  European  law.  The  ECJ  protects  these 
against Union institutions; it also reviews member state actions that implement European law or 
might interfere with the free movement of  goods, capital, services, and labor (the “internal market 
freedoms”).41 The content of  this jurisprudence derives from three sources. First, the rights of  EU 
citizenship defined in Art. 18-25 TFEU. These include free movement across the Union and equal 
treatment independent of  national origin (within the range of  application of  European law). Cit -
izens have comprehensive access to official documents, elect the Parliament, and can launch an initi-
ative to request legislation from the Commission.42 Further privileges include: the right to vote and 
stand in host state municipal elections, the right to petition the Parliament, the right to file a com-
plaint about poor administration with the European Ombudsman, the right to consular protection 
fied majority of  governments has to reject this proposal. Note also that one element of  the Fiscal Compact – the  
obligation to enshrine a “debt brake” – is enforceable before the ECJ.
39 An official censure of  infringement would seem to require unanimous consent among the heads of  government.
40 Kenneth Abbot et al. have suggested that one can measure the legalization of  a regime along the following dimen-
sions: a) the degree to which judicial bodies have the power to interpret norms, b) the degree to which norms are  
binding, and c) the degree to which norms are precise. See Kenneth Abbott et al., "The Concept of  Legalization," 
International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000).
41 Art. 26 TFEU.
42 The European Citizens' Initiative enables one million individuals, who must hail from at least one quarter of  the 
member states, to invite a piece of  legislation; the Commission is not bound to follow such a request (Art. 11 TFEU, 
Art. 24 TFEU).
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from other member states, and the right to communicate with EU organs in all official Union lan-
guages. Second, the ECJ construes the internal market freedoms as basic individual rights: these 
liberties have direct effect and if  a member state wishes to restrict them, it must prove a compelling 
public interest. Third, the Charter of  Fundamental Rights protects a broad range of  liberties, sim-
ilar to a domestic schedule of  constitutional rights.43
This bundle of  freedoms is consistent with Bund citizenship. Unlike the constitution of  a state, 
the European treaties do not establish who is a citizen. Rather the member states make their own 
rules on this question. Yet once a person is recognized as a national, she becomes a Union citizen as  
well. This status cannot be reconciled with an international organization understanding of  the EU.  
To begin with,  it  guarantees  the characteristic  horizontal  dimension of  federal  citizenship:  free 
movement and some degree of  equal treatment. In particular, this includes the right to pursue eco-
nomic activities in all member states. But individuals can move across national borders, regardless  
of  whether the purpose is to work or to do business. What is more, in their host state, EU citizens 
have access to public services and can participate in municipal politics. However, consistent with the 
idea of  tiered federal citizenship, such equal treatment is limited. For one thing, EU aliens lack 
political rights beyond the municipal level. Their access to social assistance benefits is furthermore  
restricted.44 At the same time, the member states cannot, for example, draft resident foreigners into  
their armed forces.
At  least  on  paper,  the  vertical  dimension  of  EU citizenship  looks  robust  as  well.45 First, 
European policies must not infringe on civil freedom, which is protected under the Charter of  Fun-
43 The Charter of  Fundamental Rights is a freestanding document. Art. 6 TEU accords it the same legal value as the  
treaties.
44 Directive 2004/38/EC limits the right to free movement to individuals that will not become a burden on social as -
sistance in the host state. Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 stipulates that Union citizens who live and work in another  
member state must be able to participate in “social security” arrangements such as retirement insurance, health in-
surance, or unemployment insurance. Equal treatment, however, does not extend to means tested “social and med-
ical assistance.”
45 As Chapter 3 will discuss, legal protection of  the vertical citizenship rights is somewhat feeble.
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damental Rights. Second, individuals elect the Parliament, have comprehensive access to informa-
tion, and can invite legislation from the Commission, all of  which establishes a certain degree of  
political freedom at the European level. One can dispute if  these liberties are meaningful, when 
compared to the national context. But it is certain that no international organization permits a sim-
ilar degree of  individual participation. Third, while the EU does not have a positive obligation to 
realize social and economic freedom, the Charter of  Fundamental Rights is supposed to prevent 
Union governance from hollowing out the national welfare state.
This regime of  transnational citizenship was not there from the outset.46 The Rome Treaty 
made a commitment to the internal market freedoms, but it came in the form of  a vague promise to 
realize certain policies later on. At the time, the member states did not seek to create enforceable 
rights for private legal subjects. However, the revolutionary jurisprudence of  the ECJ transformed 
the four freedoms into basic individual liberties, which impose a genuine constraint on permissible 
member state policies. From the 1960s onward, this principle effected an inexorable expansion of  
the sphere, in which economic agents have the right to equal treatment from their host state. Bey-
ond this peculiar form of  market citizenship, the introduction of  a more general status for individu-
als featured on the European reform agenda for a long time. Yet the project did not succeed until  
the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced the language of  citizenship proper. The new status de-
coupled free movement and equal treatment from the internal market, such that individuals can 
now claim these rights without a link to economic activities. Maastricht also emphasized that Union 
citizenship implies a degree of  public oversight and participation in transnational decision making.  
Subsequent treaty reform led to further consolidation, in particular through incorporation of  the 
46 For a historical overview see Willem Maas, Creating European Citizens (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
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Fundamental Rights Charter at Lisbon.47 The sum total of  these individual freedoms makes citizen-
ship the most significant federal dimension of  the European status quo.
Legislative Process
After Lisbon, most secondary norms emerge from the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP).48 Un-
der these rules, the Commission has the sole right of  legislative initiative. In the subsequent process  
of  codecision, Parliament and the Council have equal power. A proposal is first read in Parliament,  
which can endorse or amend it. If  the Council approves the resulting text, it becomes law. The 
Council may also propose its own version and submit it to Parliament for a second reading; the lat -
ter can endorse, amend, or reject this proposal. If  disagreement persists after renewed consideration 
in the Council, a conciliation procedure begins, which leads to a joint version or abandonment of  
the legislative project. For a law to pass in Parliament, a simple majority is required. Under the OLP, 
the Council employs qualified majority voting (QMV). From 2014 onward, this means 55 percent  
of  member states, which must account for at least 65 percent of  the EU population.49
At first sight, the OLP fits a Bund, whose referent is a political union of  states and individuals.  
Recall that in such an order, the goal of  the legislative process is to reconcile national public in -
terests with each other and the democratic will of  a federal people. Under the European status quo,  
the member states are represented in the Council. Given that it operates based on QMV, one might 
perceive this institution as the federal diet and upper chamber of  a bicameral legislature. Such a  
view gains further support from the fact that deliberation is public when the Council reads a pro-
47 This step had largely symbolic character. For the most part, it formalized the existing practice of  the ECJ to enforce 
standard basic rights. The latter emerged in reaction to the Solange I decision of  the FCC, which made clear that 
European norms must not violate the rights enshrined in the Basic Law. See Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of  
European Law. The Making of  an International Rule of  Law in Europe, 90-98.
48 The OLP is laid down in Art. 294 TFEU.
49 Art. 16 TEU. Before 2014, the QMV criterion of  the Nice Treaty remains in force: absolute majority of  states, 74 
percent of  voting weights (that give small member states greater weight relative to their population), and 62 percent 
of  the EU population. Any member state can request use of  the Nice rules for a particular vote until 2017.
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posed law. The Parliament could be seen as the lower chamber in this system. Election is direct and 
voting blocs are based on ideological affiliation rather than national origin.50 These features make it 
at least somewhat plausible to understand the Strasbourg legislature as the voice of  a transnational  
demos.
But the picture gets more complicated, once we consider the role of  the European Council.  
This institution does not have a formal legislative function. Yet it has emerged as the main agenda  
setter for the Commission. No more than 10 percent of  EU legislative output goes back to genuine  
initiative from the latter. The remainder is drafted at the request of  the Council, Parliament, and in  
particular the European Council.51 This body is composed of  the national heads of  state or govern-
ment; it meets at least four times a year; these summits are not public, and decision making is based 
on consensus. Under the treaties, the European Council has the task to provide general political  
guidelines. In practice, this means that, at each meeting, the heads of  government prepare a list of  
assignments for the Commission and seek to resolve disagreements over legislative measures that  
arose in the Council. Another important power of  the European Council is to appoint the Commis-
sion President (subject to approval of  the Parliament) who hence depends on political support from 
the national leaders.
In light of  this, it should be clear that EU lawmaking retains a significant element of  the inter -
national  organization model  –  the  European Council  is  a  conference of  the  parties,  steering a 
bicameral legislative process. One might note that expansion of  the OMC through the Euro Plus  
Pact has reinforced the diplomatic element in this mixture. The European Council wields exclusive 
power to define the criteria, which the member states commit to implement. As we have seen, these 
standards are not law proper. Nonetheless, benchmark setting under the Pact might become an im-
50 Simon Hix et al., Democratic Politics in the European Parliament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
51 Doreen Allerkamp, "Who Sets the Agenda?," in EUSA (Boston: 2011).
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portant aspect of  EU normative output, limiting national autonomy to a significant extent. To be 
sure, the substantive reach of  the Pact is atypical of  an international organization. But its procedural 
features derive from this model.
The present constellation is the result of  a complex multidirectional evolution. During an initial 
transition period, the Rome Treaty stipulated consensus as the standard decision rule in the Council. 
For 1966, it scheduled a major expansion of  QMV. Yet a French boycott led to the infamous “Lux-
embourg Compromise”: member states with a vital interest at stake could veto an unwanted de-
cision. This regime turned the Council more or less into a conference of  the parties. It survived un-
til 1985. From the SEA onward, QMV became the dominant voting mechanism, reflecting growing 
concern over political deadlock in the shadow of  the veto. The Lisbon Treaty furthermore intro-
duced public deliberation, which underlined the legislative as opposed to diplomatic nature of  the 
Council.
The Parliament started out with a rather insignificant role. Under the Rome Treaty (and the 
earlier ECSC agreement), it had a consultative function; members were delegated from national par-
liaments. Still, the fact that such a body was created at all is remarkable. 52 This decision set the stage 
for the piecemeal creation of  a powerful legislative institution: the Luxembourg Treaty of  1970 es-
tablished some degree of  budget power; in 1979, the first direct election took place; the Maastricht  
reform allowed the Parliament to vote on the investiture of  the Commission; and under the SEA, it  
gained the formal right to participate in lawmaking. Expansion of  this power has since been the 
main focus of  the effort to improve the democratic legitimation of  Union governance. Each re-
form after the SEA fortified the legislative role of  the Parliament. Today codecision has become the  
baseline rule, from which there is little deviation.
52 Berthold Rittberger, Building Europe's Parliament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 73.
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We must not forget, though, that the rise of  Parliament coincided with that of  the European 
Council. The first informal meeting of  the latter took place in 1974, the same year in which the  
member states gave the green light for direct election of  the Strasbourg representatives. Over time, 
summit meetings became the engine of  institutional change, and the heads of  government also  
took on a more important role in setting the legislative agenda. The Lisbon reform codified this de-
velopment, making the European Council a formal Union organ. In other words, there is now a  
clear separation between the technical process of  lawmaking, on the one hand, and political over -
sight exercised in a diplomatic mode, on the other. The European Council, one might conclude 
(with perhaps a little exaggeration), has become the de facto government of  the EU, while the 
Commission functions as its secretariat.
Subject of  International Law
The EU is an independent subject of  international law.53 When its mandate of  internal governance 
requires it, Brussels can enter agreements with third parties or participate in an international organ -
ization such as the WTO. CFSP likewise allows for the conclusion of  treaties. In both fields, the  
Commission represents the EU; the Council formulates negotiation mandates and renders the final  
decision on whether to sign a legal instrument (depending on the question at issue, the voting rule is 
either QMV or unanimous consent). At the same time, the member states retain their own interna-
tional stature, insofar as EU competence does not preempt national action. This arrangement is 
consistent with the Bund model. It goes back to the Rome Treaty, which already permitted the EEC 
to enter international agreements. Then, the substantive range of  this power was narrow, but its 
growth has since kept pace with the expansion of  internal Union powers.54
53 For a comprehensive discussion of  the legal principles that govern the external relations of  the EU see Piet Eck -
hout, External Relations of  the EU. Legal and Constitutional Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
54 In addition to political reform, the ECJ played an important role as well: from its 1971 ERTA judgment onward, it 
has often recognized an implied power of  external action, when it deemed the latter necessary to effective pursuit of  
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An Intractable Puzzle
Few real world phenomena fit neat ideal types. The EU, though, is hybrid to a quite remarkable ex -
tent. The preceding has shown that it matches the international organization model on three im-
portant criteria: its legal basis is a set of  treaties, which citizens do not see as their shared constitu -
tion; the Union is not permanent; and primary law amendment requires unanimous consent among 
the member states. At the same time, broad jurisdiction, the direct effect of  European law, robust  
federal  citizenship,  and the possession of  international legal  subjecthood cohere with the Bund 
model. Regarding the question of  the ultimate decision, the silence of  the treaties leaves open if  we 
should assume that domestic constitutional norms can, in principle, trump Union law, or if  the ECJ  
has in fact a coequal or even superior claim to delimiting the scope of  the transnational sphere. Fi -
nally, the enforcement powers of  the EU and its legislative process fit neither the international or-
ganization nor the Bund model.  Here, the status quo amalgamates features of  both ideal  types 
(Table 1). This constellation, as we have seen, is the result of  a complex evolution. At the outset, 
the EU deviated little from the international organization model. Over time, it came to resemble a 
Bund to a degree. Some recent changes, however, point in the opposite direction. By way of  conclu-
sion, let us take a brief  look at the historical processes that brought about this nonlinear and incom-
plete transformation.











Legislative process + +
Subject of  intl. law ++
Table 1: The EU between international organization and Bund
During the first three decades of  integration, the ECJ was the motor of  deepening. It is signi-
ficant to note here that most national governments opposed the van Gend en Loos and Costa juris-
prudence, but were unable to overrule it (this would have required a unanimous decision to amend 
the treaties).55 Hence the main obstacle for the ECJ was to convince national jurists to implement  
direct effect and supremacy in their legal system. It is a little known fact that this feat succeeded, at  
least in part, due to an organized lobby effort. Karen Alter has shown that European law associ -
ations played a crucial role in the initial phase of  judicial integration.56 These professional networks 
worked to strengthen the role  of  transnational  norms in their  respective  countries.  Association 
members engineered disputes – including Van Gend en Loos and Costa – that would allow the ECJ 
to promulgate its revolutionary doctrines. Once direct effect and supremacy had been established, 
lower domestic courts faced an incentive to refer questions to Luxembourg, as the application of  
European norms could render them more independent from appellate instances within their own 
55 Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of  European Law. The Making of  an International Rule of  Law in Europe , 192-
202.
56 ———, "Jurist Advocacy Movements in Europe. The Role of  Euro-Law Associations in European Integration 
(1953-1975)," in The European Court's Political Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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legal system.57 Alter, however, admonishes that we cannot understand the phenomenon of  lower  
court participation without also bearing in mind the ideological climate produced by the effort of  
the associations. If  she is right, the lobby campaign of  the European law profession has been a mo-
numental success: through doctrinal innovation, the continent made a big step in the direction of  
federalism, against the political design of  the immediate postwar generation.
Beginning  in  the  1980s,  however,  the  momentum of  integration  shifted  to  the  diplomatic 
sphere. In more or less constant reform negotiations, federalist visionaries and international law  
conservatives have since been working to resolve their differences. Here is not the place to recount 
in detail what happened so far.58 Suffice it to observe that each side has won and lost some fights. 
The federalist camp achieved a massive expansion of  EU competence, the strengthening of  transna-
tional citizenship, and greater power for the Parliament. Actors that favored an international law 
framework prevented ratification of  the TCE, defended unanimous consent as the amendment rule,  
and managed to introduce an exit clause. Furthermore, summit negotiations in the European Coun-
cil emerged as the most important decision mechanism at the Union level.
Against this historical  background, the hybrid nature of  the status quo is no surprise. The 
present institutional structure embodies a historical bargain, resulting from a drawn out and multidi-
mensional struggle between champions of  a federal constitution and their opponents. What is re-
markable here is that integration progressed despite profound disagreement about its ultimate goal.  
To some extent that is the result of  the astute maneuvering of  European judges and lawyers. But at 
the political level, the secret has been the “Monnet method”, named after the French diplomat and 
chief  architect of  the Communities in the 1950s. At the heart of  this approach lies the belief  that  
European integration should advance piecemeal rather than in one big stroke – small and concrete  
57 ———, Establishing the Supremacy of  European Law. The Making of  an International Rule of  Law in Europe, 45-
52.
58 For a historical overview see Martin Dedman, The Origins and Development of  the European Union, 1945-2008. 
(London: Routledge, 2009).
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projects, on which states desire to cooperate, are preferable to endless debate of  grand schemes that 
have no chance of  implementation. As we have seen, the wisdom of  this method has sometimes  
been challenged, on the most recent occasion with the 2004 attempt to establish a genuine transna-
tional constitution. Yet, in the end, the member states always returned to the incrementalist path.
There can be little doubt that without the pragmatism of  the Monnet method, the splendid and 
improbable achievements of  integration would not have been possible. But from the perspective of  
constitutional theory, this institution building style has left the EU in a rather awkward position. Re-
call that if  the Bund model fit the status quo best, one should embrace the pluralist conception of  
the relationship between domestic and European law. In contrast, were the EU still more or less an  
international organization, domestic courts would be justified to assert the right of  ultimate de-
cision. This chapter has shown that a definite solution to the puzzle remains elusive. To support  
either view, strong evidence for the opposite interpretation has to be discounted.
National judges must of  course pick a side. Should we care that no matter what, their doctrine  
will brush over a powerful counterargument? Many observers counsel not to get hung up on the is -
sue. The question of  the ultimate decision, runs the argument, carries at best academic interest, as  
the matter is settled in practice. While national high courts – most of  all the German FCC – engage  
in dualist posturing, actual litigation results are more or less indistinguishable from what pluralism 
would prescribe. Adherents of  the heterarchical approach see this as proof  of  judicial wisdom: even 
if  domestic courts refuse to acknowledge the federal nature of  the Union order, judges are not so  
imprudent as to disturb its actual working. Perhaps we should indeed be glad that domestic courts 
recoil from their sometimes belligerent threats to rein in the EU. But there is still no reason for cel -
ebration. The mismatch between dualist rhetoric and pluralist outcomes is one symptom of  a con-
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stitutionalism deficit that stems from the peculiar hybrid character of  the status quo. This, at least, is  
the argument of  the next chapter.
Chapter 3
The Constitutionalism Deficit
This chapter develops the pivotal claim in my overall argument: the peculiar hybrid nature of  the 
EU undermines constitutionalism. Before I support this assertion, let us recapitulate the preceding  
analysis.  We started our investigation with the following puzzle:  what is  the proper relationship 
between domestic and European law? The German jurisprudence on this question champions dual-
ism, or the view that Union norms are subordinate to the domestic constitution. According to the  
FCC, the EU remains in essence an international organization, and the member states are still sover -
eign.  Critics  of  this  doctrinal  stance  reject  such  a  hierarchical  conception  of  the  relationship 
between domestic and European law. They recognize that integration has not created a state, but 
also dismiss the international organization narrative. According to them, the EU has a fundamental  
order that is equivalent to national higher law. One should therefore understand the relationship 
between domestic and European norms as pluralist.
I have argued that, from a theoretical viewpoint, a heterarchical system is indeed conceivable: 
we can imagine a federal union of  independent states, or Bund, that leaves open which level is sov-
ereign. However, the European status quo does not quite fit this model. While the EU is neither a  
state nor an international organization, it has also not traversed the full distance from the latter to a 
Bund. The present institutional structure remains instead a bewildering hybrid. Hence the riddle of  
the proper relationship between domestic and European law does not have an evident or in fact any 
correct solution. That is more than an esoteric jurisprudential problem – it should alert us to a quite 
real erosion of  constitutionalism. Both dualism and pluralism suggest a certain form of  mediation 
between national and Union norms. Yet, at the same time, these conceptions entail a particular nar -
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rative as to how the EU fulfills or should fulfill the demands of  constitutionalism. The problem is 
that under the status quo, neither route is viable.
From the pluralist viewpoint, the European order itself  should realize the rule of  law, demo-
cratic legislation, and basic rights protection within its sphere. National high courts are to remain on 
the sidelines, so long as there is no flagrant violation of  these principles. Those who advocate such a 
judicial ethos point to a gradual “constitutionalization” of  the EU over time. However, as Chapter 1  
explained, a regime can undergo legalization,  permit citizen participation, and protect  individual 
freedom, but still fail to meet the full demands of  constitutionalism. To accomplish this, the order in 
question must also represent a genuine political union. I have introduced the concept of  the Bund 
to describe a federal structure that fulfills this condition, without being a state.  As we have seen, the 
EU resembles such an order up to a point. Yet the following will show that its residual international  
organization features undermine the rule of  law, democratic legislation, and basic rights protection.
From the dualist viewpoint, this conclusion misses the point. The main defense of  constitu -
tionalism, goes the reasoning, is located at the member state level. Integration might have the poten-
tial to subvert national higher law. But, as Peter Lindseth puts it, high courts have reacted with the  
promulgation of  “resistance norms”, which compel EU organs to respect the treaty mandate, to  
leave the most important political decisions to the democratic process in the member states, and to 
uphold the basic rights protected under national law.1 The domestic constitutional order, runs the 
argument, will therefore remain intact. But this promise is not credible, or so I will demonstrate  
here. Redeeming it would deal a serious blow to the effectiveness of  European law, for earnest re -
view must undermine Union governance where it operates in a federal mode. That is a price no high 
court has been willing to pay, nor should one expect this in the future.
1 Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy, 133-187.
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It does not matter, then, if  the empirical glass is half  full for pluralism and half  empty for dual -
ism, or if  the reverse is the case. Regardless of  which prism we see through, the state of  constitu -
tionalism in Europe is poor. To substantiate this claim, the chapter looks at the present condition of  
the rule of  law, democratic legislation, and basic rights protection in turn. For each principle, I dis-
cuss, first, in how far the Union system itself  falls short of  the relevant criteria. To show that mem-
ber state high courts are unable to make up for this deficit, the chapter then examines the relevant  
jurisprudence of  the FCC. In a third step, it will become clear that the current dilemma stems from 
the peculiar hybrid nature of  the EU, which is no longer an international organization and not yet a  
Bund.
Rule of  Law
As we have seen, the rule of  law in the European order is robust when it comes to enforcing mem-
ber state obligations. The ECJ has also cast a tight net of  judicial review around the EU organs. But  
this regime, I will now argue, suffers from a striking defect. Throughout its history, the EU has 
shown a remarkable aptness to exceed its competence mandate – with tacit acquiescence and some-
times active help from the court. In this particular regard, integration undermines the rule of  law.  
Why is that so? The European institutional setup does not compel the ECJ to enforce competence  
restrictions. On the contrary, the Luxembourg court has incentive and opportunity to expand the  
Union sphere at the cost of  member state independence. Domestic ultra vires litigation, the follow-
ing will suggest, cannot rein in this development.
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The Deficit at the Union Level
From the pluralist viewpoint, we should trust the European order to enforce its own competence 
rules. This expectation, I submit, is rather too optimistic. Often enough, the ECJ has overlooked 
usurpation of  power through legislative or executive measures, which seemed to transgress either 
the enumerated powers of  the EU or to breach the subsidiarity principle.2 What is more, the Lux-
embourg court itself  has sometimes been the original culprit of  apparent ultra vires action.
Let us begin with the issue of  legislative or executive usurpation that fails to elicit a response 
from the ECJ. Here we should first note that judicial review is not the sole protection against illegal  
competence expansion. One important political safeguard is the strong representation of  the mem-
ber states in the legislative process. National governments can restrain the Commission when it 
makes a proposal that exceeds Union competence. But what if  the Council itself  breaches the rules? 
This scenario is far from unusual: member state leaders have often made European law, whose basis  
in the treaties was questionable (see below). Another political safeguard is the watchdog function of  
national parliaments. Since the Lisbon reform, member state legislatures can stall a measure, if  a suf-
ficient number of  them consider it to violate subsidiarity.3 Yet this “early warning mechanism” is ex-
pected to show at best modest practical impact – national parliamentarians have little incentive to  
make use of  the new procedure.4 We should also note that political safeguards do not cover the en-
2 Under Art. 5 TEU, the requirement of  proportionality is a further constraint on EU power. This principle stipulates 
that content and form of  Union action must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of  the treaties.  
The ECJ seems to be a great deal more prepared to enforce this requirement than to police enumerated powers and 
subsidiarity. See Alec Stone-Sweet, "Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism," Columbia Journal of  
Transnational Law 47, no. 1 (2008). That is not surprising. The Luxembourg court increases its power through judi -
cial review of  how the EU seeks to achieve its goals. In contrast, whenever it limits the range of  goals the EU can 
pursue, it forgoes potential influence.
3 Art. 12 TEU. Under this provision, one third of  the member state parliaments can prompt a reconsideration of  draft 
legislation, but the Commission is under no obligation to change its proposal. A majority of  national parliaments can 
force a vote in Council and Parliament on whether legislation passed under the OLP violates subsidiarity. If  either 
body finds an infringement, the legislation is quashed.
4 Tapio  Raunio,  "Destined  for  Irrelevance?  Subsidiarity  Control  by  National  Parliaments,"  Real  Instituto  Elcano  
Working Paper 36/2010  (2010). Raunio argues that national parliaments will not seek to override a law, which their 
government approved. For a more optimistic assessment see Ian Cooper, "Watchdogs of  Subsidiarity,"  Journal of  
Common Market Studies 44, no. 2 (2006).
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tire range of  European norm production: the Commission and several bureaucratic agencies have 
significant regulatory power, whose exercise does not require the participation of  Council or Parlia-
ment.5 In light of  this, a strong judicial safeguard against illegal competence usurpation would be 
desirable.
But so far, the ECJ has not assumed this role. Proceeding from the assumption that a “prefer-
ence for Europe” is built into the treaties, enforcement of  the competence mandate has been rather  
indulgent.6 Until 2000, the Luxembourg judges never struck down an ultra vires measure. Tobacco 
Advertising  found that a Council directive, whose ostensible purpose was to regulate the internal 
market, aimed in fact to harmonize public health regulation, over which the EU does not have juris-
diction.7 Lack of  potential infringements cannot explain this passive stance of  the ECJ. As Stephen 
Weatherill notes, the Council in particular has shown a “readiness to act with slender regard for [...]  
the principle of  attributed competence.”8 This observation refers to the frequent misuse of  the 
mandate to regulate the internal market. In ostensible pursuit of  the latter objective, the Council –  
often united in consensus – has enacted numerous pieces of  legislation with little relevance to mar -
ket integration.9 Another controversial point has been the question of  correct legal basis. The treat-
ies establish different procedural regimes for different issue areas. Hence the choice of  a particular  
legal basis over another can make it easier to pass legislation: it determines whether the decision rule 
is QMV or consensus, and if  the format of  a “regulation” can be used, which unlike a “directive”  
does not require a domestic implementing statute to become effective. Member states have on sev-
5 Deirdre Curtin, The Executive Power of  the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 105-134.
6 Peter L. Lindseth, "Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of  Supranationalism," Columbia Law 
Review 99, no. 3 (1999), 701. The phrase goes back to former ECJ judge Federico Mancini: “The preference for  
Europe is determined by the genetic code, transmitted to the court by the founding fathers, who entrusted to it the 
task of  ensuring that the law is observed in the application of  a Treaty whose primary objective is an ever closer  
union among the peoples of  Europe.” See Federico Mancini and David T. Keeling, "Democracy and the European 
Court of  Justice," Modern Law Review 57, no. 2 (1994), 186.
7 ECJ case C-376/98.
8 Stephen Weatherill, "Competence Creep and Competence Control," Yearbook of  European Law 23, no. 1 (2004), 6.
9 ———, "Competence Creep and Competence Control," 6-7.
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eral occasions sued the Council for referring to an inapplicable provision in order to establish its  
competence to act. In such disputes, the court has usually favored the legal interpretation that min-
imized the prerogative of  national governments.10
To be sure, Weatherill intimates that since the 1980s, periodical treaty amendment has replaced 
legislative transgression as the mechanism of  choice to widen the EU mandate.11 At the same time, 
greater procedural standardization has made the problem of  correct legal basis somewhat less relev-
ant. Is ultra vires legislation therefore an issue of  the past? The situation after Tobacco Advertising  
does not confirm this hypothesis.  Weatherill himself  points out that several measures that seemed 
questionable in light of  the new test went unopposed in court.12 And when a case reached the ECJ, 
it refused to grant relief. The most striking instance of  this concerned a new attempt to regulate to-
bacco advertising in 2006. Here the judges upheld a directive of  more or less the same content as 
the measure struck down in the original decision.13 Against this background, it seems indeed right to 
conclude that “plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose.”14
Let us pause to consider a possible objection. At least when a presumed competence transgres-
sion is the result of  a unanimous vote in the Council, must the ECJ not defer to member state will?  
There are without doubt times when judges should give in to a political consensus to disregard the 
established law. If  formal legal change is too arduous or impossible, a flexible doctrinal stance can  
accommodate popular desire to alter the rules. But we should be skeptical if  one can interpret a 
Council vote – even a unanimous one – as the proper expression of  democratic will in the member 
states. Were the Council allowed such discretion to rewrite competence rules, national executive  
leaders could strengthen their own position relative to the legislative and judicial branches within 
10 Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy, 705-706.
11 Weatherill, "Competence Creep and Competence Control," 6.
12 ———, "Competence Creep and Competence Control," 14.
13 ECJ case C-380/03.
14 Weatherill, "Competence Creep and Competence Control," 15.
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their respective domestic order. Loose interpretation of  the treaties permits them to accomplish this  
goal, without a public debate regarding whether the EU should in fact have a particular competence.  
In this manner, the power equilibrium between units and center might lose its democratic legitima -
tion. A proper constitutional order should prevent such a development.
So far, then, we have seen that enumeration of  powers did not prove a too strong legal con-
straint for the EU. What about subsidiarity? Recall that under this principle, Brussels must explain  
why a particular issue demands a joint solution, when it seeks to exercise a competence shared with 
the member states. Concerning this requirement, the approach of  the Luxembourg court is again 
rather permissive. Some observers applaud this stance, arguing that if  the EU or national govern-
ments are better placed to reach a particular objective is a political question, which the court should  
leave to the legislative process.15 On this view, the main virtue of  the subsidiarity principle is to in-
crease awareness of  possible EU overreach, given that bureaucrats and politicians must now con-
front the issue of  whether common action is justified. Florian Sander, however, argues that absent 
court review, one cannot expect serious engagement with this question. If  the legislative organs had 
complete discretion regarding the interpretation of  subsidiarity, there would be little incentive for re-
flection.16 The ECJ should hence at least demand a reasoned explanation, to which it  can then 
choose to defer. Sander holds that it fails to deliver on this task. First, the court accepts formulaic  
protestations  of  subsidiarity  compliance – it  does not  require  a  substantive rationale for why a 
European solution is preferable over national independence.17 Second, the judges exempt certain 
kinds of  legislation from subsidiarity review altogether. These include harmonization of  national 
law and the removal of  trade obstacles in the internal market. Here the ECJ argues that for logical  
reasons, subsidiarity cannot be violated: the member states are unable to pursue harmonization and  
15 See for example George Bermann, "Taking Subsidiarity Seriously," Columbia Law Review 94, no. 2 (1994).
16 Florian Sander, "Subsidiarity Infringements before the European Court of  Justice," Columbia Journal of  European 
Law 12 (2005), 16-17.
17 ———, "Subsidiarity Infringements before the European Court of  Justice," 543-544.
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removal of  trade impediments on their own. But this reasoning is sophistic – it absolves the EU of  
an explanation as to why exercise of  its competence and the implied substitution of  national rules 
are beneficial in the first place.18
From a rational choice perspective, the approach of  the ECJ is not difficult to understand. We 
can assume that  one factor  influencing the  doctrine  of  a  court  is  a  desire  to enhance its  own 
power.19 Since a wider Union sphere also means greater jurisdiction for the ECJ, it has an incentive  
to turn a blind eye on EU organs that reach beyond their mandate. What is more, the Luxembourg 
court itself  has often been the prime mover of  controversial encroachment on the member state 
domain. In fact, such ultra vires action seems to be a more important problem than legislative or ex-
ecutive usurpation. Let us now take a closer look at this issue.
Judicial development of  European norms is common. This need of  course not always be a 
reason for concern. Indeed, it is frequently desirable: a legal text might remain silent on a particular  
situation that, given the legislative intent, should be regulated – courts are expected to fill such an 
evident gap.20 But the ECJ goes beyond this role. Often against the manifest will of  the member 
states, it has reinterpreted the law, making Union rules intrude deeper into national legal systems.  
Martin Höpner distinguishes three scenarios of  such norm development, in which the ECJ is the 
prime mover of  apparent competence transgression.
First, the court has sometimes construed secondary legislation in a manner that let it cover  
more ground than Council and Parliament had foreseen.21 One recent example is the Laval case: in 
this decision, the judges limited the right to strike on the basis of  a directive, whose text appears to 
exclude the governance of  collective labor bargaining from its ambit. Second, the ECJ has applied  
18 ———, "Subsidiarity Infringements before the European Court of  Justice," 544-545.
19 Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of  European Law. The Making of  an International Rule of  Law in Europe, 45-52.
20 Martin Höpner, "Von der Lückenfüllung zur Vertragsumdeutung," Der Moderne Staat 3, no. 1 (2010), 170-171.
21 ———, "Von der Lückenfüllung zur Vertragsumdeutung," 171-172.
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primary law to fields, which the member states had not planned to regulate in common.22 The most 
significant instance of  this has been the frequent use of  the internal market freedoms to strike down 
national regulation in areas, which the treaties reserve to the member states. Finally, the court has  
sometimes fashioned unwritten treaty principles with a dubious connection to either text or drafting 
intention.23 The most notorious example is perhaps the assertion of  the Costa ruling that European 
law is supreme over the member state legal orders. A more recent such case is Mangold. Here the 
ECJ claimed the existence of  a universal ban on age discrimination. This pronouncement led to a  
heated debate as to whether the court had invented a legal principle from thin air (I discuss the  
Mangold saga in more detail below).
To be sure, whether or not the scale of  judicial lawmaking is in fact a worrisome problem (and 
one that is more prevalent at the Union level than in a typical domestic legal system) remains to  
some extent a disputed question. Höpner concedes that with regard to norm development of  the 
first kind, observers disagree about how often it occurs and what significance it has. There is, how-
ever, less debate as to the momentous effect that judicial lawmaking of  the second and third kind 
had on the course of  European integration.24 The transformation of  the internal market freedoms 
into basic individual rights and the assertion that Union norms trump domestic law have defined the 
nature and content of  the present European order. And even if  we count this development as water  
under the bridge, the ongoing controversies regarding cases such as Laval and Mangold demonstrate 
that ECJ overreach remains a live concern.
How can one explain the prominent and sometimes outsize role of  the judicial branch in the 
creation of  Union norms? A well designed fundamental order would match the power of  courts to 
misconstrue  the  law with  a  realistic  threat  of  legislative  correction,  either  through a statute  or  
22 ———, "Von der Lückenfüllung zur Vertragsumdeutung," 172-174.
23 ———, "Von der Lückenfüllung zur Vertragsumdeutung," 175.
24 ———, "Von der Lückenfüllung zur Vertragsumdeutung," 179.
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through constitutional amendment. Such a response might indeed occur in the European system: le -
gislation and even treaty changes have sometimes reversed ECJ doctrine regarding the extent of  the  
Union sphere. Nonetheless, such intervention is rare.25 This does not mean that judicial norm dis-
tortion  has  found tacit  member  state  acceptance.  It  is  rather  a  sign  of  a  structural  imbalance  
between the Luxembourg court and the EU legislative branch. The former will seldom meet opposi -
tion because the latter will often find it difficult to respond. Compared with the relative ease of  
passing legislation and constitutional amendments in a domestic legal order, the Union system es-
tablishes high obstacles to political action. When the ECJ misconstrues secondary norms, a legislat-
ive response would entail a revision of  the measure in question. Such an intervention requires not 
just the support of  enough member state governments, but also the cooperation of  the Commis-
sion and the Parliament, both of  which have an incentive to countenance judicial expansion of  
Union power. When the ECJ misconstrues the treaties, a political response is even harder to mount.  
Amendment of  the treaties presupposes consensus among the member states. In light of  this, em-
pirical research has come to the more or less unanimous conclusion that fear of  override does not  
influence the jurisprudence of  the Luxembourg court.26
A skeptic might interject here that even if  political response is a rather ineffective check on the 
ECJ, the latter must still persuade member state judges to implement Union norms, which restricts 
the elbowroom to misconstrue them. That is without doubt true. Yet we have reason to believe that 
a possible enforcement strike makes at best for a modest constraint.  There is just one instance  
where this dog has in fact barked: Keck (which I discuss in more detail below) limited the applica-
tion of  an earlier ECJ ruling. The adjustment occurred in part because national judges often refused  
25 ———, "Von der Lückenfüllung zur Vertragsumdeutung," 180-181.
26 For an overview see Kelemen, "The Political Foundations of  Judicial Independence in the European Union," 45-46.  
The same hurdles that forestall a legislative correction of  an ECJ ruling also prevent measures such as court packing, 
resource deprivation, or jurisdiction stripping. Kelemen furthermore argues that member states will find it difficult  
to use judicial appointments to influence the Luxembourg court. See ———, "The Political Foundations of  Judicial  
Independence in the European Union," 50-54.
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to implement the prior doctrine.27 Of  course, such resistance does not have to be a regular event in 
order to restrain the ECJ. The mere chance that it can happen might force the court to observe the  
letter of  the law, especially when it comes to sensitive competence norms. Perhaps there is a grain 
of  truth to this hypothesis. But given the evidence of  systematic transgression that Höpner has col-
lected, the size of  the effect must be limited. That is not surprising. One can presume that judges in  
general are disinclined to flout the doctrine of  a superior instance. What is more, lower domestic 
courts  benefit  from cooperation with the  ECJ.  As  we noted,  the  implementation of  European 
norms renders them more independent from appellate instances within their own legal system (see 
Chapter 2). The matter is of  course somewhat different for high courts, whose institutional role  
shrinks in proportion to the expansion of  the Union sphere. Let us next consider how German 
constitutional judges have responded to this threat.
Obstacles to Effective Domestic Review
The preceding has shown that in one particular sense, the rule of  law remains weak at the European 
level: enforcement of  competence norms is lackadaisical. From the Maastricht decision onward, the 
FCC has claimed that it will make up for whatever bias Union institutions might have (see Introduc-
tion). Domestic  ultra vires control, runs the argument, will catch violations that have been over-
looked at the European level. What is more, the mere threat of  such an intervention is expected to  
have a positive effect: in the shadow of  domestic review, the Luxembourg court will pay greater at-
tention to competence limits, because it must account for a possible reversal of  its jurisprudence by  
member state high courts. Or so believe adherents of  the dualist position. Yet what if  the threat is  
not credible? I will now suggest that national judges have little choice but to forgo effective  ultra  
vires control.
27 Alec Stone-Sweet, The Judicial Construction of  Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 140.
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The jurisprudence of  the FCC since the Maastricht judgment illustrates this point. Legislative  
usurpation has sometimes been alleged in proceedings before the court. But the latter never upheld 
such a claim. Neither has it found the ECJ itself  in violation of  its power under the treaties. As the 
recent Honeywell decision makes clear, this will not change in the near future. Honeywell addresses 
the Mangold judgment of  the ECJ, which struck down a German waiver of  restrictions on tempor-
ary labor contracts for employees older than 52 years. The Luxembourg court found this law to viol-
ate a universal ban of  discrimination on any ground. Although not codified, such a norm is re -
portedly a general principle of  European law.28 This assertion met strong criticism: legal scholars ac-
cused the ECJ of  making up primary law to extend its authority.29 The FCC considered this objec-
tion weighty enough to investigate whether Mangold amounted to an ultra vires act. To answer this 
question,  Honeywell puts forward a general test for competence violation. But, first, the German 
judges recognize the ECJ as the primary interpreter of  European law. Therefore, a domestic com-
plaint is not admissible until the Luxembourg court had a chance to pronounce on the dispute. In  
other words, all such claims must refer to an infringement by the ECJ, regardless of  which institu-
tion committed the original alleged violation. The FCC will then strike down the judgment in ques-
tion, if  the alleged breach meets the following two criteria: it must be serious, in the sense that it  
leads to a significant transfer of  competence, and it must be manifest, in the sense that the Luxem-
bourg court has disregarded accepted legal method.30
This test makes an ultra vires finding quite improbable. As several observers remarked, past ju-
dicial competence expansion has not usually occurred through an individual ECJ decision. Shifts 
that were ultimately momentous resulted instead from a line of  precedent, which had cumulative ef -
28 ECJ case C-144/04.
29 See in particular Lüder Gerken et al., "Mangold" als ausbrechender Rechtsakt (Munich: Sellier, 2009).
30 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06, paras. 60-61.
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fect. Any single link in that chain would not have met the serious breach criterion. 31 Manifest viola-
tion, I submit, is just as lax a standard. The FCC was obviously reluctant to embrace a genuine re-
view function. Within a judicial hierarchy, a superior instance decides whether the lower court has  
offered the most persuasive interpretation of  the law. In contrast, the ECJ must leave the realm of  
accepted legal method before the FCC intervenes. What precisely this means remains somewhat 
nebulous. In fact, the German judges left open whether Mangold still meets the requirement – the 
complaint was rejected on the basis of  the serious breach criterion alone. But it seems that Honey-
well establishes a purely formal test: does the reasoning of  the ECJ take the shape of  juristic argu-
ment? One need not be a radical legal realist to see that such a criterion does not impose much of  a  
limit. The past jurisprudence of  the Luxembourg court is not questionable because of  a complete 
absence of  juristic argument; the problem is rather its systematic preference for a lenient interpreta -
tion of  EU power, despite the fact that a different result seemed often more convincing.
Why did the FCC choose to make its ultra vires control toothless? The crucial obstacle to do-
mestic court supervision of  the EU is the risk of  legal fragmentation. If  the FCC engages in sub-
stantive review, high courts in other member states can be expected to follow suit. This would over 
time lead to a cacophonous interpretive landscape. To see why, one need just consider how often ap-
peals succeed within a domestic legal system. Once the applicable standard is the most persuasive  
argument, judges will often disagree about the right solution. For this reason, the FCC has put for -
ward a formal criterion in place of  substantive review. Yet such a test, as we have seen, does not 
provide a real check on the freedom of  the Luxembourg court to render biased judgments. In other 
words, a choice has to be made between effective ultra vires control and legal fragmentation.  Ter-
tium non datur. One can be more or less certain that faced with this dilemma, domestic constitu-
31 Judge Landau dissented from the majority in Honeywell, stressing the piecemeal nature of  competence transfer via 
ECJ rulings.  See also Dieter  Grimm, "Die  große Karlsruher  Verschiebung,"  Frankfurter  Allgemeine Zeitung,  9 
September 2010b.
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tional judges will forgo resistance against European intrusion on the member state sphere, even if  
this weakens their own institutional position. The alternative would be to jeopardize the working of  
the entire system of  Union governance. No court will be prepared to shoulder the blame for such  
an outcome.
Legal scholars have been quick to point out that Honeywell  marks a step back from the ostens-
ible dualism of  the Lisbon decision.32 The new test rather fits a pluralist ethos: the FCC trusts the 
ECJ to police competence rules; domestic review becomes a power reserved for egregious violation.  
Authors who adhere to a heterarchical understanding of  the EU celebrate this stance as a return to 
reason.33 But its actual meaning is rather less happy. From the Maastricht decision to the Lisbon 
judgment, the FCC has assured the German public that it will contain illegal EU overreach. Honey-
well exposes the emptiness of  this promise. The overriding importance of  effective European gov-
ernance forces the court to shrink back from meaningful review. Instead, the judges choose to de -
pend on faithful legal interpretation at the Union level. As we have seen, there is little reason to ex -
pect that the ECJ will deliver on this hope.
Discontents of  Hybridity
In significant part, the problem described above stems from the mixed character of  the status quo.  
Consider first the pluralist desideratum that European law itself  should provide a sufficient guaran-
tee that Union organs heed their competence limits. As the preceding has argued, that is not the  
case at present. One important reason, I submit, is that amalgamation of  international organization 
features and federal traits impedes the enforcement of  the mandate set forth in the treaties.
32 Torsten Stein, "Always Steering a Straight Course? The German Federal Constitutional Court and European Integra-
tion," ERA Forum 12, no. supp. 1 (2011).
33 See for example Mehrdad Payandeh, "Constitutional Review of  EU Law after Honeywell. Contextualizing the Rela-
tionship between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of  Justice," Common Market Law Review 48, 
no. 1 (2011).
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To be sure, weak judicial resistance against expansion of  central power is a problem that can af-
fect layered structures in general. Regardless of  which political form the EU will take, the ECJ has  
an incentive to expand its own jurisdiction via loose competence review. But it seems nonetheless  
fair to speculate that the ambiguous nature of  the status quo fuels the zeal of  the Luxembourg  
court. The judges (along with the entire European law profession) have often imagined themselves 
as the vanguard of  federalism, engaged in a fight against political inertia that leaves the continent  
unable to complete the historical mission a putative founding generation has assigned to it. A clear  
answer to the constitutional question might lead the ECJ to focus more on sound legal interpreta -
tion and less on such activism.
However, the more obvious and more important problem for the pluralist approach is the im-
balance between the judicial branch and the legislative. The power of  the Luxembourg court as the 
sole interpreter of  Union norms has no adequate political counterweight, as the EU retains the 
amendment rule of  an international organization and emphasizes consensus even in the normal le -
gislative process. Given this failure to heed the logic of  checks and balances, one should not be sur -
prised that illegitimate judicial norm development is a significant phenomenon.
Of  course, from the dualist perspective, the lack of  a proper equilibrium at the Union level is  
no reason for alarm – national ultra vires control should motivate the EU to respect its enumerated 
powers. But, as we have seen, this expectation is just as fanciful as the pluralist assertion that suffi -
cient limits exist at the Union level. The mixed character of  the present regime is an important ex -
planation here as well. EU jurisdiction, we recall, has the substantive extension of  a federal compet -
ence mandate. Wide reach and broad functional goals make disagreement about its boundaries inev-
itable. Dissatisfaction with how the ECJ manages this friction has provoked the FCC to threaten ul-
tra vires control. But the irony of  the current situation is that precisely because competence dispute 
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is an ever present risk, national judges cannot perform such review in earnest. The European order  
might perhaps tolerate the occasional domestic invalidation of  a Union norm. Yet an effective sys-
tem of  supervision would seem to entail  permanent litigation before member state courts,  and 
hence significant legal fragmentation. Given this prohibitive cost, national judges are unable to make 
a credible promise to rein in EU overreach. In practice, domestic review must therefore fail to com-
pensate for the shortfall at the Union level.
Democratic Legislation
Let us next consider the second principle of  constitutionalism. To make European legislation more 
democratic has long been a goal of  treaty reform. But, as the following will argue, the status quo still 
fails to meet the standard required of  a genuine democratic constitution. The German Lisbon de-
cision recognizes this  problem.  Its  answer  is  to police  future competence delegation,  such that 
powers that require strong legitimation remain under domestic control. This approach, it will be-
come clear, is futile because the EU has already encroached too far into the domain of  what must  
count as “essential” competences. Once again, domestic court review is unable to make up for the 
faults of  the European institutional structure.
The Deficit at the Union Level
The literature on whether or not the EU has a democratic deficit is vast and rather perplexing, given  
the multitude of  viewpoints, from which scholars have addressed the issue.34 Here I will refer to ex-
isting scholarship only insofar as it bears on the specific question before us: can one maintain that  
34 For an overview see Thomas Jensen, "The Democratic Deficit of  the European Union," Living Reviews in Demo-
cracy 1 (2009).
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under the status quo, Union governance has, or could in principle acquire, sufficient democratic le-
gitimation of  its own to warrant a pluralist relationship with domestic norms?
Put in the most abstract terms, this would require that European law is made on the basis of  
rational opinion formation in the public sphere. Here I assume of  course that Jürgen Habermas 
provides the right general understanding of  the democratic legislation principle (see Chapter 1). Re -
call that, on his account, rational deliberation means that participants seek to formulate norms that  
all whom these will affect should be able to endorse. The outcome must hence reconcile moral prin -
ciples, the specific ethos of  the collective in question, and pragmatic calculation. Or in short, it 
should manifest the best interpretation of  the common good. In an intact democratic system, the  
public  sphere  approximates  this  ideal  of  rational  deliberation.  Actual  decision  making,  in  turn, 
should reflect the opinions formed there.
Using this standard implies that we reject the need for a sui generis approach to the normative 
evaluation of  European lawmaking. Some authors believe that a transnational order like the EU can-
not in principle become democratic, and hence, goes the argument, one must use alternative criteria  
such as, for example, “justice” to assess it.35 But instead of  making normative principles fit the em-
pirical object, we should criticize the latter from the viewpoint of  the same philosophical standard 
that we otherwise subscribe to. Or at least, this must be our approach, if  the goal is to support a 
heterarchical understanding of  the European order. For domestic and Union norms to stand on co-
equal footing, European governance needs to possess an equivalent potential for democratic legitim-
ation as the political process in the member states. An investigation of  whether that is the case  
should entail the application of  like normative criteria to both spheres. However, this does not mean 
that we must bring the exact same yardstick to bear on the EU as would be appropriate for a state.  
35 Jürgen Neyer, "Justice, not Democracy. Legitimacy in the European Union," Journal of  Common Market Studies 48, 
no. 4 (2010).
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In the latter setting, the normative  telos of  legislation is to reflect the common good of  a single 
people. A heterarchical order, though, has a different kind of  collective referent: the Bund is a polit-
ical union of  peoples. Individuals, to be sure, hold a membership status as well. But, as Chapter 1  
observed, exactly how citizens should participate in decision making remains controversial. We shall  
return to this question later (see Chapter 5). At the moment, it will suffice to note that a heterarch-
ical order has a composite subject, which encompasses preexisting communities.
Can one adapt the Habermasian understanding of  democratic legislation to such a context? 
The decisive conceptual move is to posit that in a Bund, the member state peoples embrace the fed-
eral common good as part of  their respective public weal.  A domestic citizen has then rational  
ground to accept laws that emanate from the center. That is the case even when her own unit gov-
ernment has opposed the measure in question. Just as minorities in the domestic sphere are obliged 
to accept the results of  majoritarian procedures, so must whole peoples live with the outcome of  a  
lost vote, at least so long as the federal decision has a reasonable claim to reflect the overarching  
common good. Whatever institutional framework is suitable to elaborate the content of  the latter, it 
must differ from the legislative process in a state, which seeks to formulate the will of  a single uni-
fied people. The question is hence not if  Union lawmaking looks just the same as its domestic equi -
valent. Rather we should investigate whether the status quo permits the rational determination of  
the European public interest, given the composite nature of  its referent.
Let us recall the seven prerequisites of  the Habermasian ideal. An intact public sphere depends 
on individual rights that safeguard it, on a vibrant realm of  civic association, and on a suitable media  
infrastructure. For the political system to connect with rational opinion formation, legislative institu-
tions must permit decision making based on the common good. Politicians need furthermore to 
have an incentive to engage with public opinion, either through heeding it or attempting to influ -
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ence the debate. To function as Habermas envisages, both the public sphere and the political system 
require furthermore the neutralization of  social power and – somewhat less tangible – a disposition 
toward virtuous behavior on the part of  citizens and officials. Lawmaking in the EU, I submit, fails  
to meet at least some of  these criteria.
Consider first the level of  the public sphere. Here it is crucial to recognize that a European 
space of  political communication must have a different structure than its domestic counterpart. The 
latter connects fragmented publics via nationwide mass media, such that a large audience can parti-
cipate in the same discourse.36 So long as the EU does not itself  become a nation state, the common 
public sphere cannot reach the same level of  integration. Language barriers and the continued polit-
ical relevance of  borders will prevent the emergence of  continental media that cater to a large audi -
ence.37 But a  rational  debate about topics of  shared interest  might still  be  possible,  if  there is  
enough linkage among domestic public spheres. According to Habermas, such an interweaving of  
national discourses offers the best chance for the emergence of  a robust European communication 
space.38
There are several possible interfaces that can link public spheres with one another: Union offi-
cials and transnational NGOs can address each local audience at the same time; domestic media can  
include guest speakers from other member states; European media that serve a transnational elite  
audience can influence local opinion makers; and domestic news reporting can converge around sa -
lient political events, such as for example summit meetings.39 If  these interfaces were developed 
enough, national public opinion formation could avail itself  of  all relevant information and per-
36 Michael Brüggemann et al.,  "Transnationale Öffentlichkeit in Europa. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven,"  Pub-
lizistik 54, no. 3 (2009), 396.
37 As Brüggemann et al. observe, the lack of  European media with a large audience is a “commonplace” in the literat-
ure. See ———, "Transnationale Öffentlichkeit in Europa. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven," 396.
38 Jürgen Habermas, "Why Europe Needs a Constitution," in Developing a Constitution for Europe, ed. Erik Odvar 
Eriksen, et al. (London: Routledge, 2004), 28-31; ———, Zur Verfassung Europas, 77-78.
39 Brügemann et al. discuss each of  these possible links in detail. See Brüggemann et al., "Transnationale Öffentlichkeit 
in Europa. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven," 396-405.
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spectives. Citizens in each member state would then be able to debate the same topics at the same  
time, with similar degrees of  attention paid to them. What is more, shared frames of  meaning and 
reference could emerge, which is an essential precondition for a genuine transnational conversa-
tion.40
Is there a robust European communication space in the sense just defined? Let us assume that  
domestic public spheres fulfill the criteria of  legal rights, civil society development, and media infra -
structure. Our main concern is then whether these separate communication spaces are linked to a  
sufficient degree. This question poses various operationalization and measurement challenges. One 
would furthermore have to define a cutoff  point for the adequate empirical degree of  “Europeaniz-
ation.” Yet here we need not consider the issue in detail. Based on existing studies, it would seem 
fair to conclude that linkage among national public spheres falls short of  a desirable level; at the 
same time, the goal of  interweaving does not appear unrealistic altogether.41
Optimism regarding the democratic potential of  the EU would nonetheless be premature. As 
the following will show, the main faults of  the status quo lie elsewhere. The design of  legislative in-
stitutions hinders pursuit of  the common good. Elected representatives are furthermore under in-
sufficient constraint to engage with public opinion. In addition, the commitment of  both citizens 
and elites to the European public weal appears to be rather shallow, calling into question that ra -
tional opinion and will formation is possible to a meaningful extent.
Consider first the problems at the level of  the political system. As we have seen, Union law-
making has two pillars: the European Council shapes the agenda, whereas Commission, Council, 
and Parliament hammer out the details of  legislation through a bicameral process (see Chapter 2).  
40 Scholars using the Habermasian paradigm have for some time seen these criteria as indispensable for a working 
European public sphere. See Thomas Risse,  A Community of  Europeans (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 
113-120.
41 Brügemann et al. and Risse provide the best summaries of  the empirical literature. See Brüggemann et al., "Transna-
tionale Öffentlichkeit in Europa. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven." and Risse, A Community of  Europeans, 127-
174.
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To be sure, in how far the European Council is a genuine principal in this scheme is difficult to as-
certain. We have noted that it guides the work of  the Commission. Yet it might still be the case that 
most important decisions occur later in the process. This empirical question is beyond the scope of  
the present analysis. Let us just observe that it seems probable for the summit meetings to have a  
more than negligible impact on legislative output. We should also keep in mind that national leaders  
exercise sole decision making power where the OMC is used, including, for example, the coordina-
tion of  labor market regulation, social insurance, and tax policies under the Euro Plus Pact. Against 
this background, our assessment of  the status quo should depend in significant measure on the pro-
cedural features of  the European Council.
This institution will find it hard to pursue the common good because it operates under con-
sensus rule. Hence one should not expect deliberation about the public interest. Rather, national 
leaders will bargain to reach a Pareto efficient outcome. Since no member state can be outvoted, the  
leaders assembled in the European Council have little incentive to build coalitions on the basis of  a  
persuasive vision of  the common good. The heads of  state and government might in fact be under  
pressure from their respective electorate to mount an intransigent defense of  the national interest. 
Given these circumstances, it will be difficult for the European Council to adopt policies that im-
pose sacrifice for the whole on some or even just one member state.
Why is that so problematic? A skeptic could respond that we have in fact no better measure of  
the common good than the Pareto principle. In fields where national peoples value their independ-
ence, the argument might run, governments should rule out losing a vote. Even if  this means that  
some potential benefits of  cooperation remain untapped, no member state will end up in a worse 
position or need to submit to external domination. But the objection is unpersuasive. The same 
reasoning would be absurd, if  one applied it to the domestic context. Here individual citizens or so-
126
cial groups do not have a veto to ensure that public policies make all better off. Rather it seems  
evident that individuals will often need to accept sacrifice in order to ensure the long term health  
and justice of  the commonwealth. Holding European governance to a different standard would be a 
mistake. In fields of  exclusive Union power, the member states can no longer make their own rules. 
Even where national governments still have the competence to legislate, a common regime is often 
the best or sole chance to realize a certain public objective. In other words, when consensus require -
ments impede the creation of  joint rules, the member states remain unable to pursue the goal at is -
sue.42 This represents an illegitimate constraint on democratic legislation. Insofar as legal preemp-
tion hamstrings public power, the member state peoples are worse off  than under the status quo  
ante. And even where factual interdependence is the immediate obstacle to national action, one can 
find institutional hurdles to common policies objectionable. Uncoordinated domestic regulation fails 
in the presence of  dense crossborder social relations. The existence of  such ties is often, in the first  
place, due to European integration, and Brussels should therefore make up for the weakening of  na-
tional governments. When it fails to do so, the blame for the resulting democratic shortfall lies with  
the EU. In addition, one might question if  a single people has ever an unconditional right to block a 
solution to a transnational problem. Such a veto, this much is certain, would contradict the ethos of  
a Bund that, unlike an international organization, pursues solidaristic cooperation.
A second problem with the summit mechanism is that national leaders are under too little pres -
sure  to  defend  their  stance  before  the  domestic  public  sphere.  Diplomatic  bargaining  in  the 
European Council takes place behind closed doors. It is hence all the more important that national 
parliaments have adequate procedures in place to hold the government accountable. Chapter 5 will  
consider this subject in greater detail. For the moment, let us just note that, while comprehensive 
empirical data is unavailable, it seems that in most member states, the legislature does not reach its  
42 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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full potential in making the European policies of  the executive subject to ongoing public debate 
between government and opposition.  Insofar as this  holds true,  national  leaders are free to act  
without much regard for the views of  their voters.
What about the bicameral pillar? Here the institutional parameters are more favorable to a com-
mon good orientation. First, the Commission is independent and technocratic. Its members are ex-
pected to represent the European public interest and do not report to the national government that  
has appointed them. Second, the Council operates based on QMV (at least under the OLP). This 
could open the door for a deliberative form of  lawmaking, in which national governments seek to 
convince their peers that a particular solution realizes a shared interest. To succeed, a delegate would 
then need to persuade a winning coalition of  its viewpoint. Since defeat is possible, each participant 
would be forced to listen. Nonetheless, it might of  course still be the case that member states bar-
gain,  without  arguing  over  the  common good.  Empirical  studies  have  demonstrated  that  both  
modes of  interaction play a role; in fact, bargaining seems to remain somewhat more important  
than deliberation.43 Even so, given that no individual member state can block legislation for a selfish  
reason (unless it blackmails the other governments, threatening to make use of  its right to exit from 
the EU), the outcome is likelier to reflect the interest of  the whole than under consensus rule. Con-
sider last the Parliament. Voting in this institution is majoritarian. The deputies furthermore repres-
ent parties, not their countries of  origin. This should facilitate a deliberative mode of  proceeding.  
And, indeed, research has shown that debates in Parliament meet a high standard of  rational dis -
course.44
43 Daniel Naurin, "Most Common when Least Important. Deliberation in the Council of  Ministers," British Journal of  
Political Science 40, no. 1 (2010). Andreas Warntjen, though, cautions that observational equivalence makes it diffi -
cult to ascertain if  deliberation or bargaining is the predominant interaction mode. See Andreas Warntjen, "Between 
Bargaining and Deliberation. Decision Making in the Council of  the European Union," Journal of  European Public  
Policy 17, no. 5 (2010).
44 Christopher Lord and Dionysia Tamvaki, "The Politics of  Justification? Applying the 'Discourse Quality Index' to  
the Study of  the European Parliament," in RECON Online Working Papers (Oslo: ARENA, 2011).
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But even if  the bicameral process faces less of  an institutional barrier to pursuit of  the com-
mon good, it still does not give elected leaders enough incentive to engage with public opinion. 
Some might blame the peculiar nature of  the Commission: national governments appoint its mem-
bers – their work is not subject to evaluation at the polls. This, however, does not have to be a 
shortcoming. Perhaps, a union of  peoples should assign the executive function to technocrats. It 
might be unwise for a heterarchical system to create a government with its own electoral mandate,  
as  this could lead to a gradual eclipse of  the member states  as independent political  units  (see  
Chapter 5). From such a perspective, the Commission should remain a trustee of  the national exec-
utives, charged with rule enforcement and legislative initiative at their behest.
In contrast, there is no question that Council and Parliament must interact with the public  
sphere. Yet, at the moment, neither institution performs well on this dimension. The former, unlike  
the European Council, meets in public, at least when it reads legislation. In principle, citizens can 
therefore access information regarding the actions of  their government. But here, too, we have to 
question if  national parliaments subject the policies of  the executive to the right form of  oversight.  
Some will find this issue of  minor relevance. The Strasbourg legislature, the argument might run, 
has become powerful enough to supplement the domestic legitimation channel and make up for its  
weaknesses. Indeed, through continuous reform, the Parliament has turned into a formidable legis-
lative actor. European citizens, alas, remain unimpressed. The continental polls are still foremost 
“second order” elections: national parties contest the seats within their respective member state, and 
voters tend to choose representatives based on the performance of  government and opposition in 
the domestic political arena.45 At the same time, low participation makes for a regular embarrass-
ment to the EU. Turnout has seen uninterrupted decline since 1979, when the first direction elec-
45 Jürgen Mittag and Claudia Hülsken, "Von Sekundärwahlen zu Europäisierten Wahlen? 30 Jahre Direktwahlen zum 
Europäischen Parlament," integration 2 (2009), 116-118.
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tion took place. In 2009, it reached the new historic low of  43 percent overall, with national parti -
cipation as low as 20 percent in Slovakia. As Chapter 5 will explain, such voter disinterest is a re-
sponse to the lack of  meaningful political competition at the Union level. This situation cannot be  
changed without drastic institutional reform: so long as there are no genuine continental parties, and 
so long as the member state governments maintain their current role in the legislative process, the  
Parliament cannot emerge as the voice of  a transnational  demos (if  such a transformation would 
even be desirable is of  course a different question).
To complete the argument of  this section, let us next examine whether the background condi-
tions for rational opinion and will formation hold for European politics: is social power neutralized 
in the legislative process? And can it depend on the virtue of  citizens and elites? The first question  
turns foremost on whether transfer of  competence to Brussels implies a more unfair distribution of  
access to power than we find in the member states. Scholarship has so far not identified such an ef-
fect, although one might speculate that secret European Council negotiations are more susceptible 
to undue influence than open deliberation in a parliament. Another relevant issue concerns the dis-
tribution of  power among the member states. Here it seems that Union institutions make an effort  
to strike a fair balance between large and small countries – procedural rules are designed to protect  
the  latter  from marginalization,  but  also take  account  of  population  size  in  allocating  power.46 
Therefore, relations among the member states differ from the anarchical environment of  interna-
tional politics, where might is often enough right. In sum, there is little evidence that Union gov-
ernance is subject to greater distortions from social power than national decision making. As for the  
issue  of  political  virtue,  one  has  to  be  more  skeptical.  The  decisive  question  here  is  whether  
46 All member states have one vote in the European Council; each national government appoints one Commissioner  
and one ECJ judge. Under the Nice QMV rules (in force until 2014), voting weight in the Council depends on popu -
lation size, but  smaller countries have greater proportional influence; the Lisbon QMV system requires a 65 percent  
population majority, in addition to 55 percent of  the member states. Seat distribution in the Parliament is likewise  
based on a formula that gives smaller countries more representatives per citizen than larger countries have.
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Europeans  share a  political  identity  that  motivates a commitment to the public  weal,  similar  in 
strength to the equivalent attitudes toward national peoples. Note that in a heterarchical setting, this  
sentiment does not have to and indeed should not replace attachment to a member state. Identifica-
tion with the latter is desirable, so long as it does not remain exclusive. An ideal citizen of  a Bund  
has a dual sense of  belonging that implies simultaneous affiliation with the unit and with the over-
arching collective. Such a mindset is essential to rational opinion formation in the continental public 
sphere, for it allows citizens to perceive European questions as matters of  shared concern, rather 
than in terms of  what is best for their respective member state.47 Similar considerations hold for 
political elites. To be sure, their behavior depends in the first instance on institutional factors. Above 
I have argued that voting rules in particular determine whether Union decision making can reflect 
the European public interest. Still, even the best designed legislative process will to some extent de-
pend on congenial dispositions of  its participants.
Thomas Risse has undertaken the most comprehensive effort to assess if  normal citizens and 
political elites possess the requisite attitudes. The results paint a mixed picture. Risse refutes the as-
sertion that an imagined community does not exist  at all.48 But allegiance to it  remains uneven 
across the member states, and we should question if  this sense of  belonging engenders a deep com-
mitment to the Union public interest. In 2004, a narrow plurality of  Eurobarometer respondents 
identified both with their member state and Europe (46 percent). But at the same time, 41 percent  
reported  exclusive  national  attachment.  These  average figures  mask  large  disparities  among the 
member states. In some countries, more than 60 percent of  respondents have a dual identity (Lux-
embourg, Italy, France, Spain, and Germany). But in other member states, exclusive nationalists re -
main in the majority (UK, Finland, Sweden, Greece, Austria).49 With regard to the elite level, Risse 
47 Risse, A Community of  Europeans, 120-125.
48 For the various incarnations of  this claim see ———, A Community of  Europeans, 38.
49 ———, A Community of  Europeans, 41-42.
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has analyzed discourse in the UK, Germany, France, Spain, and Poland. He concludes that in the  
UK, most politicians still  adhere to an exclusive form of  British identity.  German, French, and 
Spanish leaders embrace a dual affiliation to nation and EU; in Poland the question remains unde-
cided.50
These findings might suggest cautious optimism that political attitudes suitable to undergird a 
heterarchical order exist. But we should note that even insofar as citizens and elites feel attached to  
the EU, the depth of  their commitment to its public weal remains doubtful. There is little survey  
data relevant to this question.51 In any event, it would seem more useful to observe actual behavior 
instead of  taking questionnaire responses at face value. Risse presents some indication that national  
public debates frame questions of  European governance as involving a shared concern. In other  
words, speakers ask what is good for the whole continent, rather than focusing on the interest of  
their respective member state. This held true regarding the controversies over the Eastern enlarge-
ment, the TCE, and the participation of  the extreme right wing politician Jörg Haider in the Aus-
trian government.52 But none of  these debates involved a recognizable conflict of  interest among 
different member state peoples. Thus one cannot infer much from the observation that national dis-
course took a continental perspective. Moreover, anecdotal evidence from the Eurozone crisis sug-
gests that when the distributive stakes are high, public debate can lose sight of  the shared interest 
and even take a jingoist turn.53 This leads one to suspect that transnational solidaristic feelings re-
main shallow and have limited behavioral impact.
What about political elites? Measuring the depth of  their commitment to the Union common 
good is rather more difficult. A systematic evaluation would have to take a stance on the content of  
the shared interest and compare it with the actual positions that leaders adopted. In order to prove 
50 ———, A Community of  Europeans, 63-86.
51 ———, A Community of  Europeans, 59-61.
52 ———, A Community of  Europeans, 162-168.
53 Severin Weiland and Philipp Wittrock, "Griechen vs. Deutsche," Spiegel ONLINE, 16 February 2012.
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that a lack of  European public spirit explains a deviation from the range of  acceptable behavior,  
one would furthermore have to show that it did not result from institutional constraints (such as  
consensus voting) or unsurmountable electoral pressures at home. Such an investigation – if  at all 
possible – is beyond our scope here. But let us again take a (not so rigorous) look at the woes of  the 
Eurozone. The actions of  member state leaders before and during the crisis suggest that one must  
doubt their common good orientation. Greek politicians, for example, manipulated budget data to 
gain admission into the Eurozone and continued to doctor the statistics for another decade.54 At the 
same time, the leaders of  member states with sounder public finances did not make a flattering im-
pression either. In the debate about the best response to excessive sovereign debt, politicians in the  
richer North often seemed to pursue short term national advantage, instead of  a solution that would 
maximize the good of  the whole.
In conclusion, the status quo has a significant democratic deficit, at least if  we judge it from a 
Habermasian perspective.  There is  an incipient,  though still  weak,  transnational  communication  
space that might, in the future, permit rational deliberation about the shared interest of  the contin -
ent. But this will remain of  limited use, so long as there is no proper link between public sphere and  
the Union political system. At the moment, that is not the case because the latter retains institutional  
hurdles to pursuit of  the common good, and because it does not impose sufficient constraint on  
elected leaders to defend their actions before voters. We should furthermore question if  citizen and  
elite identification with the EU is strong enough to support rational opinion and will formation.
54 John W. Miller, "Obscure EU Statistics Bureau May Be Getting Higher Profile," The Wall Street Journal, 10 Novem-
ber 2004, Tony Barber and Kerin Hope, "Brussels Attacks Greece over False Data,"  Financial Times, 13 January 
2010.
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Obstacles to Effective Domestic Review
In agreement with the preceding, the German Lisbon decision holds that European lawmaking re -
mains undemocratic. To be sure, the standard of  evaluation that informs this judgment is different 
from the one we have applied. The FCC often strikes rather Habermasian notes.55 Yet its main con-
cern is that Union organs deviate from the “one person, one vote” principle: small member states 
and their  citizens wield disproportionate influence (see Introduction).  Of  course,  this  reasoning 
misses the point, if  our question is whether the EU meets the standard required of  a heterarchical  
order. The latter establishes a political union of  peoples, and hence it would seem permissible for  
small member states to have some protection from marginalization.56 Nonetheless, the status quo 
also fails to meet the criteria that are in fact germane to it. Or so I have argued above.
But whatever makes European lawmaking undemocratic,  from the dualist viewpoint of  the 
FCC, there is no serious problem. The Lisbon decision argues that, given its limited substantive 
reach, Union governance does not in fact require the same legitimation as political decision making 
in the domestic context (see Introduction). What matters is that national governments retain control 
over certain essential fields – the “core state functions.” As we recall, these include the penal law,  
disposition over police and military, the tax system, social policy, and fields with a strong cultural as -
pect such as family law, education, and religious policy. The court will  engage in “constitutional  
identity protection”, striking down European norms that encroach on this sphere.57 But outside of  
55 According to the Lisbon judgment, the essence of  democratic legislation is the link between public opinion and col -
lective decision making: voters come to understand political choices through observing the struggle between govern-
ment and opposition; elections guarantee that such public opinion formation has an impact on decision making. See 
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 250.
56 In response to the Lisbon judgment, Christoph Schönberger has pointed out that federal polities often allow for sig-
nificant deviation from the “one person, one vote” principle. See Christoph Schönberger, "Lisbon in Karlsruhe.  
Maastricht's Epigones at Sea," German Law Journal 10, no. 08 (2009).
57 Peter Lindseth observes a parallel between the notion of  core state functions and the “essentialness” doctrine, which 
the FCC applies to administrative delegation in the domestic context. This jurisprudence forbids the German parlia -
ment to give up certain powers to the executive. In particular, the latter should not be able to create norms that af -
fect constitutional rights or matters of  similar importance. As noted in Chapter 2, Lindseth holds that Union gov-
ernance is based on a form of  administrative delegation. On his view, the FCC must therefore put forward an equi -
valent of  the essentialness doctrine, ensuring that integration does not remove power from the national sphere,  
134
the reserved domain, national executive leadership combined with legislative oversight is sufficient. 
What, then, is the role of  direct citizen participation at the Union level, in particular via the Parlia -
ment? The latter, according to the court, has a useful “supplemental” role, on whose precise nature 
the judges decline to elaborate further.
This line of  reasoning is unpersuasive. For one thing, limiting permissible fields of  Union ac-
tion does not address the problem that, due to the consensus orientation of  the legislative process,  
Brussels can often not pursue the shared interest of  the continent. And even if  we disregard this as-
pect of  the European democratic malaise, the notion of  core state functions is confused – there is  
no systematic rationale behind the list the court has drawn up.58 The Lisbon decision states the ob-
vious, when it points out the need of  democratic participation within the enumerated fields. Yet the 
judges fail to explain why this catalog is exhaustive. To demonstrate that European lawmaking can 
proceed without strong independent legitimation, the FCC would have had to examine what Brus-
sels does, instead of  what it does not do.
Such an investigation might have stood on the shoulders of  an important strand in EU scholar-
ship,  which describes Union governance as  unpolitical.  In a 1998 book,  Giandomenico Majone 
claimed that most European rules do not entail redistribution of  material benefit, but rather deal  
with market failures, whose correction is good for all. Hence one should not be too concerned 
about democratic participation.59 Most scholars, including Majone himself, believe this account is 
now outdated, given that current EU policies often create winners and losers.60 But we should note 
which the Bundestag should retain. See Lindseth,  Power and Legitimacy, 186. Without doubt, the notion of  core 
state functions is akin to the essentialness doctrine. Note, however, the large difference in scope: constitutional iden-
tity protection is restricted to enumerated fields; the criterion of  rights impact has been dropped altogether. Given  
this narrow ambit, one cannot maintain that integration leaves all important political choices to the national demo-
cratic process. Or so, at least, I argue below.
58 This point has often been made in the literature. See for example Halberstam and Möllers, "The German Constitu-
tional Court says 'Ja zu Deutschland!'."
59 Giandomenico Majone, "Europe's 'Democratic Deficit.' The Question of  Standards," European Law Journal 4, no. 1 
(1998).
60 Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy, 36-37.
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that Andrew Moravscik has put forward a different version of  the claim that integration does not in 
fact  pose  a  democratic  challenge.  He argues  that  Union governance  lacks  salience  for  national  
voters. Although some common rules might have a redistributive effect, the wider electorate does 
not consider European topics when making political choices. Meanwhile, all the issues that people in 
fact care about remain under national control.61
The problem here is that Moravscik takes the lack of  voter interest at face value; he does not 
take into account that it might result from a deficient institutional setup. In response to him, An-
dreas Føllesdal and Simon Hix maintain that salience hinges on whether a question is contested 
within the political system. Unless identifiable factions disagree over some topic, voters cannot in-
clude the issue in their decision calculus, when choosing among parties and individual leaders. 62 As 
we noted earlier, contestation of  European issues remains weak, both in the domestic and transna-
tional realm. In light of  this, the right question to ask is not whether voters pay attention, but rather: 
should they care, given the objective importance of  Union governance? If  the latter has a strong in-
fluence on their life, we should expect a different institutional structure, allowing for more political 
competition, to increase the salience of  European issues.
To be sure, Moravscik is right that, in the past, the impact of  Union regulation has often been 
exaggerated. Former Commission President Jacques Delors once claimed that 80 percent of  do-
mestic legislation implements a European measure. This number does not hold up to scrutiny. As  
Moravscik reports, the accurate figure is closer to 10-20 percent.63 But how important is that share? 
Recall the scope of  the treaty mandate: the EU governs the internal market, it pursues an economic  
and monetary union, and it seeks to establish an “area of  freedom, security, and justice” through po-
lice and judicial cooperation; in addition, the member states formulate a common foreign and secur -
61 Andrew Moravscik, "The Myth of  Europe's 'Democratic Deficit'," Intereconomics 43, no. 6 (2008), 332-333.
62 Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, "Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU. A Response to Majone and  
Moravscik," Journal of  Common Market Studies 44, no. 3 (2006), 545-546.
63 Moravscik, "The Myth of  Europe's 'Democratic Deficit'," 333.
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ity policy (see Chapter 2). The following will argue that in all these fields, except the last one, Union  
governance touches on controversial issues that deserve of  stronger politicization.
Consider first internal market governance. By means of  court rulings and legislation, the EU re-
moves barriers to the free movement of  goods, services, capital and labor. If  domestic norms con-
stitute such obstacles, the ECJ will annul them. Via legislation, Brussels can establish a harmonized  
regime to replace national limits. Later in this chapter, it will become clear that judicial market integ -
ration has often high political stakes – European rules need to balance private economic freedom 
and public interests, which domestic courts might otherwise choose to protect. Legislative harmon-
ization can likewise affect important social concerns. One prominent example has been the 2006 
“Bolkestein directive” on the liberalization of  trade in services. In fact, the debate around this par -
ticular measure contradicted the hypothesis that normal citizens do not care about Union issues.  
Left wing political forces ran an intense public campaign against the directive because it was expec -
ted to put pressure on wages in the richer member states. In France, negative perception of  the ini -
tial Commission draft might even have been responsible for the referendum vote against the TCE.64
What about the economic and monetary union? Moravscik argues that, here, it would make 
little sense to diagnose a legitimation deficit. EU competence in this field rests for the most part  
with the European Central Bank, which is (and should be) just as independent from democratic 
control as its national counterparts.65 That is correct. Yet, as the Eurozone crisis has brought home, 
the shared currency is not sustainable without coordination of  labor market regulation, social insur-
ance, and fiscal policies. Moravscik, writing in 2008, could not anticipate this development, but the  
latest crisis responses mark, or at least foreshadow, a significant expansion of  Union governance 
into the most contested fields of  modern politics (see Chapter 2).
64 Amandine Crespy, "Legitimizing Resistance to EU Integration. Social Europe as a Europeanized Normative Frame  
in the Conflict over the Bolkestein Directive," in Les Cahiers Européens de Sciences Po (Paris: 2010).
65 Moravscik, "The Myth of  Europe's 'Democratic Deficit'," 335.
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Police and judicial cooperation likewise touches upon questions that might give rise to vigorous 
public dispute. According to Moravscik, the EU does not play an important role with regard to the  
maintenance of  “law and order.”66 That is false. Past and ongoing debates about the European Ar-
rest Warrant, telecommunications data retention, or external border policing in the face of  strong  
immigration pressure suggest that Brussels has the power to enact controversial rules.67 If  the insti-
tutional framework allowed for partisan contestation of  such issues, one should expect the wider 
electorate to take notice and to evaluate politicians on the basis of  their respective stand.
The sole aspect of  Union governance that does not require improved democratic legitimation is  
CFSP. Foreign policy is, qua its nature, not based on general statutes that emerge from open deliber -
ation in the legislature. Rather it demands the concentration of  decision making power in the exec -
utive, which must often act in secret to realize the public interest. The fact that member state leaders  
negotiate common policies behind closed doors – without much involvement from domestic or 
European parliamentarians – is therefore unproblematic. Coordination at the Union level does not  
give a member state executive undue power that it would otherwise lack.
In sum, the integration process has removed enough competences from the national sphere to  
necessitate strong democratic legitimation. This demand is all the more urgent given that power 
transfer to Brussels looks set to continue in the future. “Constitutional identity protection” must  
therefore fail to achieve its stated goal. When the FCC put forward this notion, it entered a fight  
66 ———, "The Myth of  Europe's 'Democratic Deficit'," 333.
67 The implementation of  the European Arrest Warrant has been challenged before several member state high courts.  
See Jan Komárek, "European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant. In Search of  the Limits of  'Con-
trapunctual Principles'," Common Market Law Review 44, no. 1 (2007). Alleged misuse of  the regime has provoked 
criticism, especially in the UK. See Andrew Bowcott, "Trivial Cases Undermining European Arrest Warrants, Warns 
Brussels," The Guardian, 10 April 2011. The EU data retention directive (2006/24/EC) has likewise led to numer -
ous domestic lawsuits and heated public debate. See Christian DeSimone, "Pitting Karlsruhe Against Luxembourg? 
German Data Protection and the Contested Implementation of  the EU Data Retention Directive,"  German Law 
Journal 11, no. 3 (2010). EU immigration policy has long been subject to vigorous dispute across the continent. See 
Peo Hansen, "More Barbwire or More Immigration, or Both. EU Migration Policy in the Nexus of  Border Security 
Management and Neoliberal Economic Growth," The Whitehead Journal of  Diplomacy and International Relations 
11, no. 1 (2010).
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that has been lost some time ago. If  the court were serious about keeping the EU out of  fields that  
demand robust citizen participation, it would have to strike down a vast amount of  extant and fu-
ture legislation. But that is of  course an unrealistic prospect. The sole benefit of  the new doctrine,  
we must conclude, is to let the FCC maintain the semblance of  a coherent dualist stance. It does 
little  or  nothing to compensate for the  shortfall  of  independent  democratic  legitimation at  the 
Union level.
Discontents of  Hybridity
To a significant extent, the predicament just described results from the mixed character of  the EU. 
From the pluralist viewpoint, the legitimation of  European norms should be comparable to parlia-
mentarism in the domestic sphere. Yet that is not the case, at least in part because the Union order 
retains international organization features, leaving its transition to a federal system incomplete. To 
be sure, this fact is not responsible for all the problems we diagnosed. First, the treaties cannot pre-
scribe a confluence of  the national public spheres into a shared communication space. At best, one 
can hope that a more federal institutional structure would encourage such a development. Second,  
the domestic legitimation of  executive action in Brussels is outside the purview of  European law – 
reform would have to occur at the member state level. Last, the failure of  the Parliament to estab-
lish a meaningful connection between voters and legislative decision making could persist even if  
the EU became a genuine Bund (see Chapter 5).
However, the tension between international organization traits and federal characteristics lies  
behind the remainder of  the democratic deficit, as seen from a pluralist standpoint. To begin with,  
the central role of  the European Council is detrimental to the common good orientation of  the le -
gislative process and makes it less accountable to voters. The rise of  summit diplomacy since the 
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1970s is a testament to the success of  the antifederalist camp that has sought to rein in the suprana-
tional element of  integration. Combined with the simultaneous expansion of  the Union mandate,  
this trend has proven inimical to democratic legitimation of  the ever more powerful European Be-
hemoth. The dubious commitment of  member state citizens and politicians to the overarching pub -
lic weal might likewise be related to the hybrid nature of  the status quo. I have argued that we can -
not understand the treaties to derive from a popular choice to establish a transnational constitution 
(see Chapter 2). Even if  certain other features of  the present constellation place it rather close to a  
federal system, the decision to scrap the 2004 TCE underlined once more the reluctance of  the con-
tinent to embrace political union in symbolic terms. The recent introduction of  an explicit with -
drawal clause and, for that matter, dualist court rulings such as the German Lisbon decision also 
cultivate a public impression that European integration remains focused on traditional cooperation 
among sovereign states. Against this background, the nature of  the EU remains too ambiguous to 
inspire widespread dedication to its common good. So long as there is no definite symbolic commit-
ment to a federal regime, we should not expect this situation to change.
From the dualist perspective, of  course, the democratic anemia of  Union lawmaking is not that  
worrisome: member state high courts, runs the argument, preserve the legitimation function of  the 
domestic constitutional order through forestalling delegation of  sensitive powers to Brussels. Yet, as  
we have seen, that is a chimerical promise. Here, too, the reason is the mixed character of  the EU.  
Chapter 2 observed that Union competence has reached federal proportions. This makes it imprac-
ticable for judges to treat it like the more circumscribed mandate of  an international organization. 
If  a court nonetheless takes such a stance, it must – like the FCC – restrict the constitutional imper -
ative of  democratic legitimation to a range of  public tasks that is both arbitrary and too narrow.
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Basic Rights Protection
We have one more principle of  constitutionalism to examine. As the previous chapter has discussed, 
the ECJ protects fundamental liberties against Union organs, and it reviews member state actions  
that fall under European law. Recall the legal bases of  this jurisprudence: individuals can sue to en-
force the rights of  EU citizenship, the internal market freedoms, or the liberties enshrined in the 
Fundamental Rights Charter. This system of  rights protection, I will now argue, suffers from im-
portant structural deficits. Once more, domestic review cannot make up for the shortfall: it must fail  
to preserve the substance of  the domestic constitutional order against the transformative impact of  
rights litigation in the ECJ.
The Deficit at the Union Level
The pluralist understanding of  the status quo postulates that European law guarantees an adequate  
scheme of  basic rights. At first sight, this seems indeed to be the case. Union citizens have a full set  
of  standard constitutional protections. However, the institutional framework through which rights 
are being enforced is deficient: there are gaps with regard to access to justice, and the ECJ wields  
disproportionate power to elaborate the content of  individual freedom. Let us consider each prob-
lem in turn.
Potential complainants will often find it difficult to initiate judicial review of  a Union measure 
alleged to violate a European basic right. There is no constitutional complaint procedure that would 
permit an individual to challenge legislation in Luxembourg. Private access is limited to executive 
measures that address the plaintiff  or acts of  “direct and individual concern” to a legal person.68 
The ECJ has made it next to impossible to meet this standard: in effect, the complainant has to 
68 Private legal subjects can attempt to challenge a European measure via the annulment procedure set forth in Art.  
263 TFEU. The Lisbon version of  this clause has dropped the requirement of  “individual concern” for acts that do  
not require formal domestic implementation. A challenge to such a measure is admissible, if  the plaintiff  can show  
“direct concern”, meaning some effect on her legal position.
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show that a measure operates as if  it were addressed to her and no one else. 69 Hence a detour via a 
domestic court is often the sole avenue for an individual to obtain redress. But this route to Luxem-
bourg is less than ideal from a legal protection viewpoint. First, it cannot be used to challenge a  
Union act that does not require a national implementation measure (unless the plaintiff  first breaks 
the law to invite a domestic enforcement proceeding, in the course of  which she might then contest 
the European norm). Second, a litigant cannot formulate the terms of  a preliminary reference – the 
national judge will define the issue for the ECJ to resolve. Third, a plaintiff  will often have to go 
through several instances before she can persuade a domestic court to refer a question, or the case  
reaches the highest appellate level, which is obliged to involve the ECJ.70 On the whole, then, it is 
more difficult for private actors to challenge a European measure than to challenge a member state 
legal act. In a telling contrast, this does not hold true for the European rights that individuals have  
against the member states. ECJ doctrine compels each member state to guarantee an effective sys-
tem of  remedies to enforce obligations that national governments have against private legal actors,  
including free movement, equal treatment, and the internal market liberties.71 To sum up, in terms 
of  enforcement, the vertical dimension of  Union citizenship is much stronger than its horizontal di-
mension.
However, the more serious fault of  European basic rights protection is the asymmetric power 
of  the judicial branch: when the ECJ elaborates the content of  individual freedom, it does not enter  
a dialog with democratic will formation. As Chapter 1 has argued, rights jurisprudence should be an 
iterative process, through which courts educate public opinion, while remaining, at the same time,  
sensitive to its political expression. A constitutional order, we noted, can promote such a relation-
69 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca,  EU Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 512.
70 Alexandra Dubová,  "Individuals at the Gates of  the European Court of  Justice" (Central  European University, 
2010), 64-67.
71 George Bermann et al., Cases and Materials on European Union Law, 2nd ed. (St. Paul: West Group, 2002), 387-422.
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ship through a proper balance of  power between judicial and legislative branch – courts will be 
more disposed to listen to public opinion, if  their jurisprudence might trigger a response in the  
form of  a constitutional amendment or a statute.
To be sure, such interaction with democratic will formation is most important when reasonable 
people disagree about the proper meaning of  a right. Does such contestation occur with regard to  
European liberties? When the Luxembourg court examines if  Union measures violate a basic indi -
vidual freedom, this does not seem to be the case. The outcome in such lawsuits has seldom, if  ever,  
provoked a strong critical reaction. This might of  course change as the European sphere continues  
to expand into new fields. But at present, the rights that individuals have against the member states 
furnish the more important source of  disagreement. Here interpretation has turned out to be con-
troversial, for these “horizontal” liberties often stand in tension with domestic rights or public in-
terests.
Sometimes, of  course,  the ECJ seeks to avoid conflict  with existing national  practice.  One 
much cited example is the Grogan judgment.72 In this dispute, the ECJ had to weigh market integra-
tion against the right to life of  the unborn, protected under the Irish constitution. Student union  
leaders had argued that an injunction to cease publishing the addresses of  abortion clinics in the UK 
violated the freedom to provide services. The ECJ found that such a link was not evident (although 
some believed that precedent would have suggested the opposite result).73 Thus it staved off  a direct 
confrontation with the Irish Supreme Court, which had made clear that it would uphold the injunc-
tion, regardless of  the European decision. Another instance of  such conflict prevention is the Keck 
ruling mentioned above. This decision modifies the earlier Cassis de Dijon judgment, which forbids 
any national regulation that hinders marketing of  goods from another EU state, even if  the measure 
72 ECJ case C-159/90.
73 Diarmuid Rossa Phelan, "Right to Life of  the Unborn v Promotion of  Trade in Services. The European Court of  
Justice and the Normative Shaping of  the Union," Modern Law Review 55, no. 5 (1992).
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in question does not discriminate in favor of  domestic products. A national government has to  
demonstrate a legitimate public concern to override this interpretation of  the free movement of  
goods principle. Under the Cassis test, the ECJ has been able to sanction consumer protection or 
environmental policies. But it could not recognize more diffuse social, cultural, and economic in-
terests as permissible limits to the internal market. To make this stance more flexible, Keck exempts 
“selling arrangements” from review, so long as there is no discrimination against goods from other  
member states (“product characteristics” remain subject to the old test).74
But the ECJ does not always pursue conciliation. Often its rulings have a transformative im-
pact. In particular,  the court has destabilized longstanding national equilibria between social and 
economic freedom. One prominent critic of  this jurisprudence is Fritz Scharpf. He points out that  
strict implementation of  equal treatment undermines the domestic welfare state. The Luxembourg 
judges have consistently ruled in favor of  EU citizens seeking access to public services in a host  
state. This approach might undermine the local welfare state because it creates a chance to freeride: 
immigrants from other EU countries can take advantage of  public services, but often do not make a  
long term contribution to their funding. Such opportunistic behavior could force governments to 
reduce the provision of  services.75 Scharpf  also notes that ECJ rulings have strengthened the in-
ternal market at the cost of  labor rights, national influence over corporate governance, and national 
taxation of  mobile capital.76
In these cases, rights enforcement should have interacted with democratic will formation. Free 
movement, equal treatment, and the internal market freedoms are of  course essential to the integra-
tion project. But politicians should participate in balancing these rights with other individual liberties 
74 ECJ case C-267/91 and case C-268/91.
75 Fritz Scharpf, "Legitimität im europäischen Mehrebenensystem," Leviathan 37, no. 2 (2009b), 265-272.
76 ———, "Legitimität im europäischen Mehrebenensystem," 264-265. Scharpf  does not think of  the Luxembourg 
judges as neoliberal conspirators. His point is rather that in order to strengthen its own power, the ECJ gives ever  
more weight to the internal market freedoms. On this view, the weakening of  the national welfare state is a more or  
less accidental byproduct of  an institutional bias.
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and public interests. Such a dialogical relationship between ECJ and elected officials cannot develop 
under the status quo. For one thing, as discussed earlier, Union lawmaking is less democratic than it 
should be. But even if  this deficit were remedied, there would still remain the structural imbalance  
between judicial and legislative branches that we observed before. Scharpf  notes that in the EU, so-
cial democratic welfare states outnumber countries adhering to a more liberal paradigm. One would  
expect the former to resist ECJ judgments, when these undermine domestic social policies.77 But 
such a reaction has not come forth. The reason is not difficult to see: the same institutional hurdles 
that forestall a political response in the realm of  competence dispute prevent it here. This high de -
gree of  assurance that a judgment will not be challenged distinguishes the Luxembourg court from 
its peer tribunals at the domestic level. The latter, for the most part, operate in an institutional envir -
onment where a reaction to an unwanted ruling is possible. National judges must therefore take into  
account the political climate when elaborating the content of  basic rights. The ECJ, in contrast, is  
under no such pressure.
Obstacles to Effective Domestic Review
From the dualist perspective, domestic review should make up for the shortfalls of  European rights 
protection. In theory, at least, a member state high court might halt implementation of  a Union  
measure that it deems to conflict with an individual freedom or public interest, recognized under the  
domestic constitution. To be sure, creating an effective review mechanism is not altogether straight -
forward. When one can argue that a European norm infringes on a specific individual right, legal  
remedies are simple to conceive, and the FCC has in fact made one available in the past (see below).  
The situation is  more complex,  if  the issue at stake is  a conflict  between a public  interest and 
77 ———, "The Asymmetry of  European Integration or why the EU cannot be a 'Social Market Economy',"  KFG 
Working Paper, no. 6 (2009a).
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European rights doctrine. National judges might be willing to recognize such a concern as a legitim-
ate reason to override an individual freedom. Yet how can a court enter into this kind of  dispute, if  
there has not been a violation of  subjective right? Scharpf  notes that in Germany at least, “constitu-
tional identity protection” could fill the lacuna.78 Recall that under this doctrine, the FCC has com-
mitted to ensure that, with regard to core state functions, significant decision making power remains 
at the member state level (see Introduction). Litigants might therefore argue that an ECJ ruling must 
be annulled, if  it undermines a cherished value of  the domestic constitutional order.
But, at present, all this remains speculation. Member state high courts do not in fact second  
guess European rights doctrine. This has not always seemed to be a natural state of  affairs. In Ger -
many, the 1974 Solange I judgment of  the FCC permitted citizens to sue against the implementation 
of  a European measure, alleged to violate an individual freedom guaranteed in the Basic Law. Yet 
the court has since revoked this doctrine. Responding to Solange I, the ECJ moved to incorporate 
standard constitutional liberties into European law – a development that later culminated in the ad-
option of  the Fundamental Rights Charter. The German judges applauded this effort: in the  So-
lange II decision, the FCC waived its power to hear complaints against EU infringement of  funda-
mental liberties (see Introduction). It will not admit such a case so long as the Luxembourg court  
guarantees “equivalent” protection (the judgment does not elaborate further on the meaning of  this  
rather enigmatic formula). The mere threat of  a return to national control is supposed to preserve  
the substance of  the Basic Law.
This expectation is problematic. Review of  individual cases would seem to be a more effective 
approach. As we have seen, free movement, equal treatment, and the internal market freedoms can 
trump rights that are otherwise guaranteed under national constitutional doctrine, or subvert a pub-
lic interest that a domestic court would not sacrifice to the protection of  individual liberties. Why 
78 ———, "The Asymmetry of  European Integration or why the EU cannot be a 'Social Market Economy'," 28-29.
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does the FCC hesitate to preserve the substance of  the German fundamental order against such col-
onization from Luxembourg? The answer is again the fear of  fragmentation. Frequent domestic re -
view would lead to an unacceptable patchwork of  exceptions from Union rules. One should expect 
different member state high courts to find different aspects of  European rights incompatible with 
their constitution.79 As soon as one tribunal asserts its preferences, others would follow suit, dealing 
a massive blow to the effectiveness of  Union governance. It follows that for integration through law 
to work, one single court must have the exclusive competence to balance free movement, equal  
treatment, and the internal market freedoms with other individual rights and public interests.
This imperative forces the FCC to contradict itself. Just like the Honeywell test for competence 
transgression, the  Solange approach does not square with the first principles of  its jurisprudence.  
From a dualist perspective, “equivalence” between domestic and European rights protection has to 
mean identical substance. The FCC could let the ECJ decide on rights interpretation, if  such defer-
ence made little or no difference in outcome. But the current doctrine rather implies procedural  
equivalence. In effect, the German judges accept European law as a coequal order, which can be  
trusted to offer adequate protection of  individual freedom, even if  the content of  the resulting jur -
isprudence will differ from national doctrine. Hence legal scholars often quote Solange II and sim-
ilar decisions from other member states as proof  that pluralism informs the EU jurisprudence of  
national high courts. Regarding the FCC, it would be more accurate to conclude that dualist rhetoric  
shrouds a pluralist practice. This mismatch is unfortunate, because it deceives the general public 
about the de facto relationship between German and European law. But the crucial point is a differ-
ent one: as we have seen, the institutional framework of  ECJ rights protection does not actually 
measure up to its domestic counterpart.  The protection of  individual freedom in the European  
sphere is unsound, and national judges can do little about it.
79 ———, "The Asymmetry of  European Integration or why the EU cannot be a 'Social Market Economy'," 29.
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Discontents of  Hybridity
The root cause behind the dilemma is again the mixed character of  the EU. From the pluralist view-
point, European law should offer adequate protection of  individual freedom. As we have seen, that  
is not quite the case. First, it is too difficult for individuals to challenge a Union measure. This would 
not be an issue, if  the EU were still an international organization. Private litigation at the regime  
level would then undermine the power of  the member state principals, and hence legal protection 
should remain limited to the domestic sphere. But given the federal traits of  the status quo – broad 
jurisdiction, direct effect, and primacy – it would be desirable to establish a safeguard against rights 
infringement that is commensurate to the actual extent of  Union power. A second and more im-
portant deficit is the now familiar issue of  excess judicial power: the European order matches a  
strong court, reminiscent of  a federal system, with a feeble political apparatus that is more charac -
teristic of  an international organization. The member states have little choice but to acquiesce to 
controversial rights jurisprudence,  for it  will  normally be too difficult to mount a legislative re -
sponse. This leaves the ECJ in exclusive charge of  important decisions that would require broader  
democratic legitimation.
The peculiar hybrid nature of  the status quo is also responsible for the problems with the dual-
ist narrative. As we noted in Chapter 2, the European scheme of  fundamental liberties has the spe-
cific profile of  a federal citizenship regime. The Luxembourg court ensures that EU organs heed 
standard basic rights, but it also protects free movement and equal treatment, as well as their eco-
nomic variant – the internal market freedoms – against the member states. This latter element is the  
driving force behind an inexorable  displacement of  member state constitutional  traditions.  Do-
mestic review could attempt to stem the tide on the ground that inflowing Union norms are not as 
legitimate as the extant national doctrine. Given the persistent international organization features of  
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the EU, this would have some justification. Yet such a jurisprudence would also fragment Union law 
and undermine an important goal of  integration – to open up national societies to each other. This  
partial leveling of  internal boundaries is a characteristic end of  heterarchical federalism. Member 
state judges have tolerated its progressive realization, while also holding on to the illusion that a dike 
as porous as the Solange doctrine can preserve the domestic constitutional order unchanged.
A Rotten Compromise
Joseph Weiler has famously likened European integration to the Mosaic covenant.80 According to 
scripture, the Israelites bound themselves with the phrase: “We will do, and hearken.” Weiler be-
lieves that Europeans, in a similar vein, undertook an obligation, without grasping its actual signific -
ance, and later began to “hearken”, or seek to understand the meaning of  the covenant they had 
joined. This process of  interpretation should take a particular direction: European law, Weiler ar -
gues, is a “constitutional order the constitutional theory of  which has not been worked out.”81 A 
great deal of  scholarship has proceeded on this assumption, before and after publication of  The 
Constitution of  Europe in 1999. But the suggested route of  inquiry has a potential danger: it might 
lead us to presume that one can somehow reconcile the principles of  constitutionalism with the fac-
tual character of  the Union legal order. What if  that is not true?
To avoid unjustified idealization, I have rejected the premise that Europe has a proper constitu-
tion, whose underlying principles just need to be elaborated in order to better understand its nature.  
Rather the dissertation has first asked if  a liberal and democratic constitution beyond the state is  
conceivable in principle. This investigation led us to the concept of  the Bund. Such an order is  
neither state nor international organization; it has an independent higher law, standing in a heter-
80 Joseph Weiler, "Introduction," in The Constitution of  Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5.
81 ———, "Introduction," 8.
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archical or pluralist relationship with the member state constitutions. Comparing the EU with an 
ideal typical account of  the Bund, we found it to resemble this model to some degree. However, im-
portant features of  the present institutional structure remain characteristic of  an international or-
ganization – a political form that does not have a fundamental order in the emphatic sense of  the 
term.
As this chapter has shown, the peculiar hybrid nature of  the status quo undermines the prin-
ciples of  liberal and democratic constitutionalism. Since the EU is not a Bund yet, it cannot, to a 
sufficient  extent,  implement  the  rule  of  law,  democratic  legislation,  and basic  rights  protection. 
Hearkening alone will not reconcile these values to European integration. But neither should we ig -
nore the features of  the present institutional structure that lead Weiler and others to see it through a  
constitutional lens. The FCC and its followers gloss over these aspects. Seen from their dualist angle, 
Union governance is an extension of  the domestic constitutional system, not an independent funda-
mental order. Member state judges, goes the claim, protect their respective higher law against in -
flowing European norms. But this attempt is bound to fail: since the EU is no longer an interna -
tional organization, earnest domestic review would undermine its effective operation. No matter 
which perspective is taken, the status quo has a constitutionalism deficit.
How did the continent end up in the above predicament? Regarding this question, the image of  
“do and hearken” is again somewhat unhelpful. The actors who built the EU over the years often 
knew quite well what they were doing, or at least what they sought to achieve. Weiler misconstrues  
their mindset when he claims these institutional architects wanted to create something, whose ulti-
mate form was not understood. The peculiar feature of  the integration process has rather been that  
it moved forward, even though its participants disagreed about the final destination. Judges on the  
ECJ and some national leaders pursued federalist aspirations. Other actors envisaged an intergov-
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ernmental union, whose member states retain full and exclusive sovereign power. The status quo  
represents the historical equilibrium that emerged from the clash of  these forces (see Chapter 2).
Alas, the compromise is rotten. Piecemeal integration, based on give and take between federal-
ists and their opponents, has produced a dysfunctional hybrid – the EU of  Lisbon is a powerful Be -
hemoth lacking the appropriate constitutional framework. This will be of  significant concern for all 
those who believe in the political union of  the European peoples: the present institutional shape of  
the project is deficient, which might well undermine its success in the long run (see Chapter 4). Pro-
ponents of  national independence have even more reason to pause and reflect. Their insistence on  
preserving certain international organization features of  the EU has distorted the institutional rela -
tionships between politicians,  judges,  and voters,  creating just that  sort of  unaccountable beast,  
which advocates of  l'Europe des Patries fear and criticize.
Given this state of  affairs, the famed Monnet method has exhausted its usefulness. To address  
the legitimation deficit of  the present constellation, the member states rather need to make a clear 
decision about the political form of  the integration project. The TCE of  2004 reflected this insight,  
even if  the substance of  the draft lagged behind its symbolic ambition. But when ratification failed, 
national governments reverted to the old approach. Perhaps the time is now ripe to revisit the con-
stitutional question. Despite all protestations that Lisbon created a lasting framework, the Eurozone 
crisis has put fundamental reform back on the agenda. In the medium term, the best route ahead is  
to complete the federal project and create a genuine Bund. Or so the next chapter will argue.
Part II
How to Fix It
Chapter 4
The Case for a European Bund
When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, a decade of  protracted reform ef-
forts had come to an end. At the time, most commentators held that further institutional change 
would be off  the table for the foreseeable future. But the debt woes of  the Eurozone have thwarted  
the hope for an enduring settlement. The political response to the crisis brought with it a further 
significant expansion of  the Union sphere (see Chapter 2). Few observers believe that reform will  
end there. A shared currency, it has become clear, must go along with deeper political integration.  
This prospect makes the issue of  how to give the power of  the EU a proper constitutional frame-
work all the more urgent. When the upheaval of  the moment has abated, the continent should ad -
dress the deficit that we have diagnosed in the previous chapter. The best solution, as I will now ar-
gue, is to create a genuine Bund.
Recall the basic features of  the constitutionalism deficit. Neither the claim that European law 
itself  meets the standard of  a proper fundamental order nor the assertion that domestic judges fill  
the breach is defensible. The Union order provides an insufficient judicial check to ensure that its  
organs heed their competence mandate; the legislative process often fails to pursue the shared in -
terest of  the continent, and it is not accountable enough to voters; basic rights protection, finally,  
operates within an institutional  framework that gives judges too much power relative to elected 
politicians. Member state high courts will not compensate for these problems, because serious re-
view of  European measures would be so disruptive that it is more or less out of  the question. As we 
have seen, one central explanation for this predicament is the peculiar hybrid nature of  the present 
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institutional structure. The state of  constitutionalism is poor because the EU is no longer an inter -
national organization, and not yet a Bund.
To overcome this structural weakness, a clear decision about political form is needed. Which 
model should the continent follow? Some will argue that the member states should turn the EU into  
a more or less standard international organization again. This position, I believe, does not merit a 
sustained rebuttal. To recapture Union norms within the legitimation framework of  domestic con-
stitutions, radical changes would need to occur: the jurisdiction of  the EU would have to shrink, the 
internal market freedoms could no longer function as federal basic rights, and the use of  QMV 
might need to be curtailed. A demolition of  the acquis on this scale is undesirable for the rather ob-
vious reason that it would undermine whatever chance European countries have to realize their eco-
nomic and geopolitical ambitions in the future. There is, however, a less extremist reform agenda,  
whose goal is to preserve the spirit of  the international organization model without dismantling the 
past achievements of  the integration project. In Chapter 2, we noted that Peter Lindseth recom-
mends a more perfect implementation of  the “administrative governance” paradigm. He believes 
that modest adjustments to the status quo would suffice to overcome the present legitimation short -
fall, whereas a transnational constitution, equal in rank to domestic higher law, is neither required  
nor desirable. On the spectrum of  reasonable plans for reform, this position represents one pole. At 
the other end, we find the claim that an effective and legitimate European order presupposes the  
creation of  a federal state.
Neither vision, this chapter will show, is quite persuasive. The following will instead suggest a 
middle course, based on the idea of  heterarchical federalism. My argument has four steps. First, I  
demonstrate that better implementation of  the administrative governance paradigm cannot over-
come the constitutionalism deficit. Second, the chapter explains how founding a Bund might ac-
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complish this goal. Third, I elaborate further on the distinction between a heterarchical order and 
the  federal  state  model,  contending  that  Europe  would  fare  better  with  the  former  approach. 
Fourth, the chapter argues that, despite the undeniable risk and cost, the creation of  a Bund is a  
worthwhile project.
The Administrative Governance Reform Agenda
European integration began with the creation of  a transnational administration, on which the mem-
ber states conferred technical functions related to economic governance. The signatories of  the  
Rome Treaty sought enduring peace through cooperation, but they did not think of  the new order 
in constitutional terms. National leaders rather understood the transfer of  power to Brussels along 
similar lines as bureaucratic delegation in the domestic sphere. To be sure, compared with previous 
international organizations, the Communities had a wider mandate and were more autonomous. But 
we must interpret this fact as the transnational manifestation of  a more general trend toward a  
stronger role for independent technocrats – it should not mislead us into seeing the Rome Treaty as  
the founding moment of  a federal Europe. This, at least, is how Peter Lindseth recounts the initial  
years of  the integration process (see Chapter 2). From a historical perspective, he seems to be right.  
But Lindseth goes on to claim that administrative governance remains the correct paradigm for the 
legitimation of  Union power in the present. Here I disagree with him.
The “administrative governance settlement”, as Lindseth describes it, relies on the executive, 
the legislative, and the courts to oversee the bureaucratic sphere. Elected government leaders steer 
the administration. Parliaments might intervene when bureaucrats violate their mandate. The pivotal 
role, though, is reserved for judges who must police the competence limits of  agencies, prevent the 
legislative from giving up too much power, and enforce basic individual rights. Without such review, 
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goes the reasoning, administrative delegation is more or less certain to eat up liberal and democratic  
constitutionalism from the inside.1
Does this legitimation triad function in the present European order? The original 1957 scheme,  
Lindseth notes, evinced striking parallels with the structure of  the national bureaucratic state, and 
more similarities emerged over time. From the beginning, the member state governments exercised 
significant clout over the Commission – akin to executive control of  domestic agencies. This over -
sight has in some ways even intensified as integration progressed.2 National parliaments, too, retain 
a degree of  influence, although it cannot be compared with their power over bureaucrats at home. 
Still, in particular after the Maastricht reform, domestic legislators have developed a range of  instru-
ments for holding executive leaders responsible for their actions in Brussels.3 Lindseth, then, is right 
to observe that national executives and, to a lesser degree, parliaments oversee Union decision mak-
ing. What he does not acknowledge is the failure of  the judicial check. To be sure, following the lead  
of  the German high court, domestic judges in several member states have asserted the competence 
to review if  European norms overstep the terms of  delegation. Their goal, as we have seen, is to  
compel Union organs to respect the treaty mandate, to leave the most important political decisions 
to the democratic process in the member states, and to uphold the basic rights protected under na-
tional higher law.4 But domestic review of  European measures is a sham exercise. Or so, at least, I 
have argued in the previous chapter. Domestic courts are unable to ensure that Union organs heed 
their mandate, that decisions in need of  strong democratic legitimation remain at the member state  
level, and that basic rights protection work as it should. The cause of  this failure is rather obvious:  
through its progressive movement toward federalism, European governance has outgrown the limits  
that a bureaucratic delegation framework can impose.
1 Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy, 74-88.
2 ———, Power and Legitimacy, 91-132.
3 ———, Power and Legitimacy, 189-250.
4 ———, Power and Legitimacy, 133-188.
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Lindseth, to be fair, does not believe the status quo is perfect. He acknowledges that Union or -
gans have often gone beyond their mandate, without meeting judicial resistance. In his opinion, the 
adequate response is to set up a “conflicts tribunal” that would permit a wide range of  litigants to  
contest European measures based on alleged ultra vires action.5 Lindseth also concedes that integra-
tion has forced domestic legislators to relinquish a vast range of  competences, leaving executive 
leaders with too much unchecked power. To counter this development, he suggests that member  
state parliaments obtain better tools to hold their government responsible for its actions in Brus -
sels.6
The first weakness of  this reform agenda is that it remains silent about the structural faults of  
European basic rights protection. Lindseth never discusses the transformative impact of  the present  
citizenship regime. The reason is not difficult to see: this phenomenon stands in tension with the  
claim that Union law is administrative, rather than constitutional. Yet, as we have seen, domestic  
courts are unable to prevent the ECJ from unsettling constitutional practice in the member states  
through a recalibration of  extant legal equilibria among rights and public interests. For this jurispru-
dence to be legitimate, the Luxembourg court would need a political counterweight. The latter, as 
the previous chapter has shown, does not exist at the moment: the sluggishness of  political decision 
making gives the ECJ outsize power to define the scope and content of  fundamental liberties. A 
solution to this problem would have to involve a more flexible amendment rule, less consensus ori-
entation in the legislative process, and democratization of  the latter. But such reform is anathema to 
Lindseth, because it would amount to the creation of  a federal order
Even so, a partial solution to the constitutionalism deficit is perhaps better than none. Would a  
conflicts tribunal and enhanced oversight from national parliaments bring about positive change? 
5 ———, Power and Legitimacy, 266-277.
6 ———, Power and Legitimacy, 225-249.
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Let us consider each proposal in turn. According to Lindseth, the conflicts tribunal should be com-
posed of  judges from both national high courts and the ECJ. It would rule on disputes regarding 
the distribution of  competence between member states and the Union. Domestic public organs, 
European institutions, and individuals should have standing to bring a case. Given that under the ad-
ministrative governance paradigm, the member states need to remain masters of  the treaties, na -
tional high courts would still have the right to invalidate a finding of  the conflicts tribunal. Yet the  
point of  the proposed institutional design is that, before it comes to such a veto, domestic and  
European judges negotiate the question in a joint forum. One can expect that, at least most of  the  
time, member state courts would accept the outcome of  this mediation process.
A conflicts tribunal,  I agree,  then,  might establish a useful  check on the expansion of  EU 
power. Under the new regime, there would seem to be a real chance for annulment of  a legal act on 
the basis that it violates competence rules. Hence Union organs, including the ECJ, could no longer  
follow their natural inclination to widen the European sphere in disregard of  treaties and secondary 
norms. Lindseth is furthermore right to point to the French legal system as proof  that a conflicts  
tribunal, ruling on the limits of  administrative jurisdiction, is workable in practice. One possible  
drawback of  the proposed scheme is that it would further complicate the Union order, in which, 
even at present, the administration of  justice proceeds with rather unhurried pace. A new appeal in-
stance would further lengthen the period until legal certainty is reached. Is that a price worth paying 
for effective policing of  the line between domestic and European competences? From a constitu-
tionalist perspective, the answer might be yes.
The  suggestion  that  improved  legislative  oversight  at  the  domestic  level  will  eliminate  the 
democratic deficit of  Union lawmaking is more problematic. Lindseth believes that we should per-
ceive the problem in terms of  a disconnect between member state parliaments and their European 
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trustees, to which the former have delegated some of  their power. The legitimation chain between  
domestic legislators and Union governance, goes the argument, could be strengthened, if  the depu-
ties  had better  means  to hold  their  respective  government  responsible  for  its  behavior  on the  
European stage. Lindseth does not offer a specific institutional blueprint as to how the member 
states could accomplish this. But he is correct that successful reform along such lines would be pos-
sible (see Chapter 5). The problem is that, as an isolated measure, strengthening the role of  the do -
mestic legislative remains an incomplete solution. While parliaments might oblige executive leaders  
to defend a particular viewpoint, this does not guarantee that Union policies will in fact reflect it.  
Given the consensus orientation of  the legislative process, Brussels will often be unable to pursue 
collective goals, even when these command wide support across the continent (see Chapter 3). And 
to the extent that decision making is majoritarian, the inverse problem arises: national preferences 
can be outvoted.
For Lindseth, that is not too worrisome: he insinuates that an imperfect legitimation chain is  
the price of  integration.7 Yet there is of  course an alternative. I have argued that in a heterarchical 
setting, national peoples would see the common good of  the EU as integral to their own public 
weal (see Chapter 3). Once that is the case, the initial position of  a member state government no  
longer matters. The question becomes rather if  the overall legislative process enables rational delib-
eration over the shared interest of  the continent. In this scenario, one need neither hold on to the il -
lusion that each member state retains full political freedom, nor presume the existence of  a single 
transnational people. Lindseth, however, is unable to entertain such a conception of  Union lawmak-
ing, for he opposes the idea of  a federal order, even when it does not establish a state.
In conclusion, the reform based on the administrative governance paradigm cannot eliminate 
the constitutionalism deficit. Perhaps it would rein in illegal competence expansion. But Lindseth  
7 ———, Power and Legitimacy, 120-132.
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does not have a good enough plan to make political will formation more democratic, and he ignores  
that, at present, the ECJ has too much power to define the content of  individual freedom. The bet -
ter solution, I will now argue, would be to complete the federal project.
The Bund Option
Creating a proper  heterarchical  order might overcome the incomplete realization of  liberal  and 
democratic constitutionalism under the status quo. Such a reform would need to entail in particular 
the following changes: replacement of  the current legal framework with a constitutional treaty, abol -
ishment of  the exit clause, introduction of  supermajority voting as the amendment rule, and further 
loosening of  consensus orientation in regular decision making. This reform scheme, as the follow-
ing will show, has the potential to enhance the rule of  law, democratic legislation, and basic rights  
protection. Once it has been implemented, the European order will be prepared for genuine consti -
tutional pluralism. In other words, judges could then, with reasonable justification, treat domestic  
and Union norms as coequal.
Rule of  Law
There is a good chance, I submit, that a federal reconstitution of  the EU would lead to better poli -
cing of  the line that separates member state and Union competence. What is the reasoning behind  
this expectation? In a Bund, the relationship between the judicial branch and elected politicians is 
more balanced than under the status quo, and hence the ECJ would have less freedom to ride 
roughshod over legislative intention, usurping power that national governments did not intend to  
transfer to the EU. When the Luxembourg court interprets primary law, it will have to take into ac-
count that a supermajority of  member states might reverse a decision that goes against the reading  
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of  the treaties favored in most national capitals. This would stand in marked contrast with the cur-
rent situation. At the moment, a ruling will hold up, provided that it has the support of  at least one  
member state and does not antagonize domestic courts so much that it leads them to disregard the 
norm at issue (see Chapter 3). Regarding the interpretation of  secondary law, the power relationship  
between judges and politicians is not quite as skewed. But we have seen that, even in the era of  
QMV, the ECJ has been able to distort the meaning of  regulations and directives. Hence a further  
loosening of  consensus orientation in the Union legislative process might still be useful (I discuss  
below what this might entail). For one thing, it would empower the member states to override an in-
terpretation of  secondary norm that most of  them oppose. What is more, the chance of  such a re -
sponse might deter the ECJ from handing down such rulings in the first place.
Yet a more balanced separation of  powers scheme is of  course no panacea. In particular, it 
would fail to prevent competence expansion that violates the letter of  the law but commands the 
support  of  national  governments (and the Parliament).  The previous chapter has argued that it 
would be desirable to block this particular route to a power shift in favor of  Brussels – executive 
leaders might otherwise increase their own clout, without a public debate as to whether the EU 
should control the field at issue. In light of  this, a separate competence adjudication mechanism 
might still have a place. Regarding its composition and jurisdiction, such a tribunal need not differ  
from the Lindseth proposal. But in a heterarchical setting, such an institution would not be part of  
the administrative realm. Rather it would take on a constitutional role. This difference in underlying 
rationale might lead to a less restrictive jurisprudence than Lindseth envisages. From his perspective,  
the treaties should be read in a similar manner as the delegated mandates of  bureaucratic actors in 
the domestic sphere. The legal basis of  a federal union, though, establishes an independent order,  
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and therefore, doctrinal tools such as teleological interpretation (which the ECJ has of  course long 
employed) would be legitimate.
In sum, a nimbler political apparatus together with a separate competence adjudication mech-
anism should make for a powerful constitutional limit on the reach of  federal law in a European  
Bund. Judges would have to anticipate the legislative correction of  rulings that expand the Union 
sphere against the original intention behind the norm in question. At the same time, politicians and 
bureaucrats would face judicial review in a tribunal that, unlike the present ECJ, does not have an in-
centive to overlook possible transgressions of  competence.
Democratic Legislation
Recall how we specified the second principle of  constitutionalism: legislation should be a rational 
discursive  process,  in  which  everyone  can  participate  via  the  public  sphere  and  elections  (see 
Chapter 1). From this perspective, the Bund model has the advantage that it might orient Union de -
cision making toward the European common good. Such a transformation is a basic precondition 
of  a legislative process, which is rational in the sense that each citizen should be able to endorse its 
outcomes. As the previous chapter has shown, the present institutional structure erects procedural  
obstacles to deliberation about the shared interest of  the continent, and it perpetuates a political cul-
ture that militates against rational opinion and will formation. Founding a European Bund, I con-
tend, might overcome both problems.
To be sure, even if  this were true, there would still be the question of  adequate democratic in-
put. According to our Habermasian criteria, politicians must heed opinions formed in the public 
sphere, and citizens should be able to assess elected leaders on the basis of  their performance in this  
regard. We have seen that, under the status quo, neither is the case to a sufficient extent. How could  
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a future Bund perform better? This puzzle is rather complex. As Chapter 1 discussed, theorists have 
put forward two opposing conceptions of  federal will formation. On the first account, a Bund is a 
political union of  states. Its sole legislative institution should be a diet that determines the interest 
of  the whole, based on fair compromise among the member state preferences. According to the 
second view, a heterarchical federation is a political union of  both states and individuals. Legislative  
power should be vested in a bicameral parliament, in which the diet turns into an upper chamber,  
whereas the lower chamber provides direct citizen representation. Political will formation under this  
arrangement is supposed to mediate between the public interests of  the member state peoples and 
of  the overarching demos. For the moment, I leave open which model is better suited to fulfill our 
standard under the particular circumstances of  the European case. The next chapter, though, will ar-
gue that a possible reform effort should look for guidance in the first approach.
At this point, let us focus on how the suggested reform plan might enhance the common good  
orientation of  Union lawmaking. Here the first possible benefit lies in the elimination of  procedural  
obstacles. The most important such hurdle is consensus decision making in the European Council.  
This organ, we recall, directs the work of  the Commission, and it has therefore an important agenda 
setting function.  Under the current procedural  regime, the guidelines negotiated at the summits 
must remain limited to the lowest common denominator of  national preferences. If  the EU turned 
into a Bund, this vestige of  its international organization heritage would need to disappear, at least 
in fields where Brussels has the competence to make law (as opposed to the mere coordination of  
policies).8 Such an extension of  the majority principle would enable the member state governments 
to draw up a legislative agenda that is focused on the public weal of  the continent. Of  course, in  
8 The increased use of  the OMC (see Chapter 2) has exposed that it can be difficult to tell apart genuine legislative 
competence and “mere” coordination. In the realm of  CFSP, the distinction is straightforward because here the goal 
is to align executive decision making. Yet where national leaders agree on common “benchmarks” for national legis-
lative output, the line separating coordination from lawmaking might be crossed. Such an empowerment of  the na-
tional executive branches is undesirable. The fields in question should either remain in the domestic sphere or fall 
under the normal legislative mandate of  the EU.
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this scenario, member states will sometimes have to put up with a lost vote; at the same time, how-
ever, the federation could be more vigorous in addressing shared concerns.
The need for reform is less urgent for the Council, which has long operated based on QMV. At 
the moment, the hurdle to pass legislation is still rather high. Yet this will change in 2014 when the 
Lisbon procedural rules enter into force (see Chapter 2). Further amendment of  the voting regime  
is perhaps not required to bring the Council in line with the Bund model. It would, however, be  
prudent to abolish the formal right to leave the EU. So long as this option exists,  governments 
might blackmail the other member states, threatening to secede if  the Council enacts a measure that  
conflicts with a strong national preference. As we noted, the danger of  such a crisis might – at least  
under some circumstances – reduce the effect of  QMV on the behavior of  member state leaders 
(see Chapter 2).9
The second possible benefit of  the suggested reform plan operates at the level of  political cul -
ture: founding a European Bund has the potential to increase the commitment of  citizens and elites  
to the shared interest. Adoption of  a federal compact and successful working of  the new institu-
tional framework could inspire a general belief  that for each member state to prosper, the whole EU 
must thrive. If  this scenario came to pass, political actors would less often prioritize short term na-
tional interest over a course of  action that promotes the good of  the entire continent. As a result, 
opinion formation in the public sphere and decision making in the political system could lead to  
more rational outcomes than under the status quo.
To be sure, such a development is not certain. A skeptic might question if  a formal constitu-
tional treaty would bring about the suggested positive effect. Codified higher law is not an absolute  
requirement for a political culture that is conducive to popular government: Israel, New Zealand,  
9 A legal norm, to be sure, cannot eliminate the factual threat of  secession. But such an illegal exit would amount to a  
hostile act, which might in turn lead to corresponding reprisal. The political cost is therefore higher than when a  
state exercises a legal right to leave the EU. How significant this difference is will depend on contingent factors.
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and the UK – all of  which lack a constitutional document – have more or less intact democratic cul-
tures; there is little reason to believe that writing down the higher law would improve public spirited-
ness in these countries. On the other hand, there are cases where the act of  making a constitution 
has promoted social integration. Dieter Grimm points to the reverence for the founding fathers in  
the United States and observes further that West German patriotism after the Third Reich is using  
the Basic Law as its central reference point.10 Yet he cautions that for such an integrative effect to 
occur, a constitutional moment must take place against the right historical background: it must dis -
tance the collective from a “past viewed with disdain and shape a new idea of  political order.”11 The 
failed TCE of  2004, Grimm argues, did not fulfill this condition. It rather aimed to propel an ongo-
ing process of  integration one stage further.12 Founding a Bund in the next decade or so would like-
wise just continue the process that began a long time ago with coal and steel regulation. Nonethe -
less, given the economic dislocations that have afflicted the continent since 2009, one can speculate 
that a relaunch of  the integration project might be seen as instrumental to overcoming a “past  
viewed with disdain.”
Regardless of  whether a federal compact will be perceived in this manner, adopting such a doc-
ument has a significant potential benefit at the level of  political culture. Note a crucial difference  
between countries without a formal constitution and the EU: Israel, New Zealand, and the UK are  
states, and no one would dispute this fact. There is hence a clear expectation that citizens embrace  
the public weal of  the communities in question. With regard to the EU, that is not the case. As we 
have seen, its political form is hybrid. Some commentators focus on international organization fea-
tures, others emphasize federal traits. The general public rather often hears a message that goes like  
this: “European integration has progressed quite far – but the member states are still sovereign, and 
10 Dieter Grimm, "Integration by Constitution," International Journal of  Constitutional Law 3, no. 2&3 (2005), 201-
203.
11 ———, "Integration by Constitution," 204.
12 ———, "Integration by Constitution," 204-206.
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Brussels is not.” National leaders invoke this argument when blocking undesired common policies; 
high courts reason along these lines when asserting the supreme character of  the domestic constitu-
tion. Given this discursive climate, we should not be surprised to find that, at present, citizens and 
elites have a rather shallow commitment to the public interest of  the whole continent (see Chapter  
3).
In light of  this, a constitutional document that fits the Bund model with regard to symbolism 
and institutional substance might provide useful clarification. Once a federal compact has been ad-
opted, it would be unmistakable that Europeans have a political obligation to pursue an overarching  
common good. That is no guarantee that anyone will in fact heed this demand. Yet it would seem to  
be a precondition for the emergence of  a political culture that supports the aspiration of  democratic  
rule at the Union level. So long as the nature of  the integration project remains ambiguous, one can-
not expect that such a transformation will take place.
To be sure, even if  the envisaged attitude shift occurred, it would not happen overnight. Hence 
the decisive question is whether the incipient European public spiritedness of  the present would be 
strong enough to keep a Bund afloat in the immediate aftermath of  its creation. If  this were the 
case, the initial success could breed further success. The history of  state formation teaches us that a  
sense of  communal belonging can emerge over time, even when it is absent or weak at the begin-
ning.13 If  majority rule is not abused to suppress minorities, generalized trust can develop, permit -
ting voters to support candidates and platforms that focus on the shared interest rather than bene-
fits for a particular social group. A federal reconstitution of  the EU, so we can at least hope, would  
be the first step to initiate such a virtuous circle, in which democratic practice begets the precondi -
tions for its own continued working. Yet it is of  course also possible that a Bund would founder at  
the outset. Political disagreement might be so intense that national citizens fail to recognize lost  
13 Simon Hix, What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 105-106.
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votes at the Union level as legitimate. In this case, European governance would acquire the taste of  
foreign imposition. Such a development could lead to a situation that is worse than the status quo or  
even an outright collapse of  the integration project. I will address the question as to whether this  
chance is worth taking in the last part of  the chapter.
Basic Rights Protection
A federal reconstitution of  the EU might go along with an expansion of  individual standing to sue 
against rights violation. We have noted that, at present, private actors must often take the route via  
domestic courts when seeking redress against Union organs. For reasons the previous chapter dis -
cussed, this form of  judicial protection is less than ideal. To eliminate the problem, a reformed EU 
might offer a complaint procedure for individuals at the federal level. Unlike an international organ-
ization, a Bund can permit direct access to its court system, for the latter has no less constitutional  
standing than the member state judiciaries. Yet it should be obvious that such a step would empower 
the European level relative to domestic courts and perhaps tilt the federal balance of  power too far 
in the direction of  the center. In other words, the values of  adequate judicial protection and mem-
ber state independence stand in tension. Here I shall remain agnostic concerning the right tradeoff  
between them.
Another potential benefit of  reform is more important: founding a Bund might correct the 
present imbalance between the judicial and legislative branches, when it comes to elaborating the  
substance of  European rights. Just like in the realm of  competence dispute, making the amendment  
rule and the legislative process more federal would enable the member states to overrule undesired 
ECJ doctrine.  If,  at the same time, the democratic  deficit  of  Union lawmaking were overcome,  
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judges and elected representatives could enter a dialogue about the proper content of  individual  
freedom.
We should note here that Fritz Scharpf  has offered a different plan as to how one might coun-
teract the excessive power of  the ECJ. According to him, the European Council should be the ulti -
mate arbiter in controversial questions of  rights interpretation. Under this proposal, a member state 
that disagrees with a ruling could refuse to enforce it and refer the question to the heads of  state  
and government. A simple majority in the European Council would then suffice to overrule the 
judgment in question. But if  the summit upholds the decision, it will remain binding on all member  
states.14
This model is much in line with the hybrid nature of  the status quo. On the one hand, it leaves 
the international organization features of  the present decision making system intact: the amendment 
rule could remain unchanged, and the EU would not have to abandon consensus orientation in the 
legislative process. The sole difference to the current situation is that a simple majority of  the mem-
ber state leaders could invalidate a decision from Luxembourg. On the other hand, the proposal re-
cognizes the federal nature of  the Union citizenship regime. Scharpf  rejects unilateral resistance to  
ECJ rights doctrine, embracing the notion that even questions of  high constitutional import must  
have a uniform transnational solution, provided the subject matter falls within the scope of  the in-
tegration project.
He is willing to pay a high price for this compromise solution. A veto right of  the European 
Council might indeed force the Luxembourg court to become more attuned to opinion in the mem-
ber states. But it would also undermine the rule of  law. If  the heads of  state and government exer -
cised their veto, a particular decision of  the ECJ would become inapplicable. Yet the law in the  
books would still be the same, and the reasons that informed the original ruling might remain valid  
14 Scharpf, "Legitimität im europäischen Mehrebenensystem," 272-275.
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in the eyes of  the judges. Against this background, how should the legal dispute at hand be re-
solved? Would the European Council write its own judgment, or would it just annul the decision, 
leaving the Luxembourg court to engineer a more palatable outcome? And how should the judges 
decide future disputes of  a similar kind? These questions illustrate what should be obvious in the  
first place: direct executive interference with the judicial process is a bad idea. To balance the excess-
ive clout of  the ECJ, the Union legislative branch should become stronger; but we must not give up 
on the separation of  powers itself.
Genuine Constitutional Pluralism
If  a European Bund succeeded in restoring liberal and democratic constitutionalism, national judges 
could move beyond their current schizophrenic attitude toward the relationship between domestic  
and Union law. We have seen that, at present, constitutional pluralism is an unacknowledged fact in  
Europe:  member  state  high  courts  still  emphasize  their  hypothetical  competence  to  review 
European measures, but never make actual use of  it, even when this would seem to be indicated. 
Pro forma, Union law is denied coequal standing with the domestic constitution, but in practice 
there is little distinction between them. Some authors see no reason for concern about this dou-
blespeak: “Constitutional pluralism does not require courts to talk about constitutional pluralism.”15 
What should matter is that judges engage in a pluralist practice. But this position sanctions that  
member state high courts misrepresent the  de facto relationship between domestic and European 
law to their national publics, and it finds no fault in the fact that judges promise to enforce the do -
mestic constitution against Union measures, when having no such intention. Perhaps this would still  
be acceptable if  the European order itself  realized the principles of  liberal and democratic constitu-
tionalism to a sufficient extent. Yet, as we have seen, that is not the case either.
15 Maduro, "Three Claims of  Constitutional Pluralism," 75.
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In a European Bund, national high courts might escape from their current dilemma. With a  
genuine federal constitution in place, judges could acknowledge that domestic and Union norms are  
coequal. Once reform has taken place, European governance will operate through a framework that 
is founded on constituent power and implements the rule of  law, democratic legislation, and basic 
rights protection. Member state high courts would then have good reason to suspend their compet-
ence to enforce national higher law against conflicting Union measures. The latter would be just as 
legitimate as the former, but the functional imperative of  legal consistence across the member states  
would tip the balance in favor of  the European norm. To hedge against grave abuse, domestic  
courts might still put forward a generalized version of  the Solange doctrine and pledge to reassert  
control when Union organs engage in systematic violation of  constitutional fundamentals, which 
goes unpunished at the federal level. Meanwhile the ECJ should accommodate extant national solu-
tions whenever possible. Unlike at present, it would have a real motivation to do so: the Luxem-
bourg judges would know that a too activist jurisprudence will meet political resistance from an em-
powered legislative branch. This expectation, it stands to be reasoned, should influence them more 
than an implausible threat of  domestic court intervention. In sum, a genuine European Bund might 
realize the aspiration of  legitimate coexistence, which the de facto pluralism of  the present can at  
most pretend to.
Why Not a Federal State?
From Winston Churchill in 1946 to Gerhard Schröder in 2011, political leaders have on occasion 
called for a “United States of  Europe.”16 But the precise meaning of  such references to American 
federalism remains often unclear. In particular, one might wonder if  the allusion is to 1787 or the 
16 Churchill made this suggestion in a speech at the University of  Zurich on 9 September 1946. Schröder called for the 
United States of  Europe in a recent magazine interview. See Christoph Schwennicke and Georg Mascolo, "Europa 
muss aufwachen," Der Spiegel, 5 September 2011. Of  course, both statesmen did not hold office at the time of  their 
federalist exhortations.
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United States of  today. The original Philadelphian system – as Europeans tend to forget – looked  
rather different from the present. At the outset, the United States bore a significant resemblance to 
the Bund ideal type.17 Yet, over time, the central government became more powerful, and the notion 
that autonomous states had contracted to form a union lost ground to a narrative of  nationhood – 
America turned into a federal state.18 Should the EU adopt this political form, instead of  pursuing a 
heterarchical solution? A federal state, it could be said, would dispose of  the constitutionalism defi -
cit just as well or better than a Bund; in addition, the argument might run, this political form delivers 
essential goods, which neither the status quo nor a heterarchical order can provide. I shall rebut this  
position below. There is a prior question, though, which needs our attention first. Some will not yet 
have been persuaded that one can draw a meaningful line between hierarchical and heterarchical fed-
eralism. From their perspective, talk of  a via media between state and international organization will 
seem either confused or dishonest: federalism, goes the objection, cannot but lead to the creation of  
a sovereign center. To dissipate such qualms, the following will build on the discussion in Chapter 1 
and provide a more concrete account of  how a possible European Bund would differ from a federal  
state.
Bund or Federal State – a Real Choice
In terms of  the classification scheme presented in Chapter 1, Bund and federal state differ along the 
following dimensions. First, the latter is based on a single constitution, not a compact between sov-
ereign entities. Second, this fundamental order is supreme over unit norms, as opposed to coequal  
17 Forsyth, Unions of  States. The Theory and Practice of  Confederation, 60-72.
18 Such a development has been rather typical for erstwhile heterarchical federations. Switzerland, the Netherlands, and 
Germany underwent a similar metamorphosis. See ———, Unions of  States. The Theory and Practice of  Confed-
eration, 17-60. This, of  course, raises the question as to whether the Bund is a transient political form that – in the  
long run – cannot but turn into a federal state. I believe that at least in Europe, where longstanding national identit -
ies exist, this does not have to be the case. So long as the federal compact anticipates possible centripetal tendencies,  
a continental Bund should be able to retain its heterarchical character for a significant period.
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with them. Third, in a federal state, the central government monopolizes legitimate force, whereas a 
Bund does not have exclusive control over the means of  violence. Fourth, the units of  a federal  
state, unlike those of  a heterarchical system, relinquish international legal subjecthood. On the re -
maining dimensions of  the classification scheme, Bund and federal state resemble each other. Both 
are permanent forms of  political association, majorities can amend the fundamental order, the juris -
diction of  the federal government is limited and original, central norms have direct effect, there is  
an overarching citizenship status, and often a Bund will have a bicameral parliament, just like a fed-
eral state.
Against this background, some will question that a meaningful distinction can in fact be made.  
Does it matter that, at the symbolic level, a federal compact refers to the member state peoples, and 
not, like a constitution, to a single unified collective? Does it matter that we describe the law of  a  
Bund as coequal to member state norms, when the latter must in practice still yield to the former.  
Does it matter that units of  a Bund keep some control over the means of  coercion when, even un-
der the status quo, the EU achieves more or less optimal compliance? And does it matter that the  
member states retain an international presence outside the federal sphere? If  we had to conclude  
that, in sum, these differences do not amount to much, the whole concept of  the Bund would be 
superfluous. The sole relevant distinction would then lie between the state – unitary or federal – and 
the international organization model. From this perspective, the idea of  a via media is at best a the-
oretical misconception or, more insidious, a Trojan horse to blindside the opposition toward what is,  
for practical purposes, a proposal to create a single European Leviathan.
In response, let me emphasize once more that it would be a mistake to subsume the whole of  
federalism under the state model. Such a conflation of  political forms, as Chapter 1 has argued,  
passes over real differences among historical federations. It also deprives us of  a theoretical frame-
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work, which can be used to imagine a viable future course for European integration that remedies  
the faults of  the status quo, without subjugating the member states to an omnipotent sovereign. To 
vindicate this claim, the abstract typological distinction I have made so far is perhaps not enough. 
Let us therefore take a more detailed look at how each model would operate in practice. The follow-
ing will argue that all the differences listed above do in fact matter. What is more, even where Bund 
and federal state appear similar on the institutional surface, a more thorough inspection will often  
reveal this impression to be misleading.
Recall the divergent fundamental principles that animate either model. A Bund establishes a 
permanent bond among the member state peoples, which nonetheless seek to retain an independent 
political existence. In contrast, a federal state is based on a single people.19 This difference of  polit-
ical logic has a number of  concrete implications. First, a compact to establish a European Bund 
would enter into force through a different procedure than the constitution of  a federal state. In the 
former case, each national people would have to approve the proposed higher law. Hence member 
states that reject the document cannot become part of  the reformed Union (Chapter 6 examines the 
ideal design of  such a ratification process). Creating a federal state, on the other hand, does not pre -
suppose national consent. European citizens would decide about its constitution via a single referen-
dum or representative procedure.
A second difference concerns amendment of  the fundamental order. To effect such change, 
neither the Bund nor the federal state require a unanimous decision of  the units. But in the former 
case, there is a qualification. As Chapter 1 has noted, a revision of  the higher law that abolishes its  
heterarchical nature would eliminate the constituent power of  the member state peoples, on which  
19 Such a collective, Federico Mancini reminds us, does not have to be a nation. He points out that Belgium, Canada,  
India and South Africa, which harbor diverse ethnic groups and languages, are more or less functioning democracies. 
Against this background, Mancini argues that peoplehood in a political sense would suffice for a European federal 
state; the member states, in other word, could still hold on to their respective national cultures and languages. See Fe-
derico Mancini, "Europe. The Case for Statehood," European Law Journal 4, no. 1 (1998).
173
the system is based. Hence a European Bund would have to forbid changes that unmake its peculiar 
character; amendments that might erode the latter over time should at least be more difficult to pass  
than a normal constitutional revision. In contrast, the higher law of  a European state could forgo 
such a limit on permissible change. Here federalism would rest on a decision of  the people to or -
ganize itself  in a particular manner. Several rationales might account for this choice: federalism can  
serve the protection of  minorities, it can bring public decision making closer to the affected popula-
tion, and it can introduce a further element of  checks and balances into the constitutional division 
of  powers. Yet, unlike the cardinal purpose of  a Bund – which is to maintain the independence of  
each unit people – these goals are not absolute. If  other values emerge as more important, the  
people might later resolve to amend the fundamental order and espouse a different mode of  polit -
ical organization.
The third contrast between heterarchical and hierarchical federalism regards the issue of  which 
legal order is supreme. In a Bund, unit and center norms are coequal, whereas, in a federal state, the 
former subordinate the latter. Above I have mentioned the possible objection that, in practice, this  
difference might have little significance. It is true that no federal regime – Bund or state – can per -
mit the units to disregard the law of  the center on a regular basis. Courts should give precedence to  
federal norms, even when these conflict with a unit constitution, so as to preserve the effectiveness  
of  the shared legal system. The peculiar feature of  a Bund is that judges have an obligation to min-
imize tension between unit and center norms. To be sure, apart from the risk of  a legislative re -
sponse to judicial overreach, there can be no hard and fast guarantee that federal courts will in fact  
heed this demand. Culture is therefore important. So long as the spirit of  heterachical federalism 
pervades  the  institutional  practice,  judges  will  seek to manage tension between unit  and center  
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norms in a manner that reflects their coequal status (or at least politicians will beat them to it). Once  
that is no longer the case, the Bund is en route to dissolution or turning into a state.
A fourth difference between Bund and federal state lies in the nature of  citizenship. While both 
models establish such a status, it is less encompassing under a heterarchical order. Here the function  
of  federal citizenship is to make the boundaries that separate the unit communities porous, yet not 
to eliminate them altogether. Recall the characteristic form that Bund citizenship takes in order to 
fulfill  this specific purpose.  First,  the member states must grant individuals free movement and  
some degree of  equal treatment with nationals. However, this does not mean that federal citizens  
have the exact same rights, irrespective of  unit affiliation. Certain privileges and duties remain lim-
ited to national citizens. Second, the Bund itself  has to respect and seek to implement civil, political,  
social and economic freedom. Yet, at the same time, it must leave the member states a degree of  
freedom in pursuing their own path in this regard.
The preceding is of  course a valid description of  European citizenship at present (see Chapter 
2). Against the member states, Union citizens are entitled to free movement and equal treatment.  
But, as we have seen, certain freedoms and obligations do not extend to them. Individuals can fur -
thermore appeal to basic rights in order to contest a particular European measure that affects them. 
However, there is no equivalent to the 14th Amendment of  the US constitution – the Fundamental 
Rights Charter does not govern national acts outside the realm of  Union law. The situation would 
be rather different in a European federal state where federal citizenship would supersede member 
state citizenship. In other words basic rights protected in the constitution would bind all public or -
gans, and everyone could assert them regardless of  national status. The federal constitution might 
even guarantee more or less equal living conditions across the continent, obligating richer member 
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states to transfer wealth to poorer governments through a fiscal equalization mechanism. 20 If  the 
EU adopted such a citizenship regime, national affiliation would turn into a mere cultural attribute –  
rather similar to being a Texan, a Bavarian, or perhaps a Québécois (given the multitude of  lan-
guages spoken in Europe).
The fifth contrast between heterarchical and hierarchical federalism is that under the former 
model, the center does not monopolize legitimate violence. As we noted, one might argue that since 
the EU has an impressive compliance record even now, the contrast is unimportant. But this would 
be too rash a conclusion. Dispersion of  coercive resources in a heterarchical order implies that more 
powerful units can refuse implementation of  policies that contradict a strong local preference. This 
might of  course unravel the Bund, given that such resistance calls the federal compact into question. 
In other words, the center faces a constraint not to adopt rules that a member state could be willing  
to disregard, even if  this meant the end of  the union. A federal state does not have to make the 
same calculation. It controls at least the armed forces, if  not the police as well. Hence the units have 
little choice but to implement whatever the central government decrees, regardless of  how intense 
their opposition might be. Where does this leave us regarding the practical difference between a  
possible European Bund and the federal state alternative? Under the status quo, the limited enforce-
ment power of  Brussels is consistent with the heterarchical model. The distribution of  coercive re-
sources could therefore remain unchanged, should the EU become a genuine Bund. In contrast, the  
creation of  a federal state would necessitate a dramatic shift in the balance of  power between na-
tional governments and Union institutions.
A sixth difference between Bund and federal state pertains to the working of  the legislative 
process. The units of  a Bund require a genuine voice in central governance. Hence the main law-
20 All existing federal states, with the exception of  the United States and Mexico, have instituted such a geographical 
redistribution of  wealth. See Ronald L. Watts,  Comparing Federal Systems (Kingston, Ontario: Institute for Inter-
rgovernmental Relations, 2008), 108-112.
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making institution is a federal diet. To be sure, this organ might form part of  a bicameral parlia-
ment, whose lower chamber provides for direct representation of  individual citizens. At least prima 
facie, this constellation resembles the legislative mechanism characteristic of  the federal state model.  
But a closer look should lead us to recognize an important contrast. The purpose of  lawmaking in a  
federal state is foremost to express the will of  the overarching  demos. Unit representation in the 
second legislative chamber is a side constraint that ensures local interests receive a hearing. One can-
not, however, equate this process with the representation of  member state executives in a federal  
diet, which is typical of  the Bund model. In the latter kind of  legislative institution, votes result  
from a complex will formation process inside the respective government, which must explain itself  
to the national opposition and the public sphere. Unit delegates in the upper chambers of  federal  
states have a much weaker claim to represent the public interest of  their constituents. There is of  
course significant variation with regard to institutional design among real world bicameral parlia-
ments. Yet in most cases, election to the second chamber is direct.21 An individual politician that 
prevails in such a contest will lack the resources to focus on more than a handful of  issues. She will  
furthermore not operate within a procedural framework that would make it plausible to consider her 
actions to manifest the democratic will of  her respective unit. Against this background, it will not  
surprise that in the upper chambers of  federal states, national parties tend to call the shots, impos-
ing voting discipline on their caucus. That is often the case even when local parliaments or govern-
ments appoint the deputies.22
A European Bund would have to institutionalize a rather different form of  unit representation. 
To ensure a meaningful voice for the member state peoples, governments must continue to speak 
for them in the legislative process. These national delegations should determine their position via  
21 ———, Comparing Federal Systems, 147-152.
22 ———, Comparing Federal Systems, 151-152.
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the existing domestic channels of  will formation and not become subservient to continental parties  
instead. While the latter could bundle the preferences of  individuals across the EU, their structure 
would make it difficult to represent the varied collective interests of  the member state peoples. In 
other words, partisan organization at the Union level has to remain weaker than in a typical state. A  
Bund does not replace  l'Europe des Patries with  l'Europe des Partis.23 If  that is so, we must of  
course ask which role the Strasbourg legislature can perform in such a context. Let us defer this is-
sue until the next chapter. There I will argue that under a possible heterarchical system, bicameral -
ism should have a different character than in a typical federal state.
The seventh and last distinct feature of  a hypothetical European Bund is that its member states 
would remain full international actors that conduct diplomatic relations outside the federal compet-
ence sphere. Whether this has practical significance depends of  course foremost on how much ac-
tual power is left at the unit level. Yet, even if  Brussels controlled the most important fields of  ex-
ternal affairs, national governments would retain a diplomatic infrastructure. Should the union break 
up, this might help the member states to resume their previous role on the world stage (here it  
would also matter that a Bund does not centralize its armed forces). The units of  a federal state, in  
contrast, would disappear from the global arena, making it rather more difficult to resuscitate them 
as international actors when the need arises.
The Value of  Member State Independence
The preceding has spelled out in how far a European Bund would be a looser form of  political as-
sociation than a federal state. If  the continent adopted the former model, national institutions could  
retain their diverse shapes, even though Brussels might have greater influence on them. Should the 
23 This formulation goes back to David Marquand who called for just such a transformation in 1978. See David Mar-
quand, "Towards a Europe of  the Parties," The Political Quarterly 49, no. 4 (1978).
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integration project ever collapse, the member states would still be viable on their own. Hierarchical  
federalism, in  contrast,  requires  a more profound transformation of  each domestic system that  
would be quite difficult to undo later on. This difference matters. Advocates of  a European federal 
state might argue that a Bund will be unstable and less effective in making decisions that impose sac-
rifice on individual units. These claims are not altogether implausible. Yet a heterarchical order, the 
following will argue, has the advantage that it preserves valuable traditions of  constitutional practice  
in the member states. What is more, in the European case, the structural frailties inherent to the  
Bund model should be manageable. For these reasons, the heterarchical model is, all things con-
sidered, the preferable approach to reform.
Let us begin with the advantages that derive from the relative conservatism of  the Bund model. 
These are in part prudential. At the moment, public opinion across the continent appears to be, on  
the whole, rather skeptical of  federalism. Therefore, one can expect that citizens will be easier to 
persuade of  fundamental change, if  the proposed scheme guarantees a larger degree of  national in-
dependence. A federal solution would moreover be an experiment that can fail. Member state cit-
izens, as mentioned before, might come to see European governance as foreign imposition and elect 
leaders that seek to impede effective common policies. This risk, it would seem, is greater in the case  
of  the hierarchical approach, given that it entails a wholesale transformation of  existing political in -
stitutions at the domestic level.24 And should the federal experiment indeed fail, a state would be 
harder to dissolve than a Bund. Seen in this light, the heterarchical route is the less dangerous one.25
24 Herfried Münkler has pointed out that democratization based on the state paradigm would entail  the risk that 
Europe becomes ungovernable,  similar to,  for example,  Belgium, whose federal  institutions are often paralyzed 
through conflict along ethnic lines. See Herfried Münkler, "The Need for a Centralization of  Power," Spiegel Online 
International, 8 July 2011.
25 Here one might draw a parallel with the creation of  the Euro, which in retrospect seems to have been a rather signi -
ficant blunder. Yet undoing the scheme, it turns out, would have so catastrophic effects that holding on to it, no mat-
ter how expensive this will be, is the least bad option for the participating states. Against this background, the ques -
tion as to whether a proposed reform would be reversible takes on significant importance.
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Yet the case for the Bund model rests on principled grounds as well: it would be a moral wrong  
to establish a single European Leviathan, which subordinates existing national institutions. The first 
relevant consideration here is that in order to ensure the allegiance of  its citizens, a federal state 
would need to become the central focus of  political attachment for its citizens. But, at present, the 
main allegiance of  most Europeans is to their respective member state. Modern political identities, 
to be sure, are manufactured. States have created them via conscious efforts to promote attachment  
to the nation, while suppressing more local identities. Might Europe not follow a similar path? Of  
course, Brussels can seek to mold citizen attitudes through education campaigns and the like. Such 
efforts have indeed long been ongoing. Yet a simultaneous active marginalization of  existing na-
tional identities, it should be obvious, is not in the cards.26 Hence the most that can be achieved is to 
create attachment to Europe alongside national identities. To a degree, as we have seen, this has in  
fact been accomplished (see Chapter 3). The political form that best reflects such overlapping at -
tachments is the Bund, which does not prioritize one layer of  communal belonging over subordin-
ate identities. A federal state, in contrast, would relegate national affiliation to second rank. It seems  
improbable that one could bring Europeans to accept this without resorting to coercive strategies of  
attitude transformation.
The federal state model, then, is problematic because its realization might presuppose the use 
of  illiberal means. But existing domestic institutions also have an intrinsic value that justifies their 
preservation. Theorists who adhere to “liberal nationalism” derive such worth from a supposed en-
titlement of  nations, understood as cultural communities, to govern themselves.27 I believe this line 
26 David Miller, "Republicanism, National Identity,  and Europe," in  Republicanism and Political Theory, ed. Cécile 
Laborde and John Maynor (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), 145-146.
27 See for example Yael Tamir,  Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), David Miller,  On 
Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1996).
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of  reasoning is mistaken. To set the stage for a more persuasive argument, let us nonetheless con -
sider the liberal nationalist approach in some detail.
One version of  this doctrine militates against European federalism in general, be it heterarch-
ical or hierarchical. David Miller, for example, holds that solidaristic cooperation presupposes the  
existence of  a nation, whose members share a language, traditions, and collective memories. He 
maintains that achievements like, for instance, the welfare state depend on such a background, as it  
motivates individuals to sacrifice for the collective. European citizens with their diverse cultures,  
goes the argument, can never develop this form of  commitment to the shared interest. Politics at  
the  Union  level,  Miller  believes,  must  therefore  remain  limited  to  bargaining  among sovereign 
peoples – a transnational republic is out of  the question.28
If  this were right, the continent would be in trouble. As we have seen, integration has pro-
gressed so far that effective and legitimate Union governance is impossible unless the European or-
der completes its transformation into a federal system. Should this project be doomed to certain 
failure, the sole possible answer to the present constitutionalism deficit is to roll back the scope of  
integration. Given the negative impact of  such a decision on the economic and geopolitical pro-
spects of  the entire continent, I have rejected this option at the beginning of  this chapter. We must  
therefore  hope  that  individuals  can  in  principle  develop  meaningful  political  attachment  to  a 
transnational collective without a unified culture. Such an expectation is not frivolous. Miller is cor -
rect that, in the past, republican politics has been confined to settings of  homogeneous culture, first  
cities and then nation states. But this link might well be contingent. To be sure, certain forms of  
sacrifice for the common good are difficult to imagine when there is no unified cultural group: sol -
diers, to the extent their motivation is moral, often fight to defend a particular way of  life. 29 Yet the 
28 Miller, "Republicanism, National Identity, and Europe."
29 Müller, Constitutional Patriotism, 74.
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situation appears to be different with regard to more mundane sacrifices, such as – to keep with the  
example – paying taxes to finance the welfare state. Do citizens feel obliged to contribute because 
the recipients of  benefits share their culture? This hypothesis seems rather implausible. The welfare 
state is better understood as the result of  political struggles, in which some actors force others to  
accept certain redistributive measures.30 For the most part, the champions of  these policies will not 
appeal to the fellow feeling of  their compatriots but to inalienable rights ascribed to humans or at 
least to the members of  a political association. Insofar as such reasoning gains traction, citizens sup-
port the welfare state for moral reasons. But this commitment derives from recognition of  universal  
principles, not from identification with a shared national culture. A possible rejoinder is that even if  
fellow feeling does not motivate acceptance of  redistributive policies, it creates social trust, which 
permits citizens to act on their moral preferences without fear of  exploitation. Yet this claim does  
likewise not establish that sharing a language, traditions, and collective memories is a prerequisite for 
republican politics. Being familiar with the other can make it easier to begin cooperative interaction  
(although the opposite could be true as well). In the long run, however, trust will arise from the ac -
tual prevention of  freeriding. Whether this feat succeeds will depend on numerous factors, and it  
seems improbable that sharing the same culture – regardless of  content – is a decisive variable. 31 
The burden of  proof  rests on those who believe otherwise.
Consider next a different liberal nationalist argument. Will Kymlicka, for example, holds that 
individuals have a right to the perpetuation of  their language, traditions, and collective memories  
through the appropriate political institutions.32 The merits of  this claim need not concern us here. 
Suffice it to note that it does not rule out European federalism. As mentioned earlier, the existence  
of  multinational polities demonstrates that diverse communities can live together under one govern-
30 ———, Constitutional Patriotism, 73-74.
31 ———, Constitutional Patriotism, 73.
32 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship.
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ment and each maintain their unique culture. In fact, the argument from individual right could even  
favor a federal state over the heterarchical option: unlike a Bund that leaves domestic structures  
more or less untouched, a state might elevate peripheral nations like the Scots or Basques to equal  
importance with the respective metropolitan communities.33 Yet whereas Miller inflates the value of  
existing domestic institutions, this position underestimates it. Preserving member state independ-
ence is not just a means to keep national cultures alive (if  that is a legitimate goal at all). The main  
benefit, I submit, is to preserve valuable traditions of  constitutional practice.
What does this mean? The abstract principles of  constitutionalism permit a great deal of  vari-
ation regarding their implementation. Liberal and democratic polities differ in terms of  how their  
fundamental order configures the separation of  powers, organizes representative government, and 
interprets basic rights. While each tenet of  constitutionalism has a more or less undisputed core  
meaning, different communities need to adapt these universal precepts to their specific needs.34 The 
traditions that emerge in this process merit preservation. For one thing, it matters that local solu -
tions reflect local circumstances. But, even when there is no objective reason to prefer a specific in-
terpretation of  a constitutional principle over another, we need to take into account that attachment  
to a particular fundamental order enters into the formation of  political identities. Citizens might  
cherish domestic institutions as concrete manifestations of  universal ideas that have stood the test  
of  time in the local context. From their perspective, maintenance of  past accomplishment and on-
going improvement is a task that links one generation to the next.35 Such “constitutional patriotism” 
is a more potent motivation for public spiritedness than perceived membership in a cultural nation.  
Individuals who see themselves as participants in a collective enterprise to uphold liberal and demo-
cratic values in a particular bounded setting are – per definition – oriented toward the common 
33 This indeed is the solution favored by the liberal nationalist writer Yael Tamir. See Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 151.
34 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 128-129.
35 For a comprehensive discussion of  “constitutional patriotism” see Müller, Constitutional Patriotism.
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good. This source of  political virtue dries up, when one disbands their constitutional project in or-
der to create a transnational state.
Even so, the value of  preserving domestic institutions is not absolute. In Europe, there are 
functional and normative reasons that demand integration. The economic and geopolitical strength 
of  the continent hinges on effective common policies. At the same time, interdependence among 
domestic societies means that freedom to make democratic choices presupposes cooperation among 
the member states (see Chapter 3). The Bund model would permit the continent to reconcile these  
imperatives with the justified desire to sustain independent constitutional traditions at the domestic  
level. While a hetererarchical system allows for legitimate federal governance where needed, it does 
not altogether eliminate the institutions that give the member state peoples their autonomous polit -
ical existence. In contrast, the federal state model achieves integration at the cost of  merging these  
communities into a single one. The pursuit of  liberal and democratic values at the central level  
would then trump incompatible practices at the unit level. Perhaps each member state would still  
have a formal constitution. But it would no longer be a genuine fundamental order.
The Price of  Member State Independence
We have now seen the prudential and moral reasons that favor heterarchical over hierarchical feder-
alism. It cannot be denied, however, that choosing the former option has a price. Above I have em-
phasized that a Bund depends to a large degree on the willingness of  domestic leaders to implement 
common decisions. Unlike a state, a heterarchical federation might not be able to whip recalcitrant 
unit governments into line, when these are determined to resist. A skeptic could hence argue that a 
Bund will either be in permanent danger of  collapse or face deadlock, making it unable to imple-
ment effective policies. If  either or both of  these charges were true, the case for heterarchical feder-
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alism would be in doubt. Let us therefore examine whether a European Bund might be too unstable  
or suffer from decision making paralysis.
Concerning the risk of  dissolution, we should recall the Schmittian imperative that in a heter-
archical union, the member states need to agree on existential questions (see Chapter 1). In contrast,  
a mere conflict of  interest will, most of  the time, not jeopardize the existence of  the common-
wealth. For Schmitt, an existential question is one that does not permit of  a compromise. A prime 
historical example here is the dispute over slavery in the United States. The South had a vast eco -
nomic stake in the continuation of  this practice, which the abolitionist camp held to be a funda -
mental wrong. For some time, the parties tried to split the difference, but the moral dispute at the  
heart of  the matter proved irreconcilable. When an abolitionist became President, the confederate  
states resolved to secede and the Civil War began. In comparison, the EU would seem to be a much  
better candidate for a lasting Bund. The member states share a liberal and democratic political cul -
ture – a breakup of  the Union, at least one due to unbridgeable moral conflict, seems therefore 
rather implausible.
The hazards of  deadlock merit a somewhat more detailed investigation. What good is majorit-
arian decision making without a credible enforcement mechanism? In particular, some authors warn 
that without a sovereign center, the EU will be unable to engage in redistributive policies and might  
fail to protect its citizens from external threats. From their perspective, founding a Bund does not  
go far  enough – the federal  state  is  the superior  institutional  model.  Yet,  as  the  following will  
demonstrate,  the  various  arguments  to  this  effect  remain  unpersuasive  (with  one  possible 
exception).
Consider first the problem of  solidaristic redistribution. William Scheuerman, for example, be-
lieves that unless the EU obtains a sovereign center, it cannot build a continental welfare state. Frag -
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mentation of  power, he contends, will preclude a significant transfer of  resources from the strong 
to the weak.36 Although Scheuerman does not mention it, this argument is also pertinent to the 
question of  whether the Euro is viable in the long run. Economists agree that monetary union has a  
greater chance of  success, if  there is a system of  fiscal transfer to even out regional differences in  
economic development.37 Perhaps such a mechanism is a precondition for the Euro to function at  
all. If  this were the case, one would indeed have to question whether the Bund is a suitable institu -
tional model for the continent.
Yet let us begin with the argument regarding the welfare state. It seems fair to claim that an in -
tegrated system of  public services and social insurance would require a sovereign center. The ques -
tion, though, is whether the EU should in fact pursue this goal. Scheuerman calls on Brussels to 
promote a fair  distribution of  resources and individual  life chances because democratic  citizens 
must be equal in a meaningful sense.38 But this argument forgets about the point of  federalism and, 
indeed, the spirit of  the integration project: to make common rules where needed, and to leave na -
tional demoi otherwise independent. The welfare state, I submit, is a field predestined to fall into the 
latter rubric. Its design reflects the cultural peculiarities and idiosyncratic needs of  a specific people.  
Across the continent, various different approaches to mediating between economic and social rights  
prevail. Few British citizens would delight over the adoption of  German corporatist arrangements,  
and Scandinavians would be loath to give up their generous welfare state just because the rest of  
Europe cannot afford it. For this reason, Brussels should have limited influence on policies that 
concern education, health insurance, labor relations, unemployment benefits, retirement schemes, 
and the like. To be sure, it can make sense to enforce certain minimal standards in order to prevent  
36 William Scheuerman, "Postnational Democracies without Postnational States? Some Skeptical Reflections,"  Ethics 
and Global Politics 2, no. 1 (2009), 46-48.
37 Jeffrey A. Frankel and Andrew K. Rose, "The Endogeneity of  the Optimum Currency Area Criteria,"  The Eco-
nomic Journal 108, no. 449 (1998).
38 Scheuerman, "Postnational Democracies without Postnational States? Some Skeptical Reflections," 46-48.
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that member states undercut one another in seeking to attract mobile capital into their jurisdictions. 
Such a “race to the bottom” might undermine the idea of  solidaristic cooperation. Building a single 
continental welfare state, though, is not desirable. Of  course, this means that Union citizens will re-
main unequal. Yet that is justifiable because the freedom to make choices that reflect the preferences 
of  local communities makes the overall system more democratic, rather than less.39
If  the long run survival of  the Euro demands the creation of  a federal state is a more complic-
ated question. The current institutional framework rests on the belief  that monetary union can func-
tion without significant redistribution from rich member states to less developed regions within the 
Eurozone. To maintain economic balance in the aftermath of  the ongoing crisis, national govern-
ments have instead pledged to coordinate relevant domestic policies. There will also be more super -
vision of  national budgets, and Brussels will have greater power to dragoon member states to un-
dertake reforms that further economic development (see Chapter 2). Proponents of  a Bund must 
hope for this  regime to succeed in practice.  To be sure,  even the  status quo does not  operate  
without fiscal transfer altogether. The Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund promote economic 
development on a regional basis; CAP has a redistributive effect as well. Furthermore, the loan guar-
antees through EFSF/ ESM impose a substantial cost on the richer member states, but this effort, it  
is hoped, will end as soon as the Eurozone crisis has been resolved. Compared with other federal 
39 This conclusion presumes of  course that independent national welfare policies remain viable in a globalized world. 
Scheuerman gestures toward the argument – popular among some Europhiles on the left – that an integrated contin-
ental regime is the sole hope for the welfare state to survive. See ———, "Postnational Democracies without Post-
national  States? Some Skeptical  Reflections,"  48.  But so far there is little  evidence to support  this claim. Most  
European welfare states do not seem to face an imminent danger of  collapse. And where existing social policies turn 
out to be unsustainable (such as for example in Greece), the causes seem to lie in political mismanagement much  
more than in the abstract force of  “globalization.”  We might also observe here that founding a Bund could make it  
easier for national governments to maintain and update their respective welfare regimes. Earlier I have noted that un-
der a proper heterarchical constitution, the Union legislative branch would be able to prevent the ECJ from eroding  
domestic social policies in the name of  the internal market freedoms and EU citizenship rights. Against this back-
ground, it seems rather implausible to maintain that affirmation of  social and economic liberties must go hand in  
hand with support for hierarchical federalism.
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polities,  then, the EU engages in quite limited resource transfer.40 More sweeping redistribution 
might well presuppose the existence of  a sovereign center that is able to force recalcitrant govern-
ments to hand over a significant portion of  their revenue to less developed member states. There is  
no consensus in the academic debate as to whether the Euro can, in the long run, exist without such 
a more robust fiscal transfer mechanism. If  this were not possible, the continent might face the  
stark choice between dismantling the monetary union, at least in its current form, and creating a  
federal state. The cost of  the former option might of  course be prohibitive. In this case, the argu-
ment for the Bund model would be moot. Europe should then establish an overarching Leviathan.
Consider next the issue of  whether the continent requires a sovereign center in order to protect  
itself  against external threats. According to some, the longstanding reliance of  European countries  
on American hard power is dangerous. Glyn Morgan, for instance, notes that after the Cold War, the 
United States has less and less reason to provide its NATO allies with a free security umbrella. He 
therefore recommends the creation of  a federal state, which could establish the EU as a serious geo-
political actor in its own right.41 I concede that in order to build a muscular global presence, Brussels 
might need to wield sovereign power. Often enough, intergovernmental coordination within the 
framework of  CFSP is unable to generate a meaningful common position, and progress in the cre-
ation of  joint armed forces has been glacial indeed.42 But, again, we should ask if  the objective itself  
is valid. Morgan, writing in 2005, rests his case on the assertion that, given unipolar American dom-
inance, Washington is under little constraint to heed the interests of  its ostensible allies. Just a few 
years later, this argument seems outdated – the period of  unchallenged American power turned out 
to be of  rather limited duration. And even if  Europe must still consider NATO a somewhat unreli -
40 Nicolaus Heinen, "A European Transfer Union. How Large, How Powerful,  How Expensive?," in  EU Monitor 
(Frankfurt: Deutsche Bank Research 2011).
41 Glyn Morgan, The Idea of  a European Superstate (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 133-157.
42 Chris Bickerton et al., "Security Cooperation Beyond the Nation State. The EU's Common Security and Defence 
Policy," Journal of  Common Market Studies 49, no. 1 (2011), 4-6.
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able alliance,  the question remains precisely which external  threat necessitates the creation of  a 
single Leviathan. The region, one might point out, is for the most part peaceful; foreign invasion 
seems all but impossible. Some, to be sure, will find this perspective too complacent. In the after -
math of  the Cold War, it has been a popular claim that for the West to remain secure, it must be  
able to reshape the international environment through armed interventions. Yet the limitations of  
such force projection have since become quite obvious: the United States undertook expensive mis-
adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, with little to show for it at the close of  either mission. Hence it  
appears that while the cost of  preparing for this kind of  conflict is vast, the benefit is more than  
questionable. The future seems instead to belong to limited operations such as, for example, the  
2011 Lybia intervention. Europe, it should be noted here, might have failed even at this mission, had 
there not been significant American help. It seems nonetheless reasonable to assume that prepara -
tion for similar contingencies is possible without a unified sovereign. Of  course, more serious ex-
ternal threats might arise in the future, and perhaps a federal state will then offer the best or sole vi -
able defense. But at present, it would seem rather premature for the continent to establish a unified  
sovereign due to fear of  its enemies.
In conclusion, a heterarchical EU can deliver effective governance, provided that it does not 
pursue the misguided goals of  an integrated welfare state or imperial prowess on the global stage. 
The argument that founding a Bund does not go far enough remains therefore unpersuasive. Heter-
archical federalism has the great virtue of  leaving the member states a large degree of  independ -
ence. A hierarchical order, in contrast, would level most differences of  constitutional practice that 
define Europe at the moment. There is little reason to embark on this route, at least so long as cir-
cumstances do not force the member states to bolster the monetary union through a massive and 
permanent fiscal equalization mechanism.
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The Cost and Benefit of  Reform
So far, this chapter has made two points. First, if  the objective is to address the constitutionalism 
deficit of  the status quo, a federal relaunch trumps reform based on the administrative governance 
paradigm. Second, the Bund model is preferable over a federal state, at least if  we assume reason-
able limits on the substantive ends of  integration. Yet another more basic question still remains  
open: why bother about the constitutionalism deficit in the first place? Let there be no doubt: a fed -
eral reconstitution of  the EU has immediate costs and brings with it a long term risk of  failure. It  
would bind the political energies of  the continent for a significant period. Voters in the member  
states might once again undo the work of  a drafting convention and reject a proposed federal com-
pact (on the issue of  ratification, see Chapter 6). Should reform in fact occur, there would still be  
the danger that, given the complete abolition of  national vetoes, Union governance will come to be 
seen as foreign diktat, which might lead to a collapse of  the integration project. From a functional  
perspective, these costs might seem to lack a sufficient rationale. Perhaps the proposed loosening of  
consensus orientation would make it easier for Brussels to solve the problems facing the continent.  
Yet there is no direct benefit of  this kind to working out a federal compact, whose purpose is to cre-
ate an unambiguous symbolic basis for integration. Some will moreover argue that, after the reforms 
in the wake of  the Eurozone crisis, the current institutional framework has sufficient means to dis-
charge its functions, making further changes superfluous. Against this background, should the EU 
embark on the arduous path of  more fundamental reform, just because liberal and democratic con-
stitutionalism is not in perfect shape?
The primary rationale for such an effort is moral. If  a political regime falls short of  the prin-
ciples of  constitutionalism, then it does not deserve our full support and we must strive for change,  
be it through resistance in the gravest situations, or through promotion of  legal reform, which is  
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more appropriate in the case of  the EU. Here I presuppose of  course that liberal and democratic  
constitutionalism is a valid ideal. My goal is not to persuade those who reject this conception of  le -
gitimate government altogether. But even if  one embraces constitutionalism and the specific inter -
pretation of  its principles that I have suggested, it remains possible to oppose fundamental reform. 
What if  the problems we have identified are just not serious enough? The EU, after all, is not a tyr-
annical regime that flouts the rule of  law, permits zero democratic participation, and tramples basic 
rights. A certain measure of  constitutional imperfection, one might believe, is the price of  integra-
tion. The EU should attempt to improve as much as is possible under the hybrid status quo (per-
haps through reform along the lines of  the administrative governance paradigm), but more funda-
mental change does not warrant the cost and risk that it would entail. Whether or not this objection 
is persuasive depends, in the first instance, on how we assess the moral seriousness of  the diagnosed 
constitutionalism deficit. But such an evaluation, it seems, would have to fall back on rather subject-
ive criteria. I shall hence meet the skeptic on her own turf  and suggest that even from a prudential  
viewpoint, the case for drastic reform is strong. While a federal reconstitution of  the EU has a price, 
holding on to the status quo might still be a mistake in consequentialist terms.
For one thing, the constitutionalism deficit has the potential to undermine popular acceptance 
of  the EU in the long run. To be sure, a normative conception of  legitimate government has no dir -
ect relationship with actual support for a political regime. Citizens hold that a government has the  
right to rule, or reject this notion, for diverse reasons that do not need to and often will not coincide 
with the principles of  constitutionalism. In fact, the relevant individual beliefs might not even relate  
to institutional features of  the political system. With some justification, common wisdom holds that  
“output” is the best empirical predictor of  support for a regime. If  the system delivers the goods, in 
particular economic wellbeing, citizens will endorse it, regardless of  whether the exercise of  public  
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power fulfills certain normative principles. In a recent article, Joseph Weiler has furthermore pointed 
out the importance of  a third form of  legitimation. He argues that political regimes can offer a  
“messianic” narrative to motivate citizen support when institutional features and output fail to se -
cure it: “the justification for action and its mobilizing force derive […] from the ideal pursued, the  
destiny to be achieved, the Promised Land waiting at the end of  the road.”43
Regimes that fed on this kind of  political legitimation include the fascist and communist states 
of  the 20th century. But the European integration project, Weiler reminds us, put forward a messi -
anic narrative, too, though one with a quite different content. The Schuman Declaration, which 
launched the process, envisaged a lasting peace based on fraternity among nations (rather than just a 
balance of  power) and forgiveness of  German atrocities during the Third Reich. It was the appeal  
of  this objective, Weiler argues, that made the creation of  a supranational administration palatable 
to European citizens. The overriding importance of  the goal compensated for damage to liberal and 
democratic values, and it motivated popular acquiescence so long as the economic fruit of  integra -
tion had not yet ripened.44
Yet the persuasive force of  political messianism, Weiler notes, cannot but fade over time, either  
because its promise turns out to be hollow, or because it falls victim to its own success. In the case  
of  European integration, the latter factor has been more important. The pathos of  the beginning is  
now almost unintelligible to the present generation. Peace on the continent, it seems, can be taken 
for granted, and hence citizens more and more question the institutional design of  the status quo or  
ask what material benefits Union policies generate for them. Such attitude changes led to a break-
down of  the “permissive consensus” in public opinion, which until the Maastricht reform enabled 
integration to proceed without much interference from national electorates. From its high point in 
43 Joseph Weiler,  "The Political  and Legal  Culture of  European Integration. An Exploratory Essay,"  International  
Journal of  Constitutional Law 9, no. 3-4 (2011), 683.
44 ———, "The Political and Legal Culture of  European Integration. An Exploratory Essay." 682-686.
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1990, citizen support for participation of  their state in the EU has seen a noticeable decline. In the  
spring of  2011, less than half  of  Eurobarometer respondents believed that membership was on bal -
ance a good thing.45 This development in public opinion coincided with greater political contesta-
tion of  the integration process as such. Mainstream parties have come to incorporate Euroskeptic 
positions,  and,  in  numerous  countries,  radical  forces  have  gained  significant  electoral  success  
through articulating criticism of  the EU and outright antagonism to it.46 Citizens have moreover re-
jected further  integration  when asked to vote  on it:  several  national  referendums on proposed  
amendments  of  the  treaties  yielded  a  negative  outcome.47 These  manifestations  of  growing 
Eurokepticism throw sand in the wheels of  the present institutional framework and bode ill for the 
chances to develop the integration project further.
Where can the EU go from here? The road of  messianic legitimation seems to be closed for 
good. Popular acceptance of  integration might further wane, if  European leaders continue to ad-
vertise perpetual peace as the sole reason to support the project, and there is no alternative grand 
vision in sight to capture the imagination of  Union citizens. At the same time, relative geopolitical  
decline and the demographic aging of  the continent suggest that economic abundance will be more 
difficult to achieve in the future. European societies will face the twin challenge to maintain both 
their current level of  wealth and its equitable distribution. In the process, one can expect intense 
political conflict among different social groups – the rich and the poor, the old and the young, the  
winners of  globalization and its losers, to name just the more evident fault lines. Intelligent Union  
policies, so we can at least hope, will make the task at hand easier. But a return to economic cornu-
45 Standard Eurobarometer 75.
46 Cecilia Leconte, Understanding Euroscepticism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 113-127.
47 In 1992, the Danish electorate rejected the Maastricht Treaty, and in 2001, Irish citizens opposed the Nice Treaty. 
However, both times, a second vote reversed the initial outcome. In 2005, French and Dutch referendums led to the 
failure of  the TCE.
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copia, such as Europe has last seen in the 1960s and 1970s, appears unfeasible. Successful legitima-
tion of  the integration project through “output” alone is therefore quite improbable.
This brings us back to the relevance of  liberal and democratic constitutionalism, or the ques-
tion as to whether mending it justifies an onerous reform effort. With the other possible sources of  
popular support depleted, legitimation through adequate institutional design must take on a larger  
role in ensuring continued acceptance of  European integration. For this reason, a push to restore  
the rule of  law, democratic legislation, and basic rights protection has a large potential benefit. Here  
I do not mean to suggest that citizens in general endorse my own theoretical understanding of  these  
principles and evaluate the status quo in light of  that conception. The argument is rather that liberal 
and democratic constitutionalism, as we have defined it, reflects the desire of  the modern subject  
for private and public freedom (see Chapter 1). To the extent the latter are being denied, people who 
share in this mindset will feel alienated, even if  their reaction might not derive from sophisticated 
theoretical contemplation.
Let me reiterate the concrete reasons for such discontent. Frequent competence transgression 
supports the notion that elites in Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg make their own rules and 
remain unaccountable to the member state demoi – their ostensible principals. The weak common 
good orientation of  joint decision making leads to an impression that Union governance is based on 
tiresome wheeling  and dealing,  which  often  enough leaves  Brussels  unable  to  address  pressing  
shared concerns. At the same time, the process remains opaque and insulated from participation via  
electoral reward and punishment, leading to popular disinterest and ignorance of  European issues.  
The impression of  illegitimate elite rule is further strengthened through the outsize power of  the  
ECJ to elaborate the content of  individual rights. While the subversive effect of  the Luxembourg  
court on the national welfare state remains for the most part unknown to the general public (though 
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not unfelt), some judgments have attracted widespread attention. For example, the restriction of  
labor rights through Viking, Laval, Rüffert, and Luxembourg incensed trade unions across the con-
tinent.48 Efforts to repeal these decisions are ongoing, but much to the frustration of  the contin -
ental left, the entrenchment of  judicial doctrine against political correction makes success quite im-
probable.
Founding a European Bund could overcome this syndrome of  disenfranchisement, and there-
fore it might, in the long run, put integration on a more solid foundation of  popular support. Em-
pirical research has shown that, at present, dissatisfaction with the democratic performance of  the 
EU is a major driver of  Euroskeptic attitudes and voting behavior. The other main factors are the  
individual perception of  utilitarian disadvantage through integration, and the belief  that it threatens 
national identities.49 Those who are critical of  the EU for the latter reason will of  course not wel-
come a federal reconstitution. Yet a functioning Bund would persuade the skeptics in the first group. 
It might furthermore reduce opposition to the EU based on the perception of  utilitarian disadvant -
age. Citizens in this group tend also to believe the status quo is undemocratic.50 One might therefore 
speculate  that  improved  procedural  legitimation  will  redirect  the  scorn  about  perceived  losses  
through Union policies. At the moment, utilitarian skeptics blame the EU itself  for their disadvant-
age. The policies believed to cause their losses result, after all, from a governance process that, in 
their eyes, does not give them adequate voice. If  this deficit were fixed, the disadvantageous rules  
48 Reingard  Zimmer,  "Labour  Market  Politics  through  Jurisprudence:  The  Influence  of  the  Judgements  of  the 
European Court of  Justice (Viking, Laval, Rüffert, Luxembourg) on Labour Market Policies," German Policy Stud-
ies 7, no. 1 (2011).
49 Lauren McLaren, "Explaining Mass-Level Euroscepticism: Identity, Interests, and Institutional Distrust," Acta Polit-
ica 42, no. 2-3 (2007), Jost van Spanje and Claes H. de Vreese, "So What's Wrong with the EU? Motivations Underly-
ing the Eurosceptic Vote in the 2009 European Elections," European Union Politics 12, no. 3 (2011).
50 Hajo G. Boomgarden et al., "Mapping EU Attitudes. Conceptual and Empirical Dimensions of  Euroscepticism and 
EU Support," European Union Politics 12, no. 2 (2011), 250.
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will perhaps remain in place, but the affected citizens might then lay the blame on the partisan  
forces that have enacted the legislation at issue, rather than on integration as such.51
A second prudential reason to entertain fundamental reform is that perceived disenfranchise-
ment has a more general negative impact on European political culture. One recent poll found that  
large majorities of  German, British, French, Dutch, Italian, Portuguese, Polish, and Hungarian re-
spondents feel they have little influence on politics.52 Discontent with unaccountable elite rule at the 
Union level is without doubt a factor here. The result should alarm us because it suggests that large 
numbers of  Europeans might be susceptible to authoritarian political beliefs. A sense of  disenfran-
chisement can provoke the illusory hope that an outstanding leader will give the people a more au -
thentic voice.  Indeed,  many participants in the quoted poll  agree that a strong man should rise  
above the fray to enforce the popular will against the establishment.53 This finding is of  course not 
much of  a surprise, given that over the past decade or so, political movements built around charis -
matic figures have been on the rise across the continent (such groups, needless to mention, are often 
the same that articulate radical Euroskeptic positions). A successful federal reconstitution of  the EU 
could take much wind out of  the sails that propel this worrisome development.
In conclusion, the potential benefit of  founding a Bund is considerable. Does it outweigh the 
cost of  reform? At the end, that is a political question. Theoretical reflection can elucidate the stakes 
on both sides of  the argument, but it cannot give us definite assurance regarding their ultimate bal-
ance. In my own judgment, the moral and prudential case for reform trumps the countervailing 
reasons. When the time is auspicious, Europe should therefore establish a heterarchical federation.  
To support this argument further and to flesh out the proposed reform agenda, let us next complete  
51 Hix, What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, 66.
52 Andreas Zick et al., "Die Abwertung der Anderen. Eine europäische Zustandsbeschreibung zu Intoleranz, Vorur -
teilen und Diskriminierung,"  (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2011), 113-115.
53 The desire for a strong leader is expressed by up to 62.4 percent (Portugal); the lowest value is 23.1 percent (Nether -
lands). See ———, "Die Abwertung der Anderen. Eine europäische Zustandsbeschreibung zu Intoleranz, Vorur -
teilen und Diskriminierung," 113-115.
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the so far unfinished discussion of  how democratic legislation might work under the envisaged con-
stitutional structure.
Chapter 5
Democratic Legislation in a European Bund
If  the EU were to become a heterarchical federation, how could it establish a robust link between 
the public sphere and lawmaking? The previous chapter has left this question open. With regard to  
the democratic shortfall of  the status quo, I have argued that founding a Bund might enhance the  
common good orientation of  the European legislative process. But this would not yet suffice to 
overcome the syndrome of  democratic ill health that Chapter 3 has described. Of  the problems we  
diagnosed, there still  remains the lack of  a proper connection between the incipient continental  
public sphere and Union lawmaking. What institutional approach should a future European Bund 
take in order to address this challenge? The following sketches a possible solution.
Recall the broad contours of  the present deficit (see Chapter 3). There is some evidence that a 
transnational communication space is emerging, which links domestic public spheres and might so 
enable rational deliberation over the shared interest of  the continent. Yet the Union political system 
does not create strong enough incentives for elected leaders to engage with this process. First, we 
have reason to doubt that national parliaments tap their full potential in terms of  holding the gov-
ernment accountable for its European policies. Second, democratic legitimation via the Parliament is  
deficient as well. When electing this institution, voters react foremost to the performance of  parties  
in  domestic  politics  and do  not  evaluate  the  work  of  their  representatives  in  Strasbourg.  Low 
turnout is moreover a persistent frustration and embarrassment. Such voter disinterest implies that  
members of  the Parliament need neither heed public opinion nor attempt to educate it in order to  
ensure their reelection.
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A possible federal reconstitution of  the EU should aim to improve this state of  affairs. The 
first  question here  is  which paradigm of  will  formation to follow.  Heterarchical  federations,  as  
Chapter  1  has  discussed,  legislate  either  through  a  diet  or  a  bicameral  parliament.  Should  a 
European Bund implement the  former model and establish intergovernmental deliberation as the 
central decision mechanism? Or should it retain a bicameral design that places a federal popular  
chamber alongside the diet, such that both an overarching demos and the national peoples can for-
mulate their respective public interests and negotiate among them?
Most observers will not hesitate to come down in favor of  the second alternative. The idea that 
Union governance must be subject to “dual legitimation” is dominant in political and academic dis-
course. From the 1980s onwards, “democratization” of  the EU has therefore primarily meant in-
creasing the power of  the Parliament in Strasbourg. The avowed goal of  this institution is to repres -
ent a transnational collective of  individual citizens or, in other words, a continental demos. But the 
European legislature is not expected to supplant national parliaments altogether. Indeed, the treaties 
recognize the latter as formal participants in Union lawmaking. Their expected contribution is to  
monitor events at the European level and to hold the national executive accountable. In this man-
ner, goes the official narrative, the transnational and the domestic legitimation channels supplement 
and reinforce each other.1 Scholars, at least, have found this notion quite persuasive. The literature is 
full of  praise for the achievements of  “multilevel parliamentarism”, and there is a great deal of  op-
timism about its future potential.2 From this perspective, the solution to residual democratic prob-
lems is to further empower both the Strasbourg legislature and national representatives.
1 The concept of  dual legitimation is codified in Art. 10 (2) TEU.
2 See for example Armin von Bogdandy, "Das Leitbild der dualistischen Legitimation," Kritische Vierteljahresschrift  
für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 83 (2000), Ben Crum and John Erik Fossum, "The Multilevel Parliament-
ary Field. A Framework for Theorizing Representative Democracy in the EU," European Political Science Review 1, 
no. 2 (2009). It is interesting to note here that Jürgen Habermas shares the optimism about the potential of  dual le -
gitimation. See Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas, 73-74. The following will use his own ideal account of  demo-
cratic legislation to undermine this position.
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Yet I shall cast doubt on the received wisdom here: true dual legitimation is difficult to achieve, 
if  not a chimera. Making the Parliament an effective voice of  a continental  demos would require 
much stronger competition among transnational parties than we see at present. This presupposes  
struggle between government and opposition forces, based on identifiable programmatic alternat-
ives. How to achieve the requisite coordination among the domestic parties forming a European 
ideological bloc seems to be a riddle without a good solution. Or so I will argue below. In light of  
this, a bicameral design that includes a popular chamber is a questionable choice for a future Bund.  
What about the diet model? The central objection against this paradigm states that intergovern-
mental deliberation is, qua its nature, an undemocratic procedure. But domestic legislatures, I will  
contend, provide a hitherto somewhat neglected resource for linking the interaction among national 
leaders to opinion formation in the public sphere. Indeed, all things considered, focusing on mem -
ber state parliaments is preferable to chasing the elusive ideal of  dual legitimation. Since the Stras-
bourg legislature, in this scenario, could not provide meaningful representation of  a demos, one 
would have to rethink its function and design. I believe there is still a useful role for a transnational  
parliament in overseeing the Commission and improving deliberation in the Union political system. 
But there is no good rationale for direct popular election. In fact, the latter turns out to have signi -
ficant undesirable ramifications. For this reason, I will advocate a return to the regime that was in  
place before 1979, when domestic legislatures appointed the members of  the Parliament from their  
own ranks.
The chapter is  divided into four parts.  First,  I  examine the importance of  parties within a 
Habermasian account of  democratic lawmaking. Next, the chapter looks at the practical difficulties 
that beset the ideal of  dual legitimation. I then explore the democratic potential of  the diet model,  
focusing on which reforms could strengthen domestic legislatures and what exact role the Parlia-
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ment might still have, if  these were implemented. Last, the chapter takes a brief  look at the idea of  
European citizenship that underlies the proposed institutional design.
The Importance of  Parties
In a recent book, Nancy Rosenblum writes that parties are the “darlings of  political science”, but 
the “orphans of  political philosophy.”3 While empirical investigators produce a never ending stream 
of  pertinent research, theorists give scant attention to the normative evaluation of  parties. This has 
not always been the case. Parties used to be notorious: from ancient Greece to the communist re -
volutions of  the 20th century, philosophers and ideologists have often berated them as sources of  
faction and corruption, which one should attempt to eliminate. Of  course, liberal democrats com-
mitted to political pluralism can no longer espouse such a position. Most theorists of  this ilk have 
instead come to see the existence of  parties as an unavoidable, if  somewhat deplorable, element of  
a representative system. The acceptance, then, is grudging, and hence it will not surprise that, in the  
current literature, proposals to improve democratic legitimation tend to focus on direct citizen in-
put, often through novel forms of  deliberative engagement. Scholarship in this vein begins from the 
implicit or express assumption that parties monopolize the political process, drowning out more au-
thentic  manifestations  of  the  popular  will.  As  to  their  positive  contributions,  silence  has  long 
reigned in theoretical discourse.4
Jürgen Habermas, whose account of  democratic legislation informs our analysis, is not alto-
gether exempt from this generalization. His magnum opus Between Facts and Norms spotlights the 
institutional structure of  a democratic public sphere. But the corresponding account of  the good 
political system is less developed, and Habermas gives no sustained attention to parties. One might  
3 Nancy Rosenblum, On the Side of  the Angels (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 3.
4 ———, On the Side of  the Angels, 1-6.
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interpret this as evidence that he is fixated on an unrealistic and mistaken ideal of  consensus, which  
blinds him to the existence of  intense political disagreement and its legitimate expression in partisan 
contest. Yet this accusation misses the point. Habermas is well aware that citizens have divergent  
private interests and quarrel over the right interpretation of  the public good. Agreement, for him, is  
a regulative ideal that provides clues as to which institutional structures enable free communication.  
It does not, however, constitute a goal that real democratic politics will often, or ever, attain. As dis -
pute persists and decisions have to be made, elected representatives vote to settle the matter. The 
victorious side, though, has no moral claim to bind the losers, unless it has sought to persuade them 
on the basis of  “public reason.” Habermas insinuates that parties support this kind of  deliberation: 
citizens, he notes, depend on “pregeneralized interest positions” to form rational preferences.5 Yet 
Between Facts and Norms does little to explore the precise nature of  this role. To understand the 
present democratic crisis of  the EU and to chart a path to its resolution, we need to account for the  
importance of  parties in somewhat more detail.
Recall how democratic legislation should work according to Habermas (see Chapter 1). The 
process, he argues, must begin with a vibrant public sphere, in which individuals and groups debate  
questions of  collective relevance. If  things go well, the participants in this discourse and – just as 
important – passive spectators develop enlightened opinions regarding the substance of  the com-
mon good. The political system is then expected to assimilate these, as it were, rational preferences  
and pit them against each other. In this manner, legislation will be shaped through a clash among  
rival visions of  the shared interest, making the outcome acceptable to the whole people.
Without parties, I submit, this ideal cannot work or even be approximated in practice. Their  
role is, first, to provide the right sort of  anchor points for public debate and, second, to offer mean-
5 Jürgen Habermas, "Popular Sovereignty as Procedure," in Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics, 
ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 60.
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ingful ballot choices, so as to enable voters to hold their elected representatives accountable. Of  
course, parties make further useful contributions such as, for example, recruiting future political 
leaders and preparing them for the business of  government. Yet the following will focus on their  
role in enabling a robust link between public sphere and political system.
Before  we  can  delve  into  this  investigation,  a  brief  terminological  clarification  is  needed. 
Parties, most theorists concur, are groups that run candidates for political office. But there is much  
debate as to whether all such groups should count as instances of  the concept.6 This ontological 
question does not have to be resolved here. I will argue that groups striving for political office are  
indispensable to democratic legislation, if  these groups also make the two contributions mentioned 
above. Let me elaborate.
The public sphere contains a multitude of  speakers: politicians, journalists, intellectuals, busi -
ness organizations, unions, NGOs, religious groups, and individual citizens. It manifests itself  in  
countless different arenas: the internet, print, television, radio, formal and informal public discus-
sions. There is no planner that coordinates the myriad exchanges that occur within this decentralized 
system. How is it possible that public debate nonetheless tends to crystallize around more or less  
defined issues? Insofar as politics is concerned, partisan contest helps to explain this fact. Parties  
create tangible lines of  division: their role is to propose the ends and means of  state power and to  
criticize each other in a permanent confrontation between government and opposition.7 The better 
part of  political discussion in the public sphere is a direct reaction to this contest: speakers approve  
or disapprove of  what parties have suggested. Other contributions are more creative. Individuals or 
groups can propose changes to existing platforms, and sometimes a social movement will put alto -
gether novel questions on the agenda. Most of  these interventions have the same goal, be it explicit  
6 Rosenblum, On the Side of  the Angels, 18-21.
7 ———, On the Side of  the Angels, 307-308.
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or implicit: to influence parties, which can then transmit the argument into the political system Act-
ors that dismiss this objective must either content themselves with irrelevance or prepare for revolu-
tion.
The distinct role of  parties in enabling meaningful public debate comes into sharper focus once 
we imagine the counterfactual of  pluralist democratic competition without them. In such a scenario, 
aspiring leaders would run for office without partisan affiliation. The main speakers in the public  
sphere would then be individual politicians as well as groups that promote specific issues but do not  
seek to govern (for example, business organizations, unions, civic associations, or religious groups).  
How would such a constellation differ from the familiar one, in which a limited number of  parties  
structure the discussion? To begin with, political communication would be a great deal more diffuse. 
Hence it would be rather improbable that opinions become public in the sense that a large number  
of  people embrace them. A second crucial difference would result from the fact that parties have a 
stronger incentive to advance proposals that serve the common good. The reason here lies in the 
need to build an inclusive coalition of  social groups. To win votes and hold on to them, parties have  
to appeal to a wide range of  different people. Depending on the electoral system, there will also be  
more or less pressure to compete for the median voter. These constraints give parties a strong in-
centive to formulate platforms based on a vision of  the public weal, instead of  seeking to appeal to 
factional interests and values.8 Perhaps, the same is true for independent office aspirants who seek 
to prevail in a nationwide race. Yet the narrower the geographical  boundaries of  a contest,  the  
greater the incentive for candidates to pander to the wants and prejudices of  the local electorate. 
Furthermore, unlike parties, leaders without permanent organizations do not create an enduring in -
stitutional site where actors who have different preferences can work out a joint agenda. What about 
8 ———, On the Side of  the Angels, 356-362; Nadia Urbinati,  Representative Democracy (Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 2006), 30-39.
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groups that focus on particular issues? Such associations, it should be clear, are even less predis -
posed to a common good orientation. Their principal objective is to promote a specific cause. Even 
if  the latter does not stand in direct contradiction to the public interest, there will be little pressure 
on an issue group to see its goals in the context of  the ends that other citizens pursue.
In sum, parties have the unique potential to stimulate public debate and to focus it on rival vis-
ions of  the common good. To be sure, not all parties realize this potential. Some vie for state power 
in order to dole out patronage, making little effort to develop and explain programmatic goals. Oth-
ers seek to further a particular factional interest at the expense of  the whole, spill hatred on scape -
goats to win support, or exist just to promote a single individual. These parties, it should be clear,  
have little value for democratic legislation in the Habermasian sense. But it would be false to con-
clude that I present an unattainable ideal, a utopia in the negative sense of  the word. At least in  
some democracies, parties exist that advocate policies based on reasons that could in principle ap-
peal to all citizens. Such traces of  ideal behavior validate the claim that partisan contest might struc -
ture an otherwise chaotic public sphere, thus supporting the formation of  enlightened opinions 
within the electorate.
Let us next turn to the second distinct contribution of  parties. So far, we have considered their  
importance for a working public sphere that enables voters to develop an informed understanding 
of  the common good. But even when citizens have such rational preferences, leaders might not re -
spond to them. To nudge politicians in this direction is one central purpose of  elections. Partisan 
contest is useful here, too, because it gives citizens a genuine chance to hold rulers accountable.  
Candidates for office will offer platforms that reflect public opinion and, once elected, deliver on 
their promises, if  voters in fact reward them for such behavior and penalize candidates that fail to 
meet these expectations. To make the requisite judgments, citizens need to understand their sub-
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stantive choices and  must be able to evaluate the performance of  incumbents. The existence of  
parties makes it a great deal easier to obtain the relevant information.
Consider again the counterfactual  scenario,  in  which all  candidates are independent.  Under 
these circumstances, voters would have to evaluate the proposals and past achievements of  numer-
ous individuals. What is more, the menu of  choice would differ from election to election. Citizens 
might then still be able to make a meaningful decision regarding a small number of  the most im -
portant races, such as for instance the election of  a head of  government. But even that is a rather  
doubtful proposition, and it should be obvious that, most of  the time, voters would fail to gather 
the information needed to evaluate a candidate on the basis of  substance and performance. In con-
trast, when parties or partisans are on the ballot, citizens benefit from a useful shorthand. A limited 
set of  platforms that remain more or less stable over time lends itself  to readier assessment than nu-
merous individual campaign manifestos. Performance is likewise easier to judge when a voter just  
needs to monitor the political effectiveness of  a whole ideological camp. In this case, the cognitive 
burden of  selecting good leaders shifts, in large measure, from the whole people to active partisans 
who select the individual candidates on their ticket.
Still, a skeptic might object that in most democracies, elections do not turn on the substantive  
proposals and past achievements of  politicians. Whether or not that is true is an empirical question  
that we can leave aside here. The goal of  the preceding discussion has been to elucidate a particular 
ideal of  democratic  legislation, and not to provide empirical description. Once more, though, it 
bears emphasis that I do not promote a utopian ideal. Sometimes, at least, elections do in fact con -
strain leaders to orient their platforms toward public opinion and to deliver on their promises down 
the road. Indeed, this might happen more often than cynics believe. As Rosenblum notes, one im-
portant finding of  empirical voting studies has been to demonstrate just how little information cit-
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izens need to elect representatives who further their values and interests.9 Parties deserve a great 
deal of  credit for this phenomenon.
We can then state the following conclusion: the existence of  parties is crucial to democratic  
lawmaking because contest among them ensures, on the one hand, that citizens have the chance to  
engage in meaningful public debate and, on the other hand, that politicians must heed the opinions  
that emerge from this process. But where parties do not exist or fail to perform their proper func -
tions, such a feedback loop cannot develop. Armed with this insight, let us now return to the ques-
tion of  democratic legislation in a future European Bund.
The Elusive Ideal of  Dual Legitimation
Under the status quo, weak partisan contest is the main obstacle to a strong connection between the 
European public sphere and the Parliament in Strasbourg. As the following will elaborate, political 
competition at the Union level is anemic in two respects: first, there is no clash between government 
and opposition within the Parliament; second, the existing partisan groups fail to advance meaning -
ful common platforms. These factors impede public debate of  European issues and ensure that 
continental polls remain “second order elections”, which motivate few voters to turn out. Reforms 
to overcome the weakness of  partisan contest at the Union level have been proposed. But these, I  
will show, are unrealistic and have undesirable side effects. In other words, the ideal of  dual legitima-
tion, or the notion that Parliament speaks for a European demos while the intergovernmental or-
gans ensure representation for national peoples, might be unworkable in practice.
Let me preface the argument to this effect with some basic facts about the current state of  par-
tisan organization in the EU. The election of  the Parliament takes place according to rules set at the  
national level. Domestic parties contest the seats allocated to their member state. Once elected, the  
9 Rosenblum, On the Side of  the Angels, 337.
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deputies form transnational groups, which are based on agreements to cooperate among their re-
spective home parties. Cohesion within these ideological blocs is high: votes in the Parliament split, 
for the most part, along the lines of  group affiliation rather than national origin of  the deputies. 10 
The “Europarties” also hold regular meetings among functionaries of  their member organizations 
and prepare common election manifestos, which are supposed to guide the separate campaign ef -
forts at the domestic level.11
This system of  partisan organization has so far not been able to generate robust political com-
petition. For one thing, there is no struggle between government and opposition. Unlike most do-
mestic legislatures in Europe, the Parliament does not elect an executive. Instead, national govern-
ments appoint the members of  the Commission and nominate its President on the basis of  QMV. 
The Strasbourg deputies, to be sure, have the power to veto the candidate selected as President or to 
reject the full roster of  appointees. Once a Commission has begun its work, the Parliament can also 
dismiss it as a whole. Such a censure motion, however, requires two thirds of  the votes to pass. In 
practice, then, the Commission does not exercise its right of  legislative initiative on behalf  of  a gov-
ernment faction or coalition. Rather it seeks to implement the political agenda that is set at the  
European Council summits and, to a lesser extent, its own preferences (see Chapter 2). In this pro -
cess, the need to have Parliament approve proposed legislation is a mere side constraint. Political de-
bate in Strasbourg has therefore a peculiar character. When the lawmakers read a draft measure, the 
plenum will not split into one side that justifies the proposal and one side that subjects it to a rigor -
ous critique. Parliamentarians instead focus on amending the measure under consideration. This ef-
fort proceeds in a manner that is more collaborative than adversarial. The working culture in Stras -
10 Hix, What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, 112-119.
11 For an overview of  the present state of  the Europarties and their historical development see David Hanley, Beyond 
the Nation State. Parties in the Era of  European Integration (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
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bourg emphasizes collegial interaction, as opposed to vigorous confrontation.12 On the one hand, 
that is a result of  the fact that legislative debate is not about the fundamental merit of  a proposed 
law but focuses on finetuning its details. A second explanation is institutional design. Committee  
chairs in the Parliament are distributed on a proportional basis, not according to a “winner-takes-all”  
rule as in most domestic legislatures. What is more, under an informal agreement between the two  
largest political groups (the conservative EPP and the social democratic PES), each faction appoints  
the President of  the institution for half  an electoral term. Power relations in the Parliament remain 
therefore more or less stable over time; election outcomes have at best a marginal influence on the  
distribution of  institutional leverage.13 In light of  this, it makes sense for the Strasbourg lawmakers 
to negotiate quiet compromises, dispensing with the argumentative belligerence and political theat-
rics, which characterize the struggle between government and opposition in the domestic sphere.
The second respect in which transnational political competition remains weak is that, most of  
the time, the Europarties fail to agree on a meaningful joint platform. Their election manifestos 
contain often little more than vague generalities, and domestic parties tend to ignore them as cam-
paign instruments.14 The immediate causes of  this programmatic emptiness are not difficult to see. 
To begin with, the sheer number of  member organizations makes coordination difficult. What is 
more, all Europarties work out their respective agenda based on consensus among national delega -
tions. Given that each of  the latter wields a veto, one cannot expect the manifestos to put forward  
more than broad ideological principles and uncontroversial goals. But why do parties refuse to cent -
ralize power over the joint platform? One reason, it will be obvious, is that no organization likes to  
give up influence. Institutional egoism, though, does not seem to be the whole explanation. We also 
12 For  a  journalistic  account  of  the  working  culture  in  the  Parliament  see  Jochen  Bittner,  "Viele  kleine  
Schraubenzieher," Die ZEIT, 28 May 2009.
13 Hix, What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, 138-140.
14 Mittag and Hülsken, "Von Sekundärwahlen zu Europäisierten Wahlen? 30 Jahre Direktwahlen zum Europäischen 
Parlament," 108-109.
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need to take into account that European political families might be too diverse to agree on a unified  
platform: for example, being a social democrat in Sweden is not the same thing as being a social  
democrat in the UK.15 A further obstacle to deeper programmatic cooperation lies in the fact that  
national politicians must speak for national voters. Parties that bind themselves to a substantive  
common program would have to defend it before the domestic public and pursue the agreed upon 
measures when holding power. In other words, positions negotiated at the Union level would com-
pete with the interests of  national constituencies. Against this background, it will not surprise that 
domestic parties have so far failed to develop more concrete joint platforms.
Is the EU exceptional with regard to its system of  partisan organization? Commentators who 
dispute this often liken the Strasbourg legislature to the US House of  Representatives.16 This com-
parison, however, is quite misleading. To be sure, the House does not appoint the executive, and it 
focuses on working out the language of  statutes, instead of  just debating the legislative program of  
the government. In this sense, at least, the Parliament and the American lower chamber resemble 
each other. Political competition in the United States, though, is still a great deal more robust than  
under the European status quo. American Democrats and Republicans are in constant public dis-
pute with each other, holding the other side responsible for the policies adopted while in control of  
the House, Senate, or White House. Furthermore, the two major parties give voters a clear choice 
between different substantive platforms. One might even consider partisan struggle in the United  
States  as  too polarized.  The contrast  with the almost  complete  lack of  adversarial  engagement 
among the European ideological blocs could not be starker.17
15 For a discussion of  the coordination problems within the social democratic bloc see Hanley,  Beyond the Nation 
State. Parties in the Era of  European Integration, 63-64. Similar problems affect the other ideological families.
16 See for example Habermas, "Why Europe Needs a Constitution," 31-32.
17 In 2010, the Parliament itself  commissioned a report that comes to the same conclusion. See "How to Create a  
Transnational Party System,"  (Brussels: European Parliament, 2010), 98.
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Let us next consider the implications of  weak political competition at the Union level. Recall  
the functions that parties  should perform for democratic lawmaking.  First,  debate in the public 
sphere relies on contest among them. The Europarties, however, do little to stimulate and structure 
political discourse. Absent ritualized confrontation between government and opposition, the news 
media lack stories to report, and hence the Union legislative process escapes, for the most part, the  
attention of  European citizens.18 Not even the most informed among them have much knowledge 
of  the policies under consideration in Brussels and Strasbourg, let alone enlightened preferences re -
garding the best course of  action. Second, parties should offer the electorate meaningful choices 
that enable them to hold their representatives accountable. The Europarties fail at this task as well.  
Given the vagueness of  the joint manifestos and the absence of  sustained public debate, voters lack 
the requisite information to evaluate whether a candidate will reflect their preferences and if  an in-
cumbent has performed well in the past. What is more, even if  the Europarties made clear program-
matic statements, the structure of  the legislative process would prevent them from implementing 
these electoral promises. The Commission, as we have seen, is not responsible to a faction or coali-
tion within the Parliament, and the amendment process is based on collaboration among the major  
political groups. This, in turn, means that elections have little or no influence on actual policies. Vot-
ing results cannot perturb the legislative apparatus of  the EU, which carries on in the same manner 
as usual, regardless of  which camp happens to win the most seats in the Parliament. It is, then, no 
wonder that citizens tend to use the continental polls to comment on domestic politics, and that 
turnout has seen a continuous decline toward ever more abysmal rates.
What sort of  reform might overcome the current lack of  adversarial engagement? Simon Hix, 
who shares the concern about this phenomenon, offers a possible solution. He proposes, first, to  
adjust the procedural rules of  the Parliament. If, goes the reasoning, the continental elections had 
18 Hix, What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, 101-102.
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more influence on the distribution of  power within the Strasbourg legislature, citizens would have a 
greater incentive to vote for platforms that match their preferences on European policies, instead of  
using the ballot to register disapproval or (less often) support for their domestic government. To 
bring this about, he suggests a “winner-takes-more” approach to the allocation of  committee chairs 
and recommends electing the President of  the Parliament for a full term, so as to reserve this office 
for the strongest faction.19
The reasoning here appears to be sound. Ending the current system of  proportional influence 
distribution could improve the link between election results and legislative output, and it might also 
have an effect on the rather too collegial working atmosphere of  the Parliament. A further advant-
age, Hix points out, is that neither proposed change would require a formal amendment of  the  
treaties. But it should also be clear that procedural reform can just be a first step toward stronger 
political competition. It does too little to establish a real government versus opposition dynamic, as  
the Union executive would still not be responsible to an ideological bloc or a coalition within the 
Parliament. Moreover, procedural reform cannot address the failure of  the Europarties to agree on  
meaningful joint platforms
To eliminate these hurdles to more vibrant adversarial politics, Hix would also like to see an 
“open contest for the Commission President.” Of  course, the easiest solution here would be to let  
the Parliament elect the chief  executive officer.20 But Hix argues that, even without such a radical 
change of  the treaties, a more transparent race for the most prominent Union leadership post is  
possible. The Europarties, he proposes, should each nominate a candidate for Commission Presid-
ent before the elections for the Parliament take place. This individual would then formulate a con -
crete platform for the next legislative period, which should guide the campaign efforts of  domestic 
19 ———, What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, 138-149.
20 Several member states, the Parliament, and the Commission advocated such an election procedure during the 2004 
European Convention. The final draft constitution, however, did not include this proposal. See ———,  What's  
Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, 159.
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parties. Hix believes that, given the prominent role of  the candidates during the run up to the vote, 
the European Council would have little choice but to nominate the politician whose camp won the 
most seats in the Parliament.21
If  this scenario came to pass, the continental elections would be fought on the basis of  sub-
stantive  platforms.  The winning candidate might  also have a genuine chance to implement  her 
agenda because she would have an electoral mandate to direct the Commission to develop policies  
in line with her campaign promises. Combined with procedural reform in the Parliament, a genuine 
struggle between government and opposition might then emerge, for the strongest camp would  
support the legislative program of  their leader, while the remaining factions seek to point out its  
flaws to the public. In sum, political competition at the Union level would no longer be anemic.
But, alas, the Hix plan is quite unrealistic. A European candidate who unites domestic parties 
under her manifesto is a  deus ex machina solution. Politicians in the member states, as we noted, 
have a strong incentive to refuse to develop a meaningful transnational platform, since this might 
bind them to policies their own voters reject. It seems therefore rather improbable that domestic  
parties will empower one individual to formulate a joint manifesto that would guide their campaign 
for the continental election, and which might become a constraint on the national executive when it 
participates in the intergovernmental Union organs.
A further weak point of  the proposed scheme is that it might lead to an excessive concentra-
tion of  power in a single leader. We noted that, given their number and diverse preferences, do -
mestic parties cannot be expected to agree on substantive common goals. Selecting one person to 
write a manifesto solves the problem, but it also bestows enormous power on this individual. What  
is more, the Commission President, as Hix imagines the office, would be a great deal more influen-
tial than under the status quo. Once elected, she would have a popular mandate to implement her  
21 ———, What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, 155-163.
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electoral promises, and hence the European  Council would be under significant pressure to sur-
render its current agenda setting role (and focus on areas not subject to the normal legislative pro-
cess, such as CFSP). In other words, personal leadership might replace intergovernmental delibera-
tion when it comes to formulating the priorities of  Union governance. To be sure, there are other 
democratic systems that give similar power to individual politicians. Consider once again the United 
States for comparison. Here presidential candidates exert strong influence over the programmatic  
direction of  their parties. And once elected to the White House, the President can shape actual  
policies to a significant extent. Still, there is an important difference to the regime that Hix proposes. 
American parties use primaries to determine their frontrunners. In these races, a large number of  
presidential aspirants engage with a partisan subset of  the whole electorate in order to win the nom -
ination. Hix, in contrast, envisages a backroom deal among the chiefs of  domestic parties. That is  
understandable, given that it seems difficult to conceive a transnational selection process involving 
more grassroots participation. But a system that chooses leaders behind closed doors and concen-
trates enormous power in their person will do little to dispel the widespread belief  that European 
politics is the business of  aloof  elites.
The Achilles heel of  dual legitimation, then, is the need for coordination among multiple do-
mestic parties within one European ideological bloc. Without identifiable programmatic alternatives,  
there can be no genuine political competition at the Union level, and so long as that is the case the 
Parliament will remain of  dubious usefulness for democratic will formation. The problem here, it  
appears, is that such coordination faces almost insuperable obstacles. Member state politicians who 
seek to represent domestic voters cannot, in earnest, delegate the formulation of  their European 
agenda  to  a  transnational  process.  And even if  this  hurdle  were  overcome,  the  most  plausible  
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method to achieve coordination would be to create partisan sun kings of  the sort Hix advocates.  
Resolving one democratic deficit, it seems, cannot but lead to another.
One hypothetical exit from this predicament is to establish a European system of  partisan or-
ganization, which is autonomous from existing domestic parties. David Schleicher recommends an 
election reform scheme that might, at first glance, seem to have such an effect. He proposes to force 
the Europarties on the ballot in the member states. This could be accomplished through a rule that 
parties cannot receive seats in the Parliament unless having gained a certain percentage of  the vote  
in a certain number of  countries. It would then be impossible for groups that run in just one mem-
ber state to send deputies to Strasbourg, and therefore local parties would have little choice but to  
make room for their European ideological blocs on national ballots. Citizens in the UK, for in -
stance, might then no longer pick between Tories and Labor, but rather between EPP and PSS. 
Schleicher hopes that as a result, the electorate would focus on the public appearance of  the Euro-
parties and stop using the continental polls to comment on domestic politics.22 This expectation ap-
pears reasonable, and hence the reform proposal merits serious consideration. Nonetheless, more 
voter attention to the European ideological blocs is not enough to improve democratic legitimation 
via the Parliament. The transnational parties would also need to compete against each other with  
meaningful platforms that stand a chance of  implementation following electoral success. For this 
reason, there would still have to be reforms that, first, bring about more adversarial debate in the  
Parliament and, second, create a link between the popular vote and the makeup of  the Commission.  
The Europarties would furthermore need to develop programs with real content. Here Schleicher 
believes that, once his scheme has been implemented, the ideological blocs will seek to build their 
“brand” in order to improve their electoral fortunes.23 But this would seem to require a transna-
22 David Schleicher, "What if  Europe Held an Election and No One Cared? ," Harvard International Law Journal 52, 
no. 1 (2011), 152-156.
23 ———, "What if  Europe Held an Election and No One Cared? ," 154.
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tional process of  platform building, which overcomes the hurdles to coordination that we discussed  
above. In other words, domestic parties would have to give up their current position of  dominance. 
This, however, is unrealistic. Schleicher recognizes that Europarties must continue to depend on na-
tional member organizations for infrastructure and personnel.24 It appears probable, then, that do-
mestic parties will maintain a hold over the substantive agenda of  their ideological bloc. So long as 
that is the case, the election reform approach is subject to the same objections that I have raised 
against Hix.
In light of  the above, one might come to question the whole concept of  dual legitimation. As 
we noted, the response to the perceived “democratic deficit” of  the EU has so far concentrated on 
increasing the power of  the Parliament. The Strasbourg legislature, it is hoped, will come to speak  
for a European collective of  individuals, entering a conversation, as it were, with the member state  
peoples, whose leaders represent them in the intergovernmental process. But for the reasons laid  
out above, this ideal has so far proven elusive, and there seems to be no evident solution to the 
problems we have diagnosed. Against this background, theorists should consider possible alternat-
ives to dual legitimation via a bicameral parliament. The following will therefore take a closer look at  
what I refer to as the “diet model” of  federal will formation.
European Lawmaking Without a Popular Chamber
At the time of  their initial creation, the historical polities that fit the Bund model were governed  
through a federal diet, composed of  diplomatic legations from the member states. That is true of  
the Swiss and Dutch federations, the German Bund of  1815, and the United States under the Art -
icles  of  Confederation.  But in all  these cases,  popular chambers were later installed.  When this 
happened, the Dutch and German federations lost their heterarchical character, whereas the United 
24 ———, "What if  Europe Held an Election and No One Cared? ," 153.
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States (until the Civil War) and, to a lesser degree, Switzerland retained important elements of  the 
Bund model.25 In other words, even where the existence of  a single unified people remained at least  
doubtful, constitution writers opted for a popular chamber alongside representation of  the units 
through what used to be the diet. While this decision might seem natural in retrospect, there is no  
logical imperative for a heterarchical federation, even a democratic one, to adopt this particular form 
of  bicameralism. The hypothetical alternative is to retain the diet as the sole or main decision mak-
ing organ and hold member state governments accountable via democratic processes at the unit  
level.
A future European Bund should follow a version of  the latter approach, or so I will argue here. 
That  is  of  course  a  rather  controversial  position.  Despite  widespread  disappointment  with  the  
present working of  the Parliament, most observers cling to the belief  that appropriate reform will 
lead to eventual improvement. Few people concerned with the democratic deficit of  the status quo 
would agree that Union decision making should become more intergovernmental, rather than less.  
But there is at least one notable exception. Joschka Fischer, the former German foreign minister  
who once called for a European federation with a “proper” bicameral legislature, revised this stance  
in a recent newspaper article. Neither the Commission nor the Parliament, Fischer has come to be -
lieve, can provide a level of  democratic legitimation that is commensurate with the kind of  powers 
Brussels will need to obtain in the future. He therefore proposes that member state leaders form a  
genuine transnational “government”; member state parliaments, Fischer argues, should guarantee 
25 For the specific histories of  each case see Forsyth, Unions of  States. The Theory and Practice of  Confederation, 17-
72.
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the requisite democratic input.26 The following will consider how such an institutional scheme might 
work in practice and develop a normative case for it.
Even at present, the member states reserve the most important decisions to intergovernmental 
deliberation. The Parliament, to be sure, is the ostensible equal of  the Council of  Ministers. Yet the  
Commission determines what kind of  legislation is up for debate in the first place, and it does so, 
for the most past, on the basis of  the political guidelines, which the heads of  state and government 
negotiate at the European Council meetings (see Chapter 2). This means that a future Bund could 
implement a diet system without creating an altogether novel institutional scheme. As far as the in-
tergovernmental process is concerned, little would need to change. The previous chapter, to be sure, 
has argued for the abolition of  consensus rule in the European Council. A reform plan to create a  
Bund should include this change because it would enable the heads of  state and government to  
make policies in line with the public weal of  the entire continent. Yet, with this exception, the inter-
governmental process might continue to operate as it does under the status quo. The main effect of  
a transition to a diet system would instead concern the role of  legislatures in Union governance. We 
have noted that, at the moment, domestic and European representatives divide the work between 
them. The former scrutinize the actions of  their government in Brussels, whereas the latter aspire to 
represent  a  continental  demos.  Under  the  regime  proposed  here,  national  parliaments  would 
shoulder a larger burden. Let us first discuss what this might entail in terms of  how domestic over-
sight is performed.
The intergovernmental process is  prima facie undemocratic because it concentrates power in 
the hands of  a small elite that makes decisions behind closed doors. To address this problem, mem-
26 Joschka Fischer, "Es wird einsam und kalt um Europa," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1 Nov 2011. Fischer does not elabor-
ate much on the institutional details of  his proposal. He advocates for a “Euro Chamber” composed of  delegates  
from domestic legislatures, but leaves open if  this institution would replace or complement the existing Parliament.  
For another voice in favor of  less attention to the Parliament and more emphasis on domestic legislatures see Anand 
Menon and John Peet, "Beyond the European Parliament. Rethinking the EU's Democratic Legitimacy," in Centre 
for European Reform Essays (London: Centre for European Reform, 2010).
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ber state legislatures have, since the 1990s, increased their effort to hold the executive accountable 
for its European policies. There is, however, no consensus as to how to approach the task. One pos-
ition is that lawmakers should have as much influence as possible on the negotiation behavior of  
their government. But such a focus on the factual power of  national parliaments is misplaced. Kat -
rin Auel points out that, in Europe, most governments emerge from and have the support of  legis -
lative majorities. This means that, even if  a national parliament has the formal right to instruct the 
executive with regard to its actions in Brussels, the governing factions will, most of  the time, sup -
port the leaders who have been recruited from their own ranks. Here and in general, it is therefore a  
mistake to think of  the legislative as a counterweight to the executive. The more important role of  a 
parliament is to furnish a stage, on which government and opposition confront each other in view 
of  the public sphere and the electorate. Auel therefore suggests that effective domestic oversight has 
two elements. First, a national parliament must be able to monitor the progress of  Union legislation 
and the stance, which the government takes in respect to proposed measures. Both the governing 
factions and the opposition have an interest to obtain such information. The former need it to exer-
cise influence behind the scenes, whereas the latter must know what the government does, so as to  
be able to criticize it. This, in turn, presupposes a second institutional component. Members of  the  
opposition should be able to force the executive to answer questions about its past, current, and fu-
ture actions in Brussels.27 If  these conditions are fulfilled, European issues can become part of  nor -
mal domestic politics, subject to permanent discussion in the public sphere.
Note that, in practice, this ideal seems to conflict with the goal of  effective control over the ne-
gotiation behavior of  the government. At present, several member state parliaments have the formal 
27 Katrin Auel, "Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments. Redefining the Impact of  Parliamentary Scrutiny 
in EU Affairs," European Law Journal 13, no. 4 (2007). See also Rudy Andeweg, "A Comment on Auel, Benz, and 
Maurer," in  Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of  the European Union, ed. Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold 
Rittberger (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007).
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right to mandate the position of  the executive.28 The Danish Folketing and the Finnish Eduskunta 
are paradigmatic examples of  this model. Empirical studies have shown that, in these legislatures,  
public contestation of  Union matters does more or less not occur.29 That is of  course not acci-
dental. If  negotiation mandates were public, other member states could exploit this information,  
and it would be more difficult for the government to fend for the national interest. The process of  
instructing the executive must therefore take place behind closed doors. Such a procedural regime 
has the further advantage that it creates the impression of  a unified national stance. This seems to  
be relevant in particular for small member states, as it is considered to buttress their negotiation  
power in Brussels.30 Yet, whatever the truth of  this belief, depoliticization of  European issues has a 
rather significant downside as well. Without public debate, voters will lack the information needed,  
first, to form rational opinions concerning Union governance, and, second, to hold elected leaders 
accountable for their policies. This, in turn, strengthens and justifies the widespread perception that 
integration is an elite project, which leaves normal citizens disenfranchised. Formal mandating is  
therefore an unsuitable model for democratic legitimation via national parliaments.
To be sure, legislatures that do not follow this approach can likewise fail to engage the public.  
The British House of  Commons, for instance, spent a meager 0.4 percent of  total floor time from  
1997 to 2010 on European issues.31 More general statements are difficult to make, given that a com-
28 This group includes the legislatures of  Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Sweden. See "Eigth Biannual Report. Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to Par-
liamentary Scrutiny,"  (Brussels: COSAC Secretariat, 2008).
29 Katrin  Auel  and  Arthur  Benz,  "Expanding  National  Parliamentary  Control.  Does  it  Enhance  European 
Democracy?," in Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of  the European Union, ed. Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold 
Rittberger (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), Katrin Auel and Tapio Raunio, "Debating the State of  the 
Union? Comparing Parliamentary Debates on EU Issues in Finland, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom," in 
National Parliaments, Electorates, and EU Affairs,  ed. Katrin Auel and Tapio Raunio (Vienna: Institute for Ad-
vanced Studies, 2012a).
30 ———, "Debating the State of  the Union? Comparing Parliamentary Debates on EU Issues in Finland, France,  
Germany, and the United Kingdom," 53.
31 ———, "Debating the State of  the Union? Comparing Parliamentary Debates on EU Issues in Finland, France,  
Germany, and the United Kingdom," 66.
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prehensive empirical assessment of  different oversight regimes is not yet available.32 One positive 
example, it appears, is the German parliament. The Bundestag devotes up to a third of  its debates to 
Union matters, including both the “high politics” of  treaty reform and “normal” legislation. Meet-
ings of  the European Affairs Committee are open to the public, and the plenum considers the gov-
ernmental negotiation stance before each European Council summit.33 Of  course, there is still much 
we do not know about this case. In particular, does the work of  the Bundestag translate into more 
vibrant public debate? What the example proves, though, is that a national parliament can, in prin-
ciple, make the EU quite central to its regular operation.
This finding will be not be too controversial. What should provoke more disagreement is the 
next claim that I would like to defend: proper domestic oversight renders a popular chamber at the  
Union level superfluous. Here is the obvious counterargument: even if  member state lawmakers  
succeed in giving European issues a more prominent stature in domestic politics, the Parliament  
could still provide valuable additional legitimation. But this response assumes that leaving the role 
and design of  the Strasbourg legislature unchanged has at worst a neutral effect. I submit that if  the  
EU turned into a Bund, the current institutional setup would do more harm than good.
The first reason to believe so is that, at the moment, the direct election of  the Parliament is a 
charade,  which risks eroding popular support  for integration. As we have seen,  the lack of  ad-
versarial politics in Strasbourg entrenches the second order character of  the European polls. This  
situation will be even more difficult to change once domestic legislatures step up their involvement  
with  Union affairs.  National  politicians  will  then need  to  elaborate  more  specific  positions  on 
European issues, which might further exacerbate the coordination problems that impede partisan 
32 A concerted effort to gain a better empirical understanding of  the current situation is ongoing. See ———, "Intro-
duction," in National Parliaments, Electorates and EU Affairs, ed. Katrin Auel and Tapio Raunio (Vienna: Institute 
for Advanced Studies, 2012b).
33 ———, "Debating the State of  the Union? Comparing Parliamentary Debates on EU Issues in Finland, France,  
Germany, and the United Kingdom," 66.
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integration across borders. Against this background, one has to ask whether holding on to direct  
elections would be sensible. The continuous decline in turnout signals that citizens are less and less 
willing to cast votes that have little meaning and effect. If, at the same time, the Parliament is sold to 
the public as the “democratic conscience” of  the EU, we can expect cynicism about integration to  
rise.
A second and related problem is that elections to the Strasbourg legislature offer a stage to  
populist euroskeptic forces. The Parliament, to be sure, has from the beginning included a fair num-
ber of  deputies who opposed integration as such. At the outset, most of  them belonged to main-
stream nationalist  parties  like  the  Gaullists  in  France or  the  Irish  Fianna Fáil.34 But  the  1990s 
brought a rise of  groups whose main or sole political end is to criticize EU membership of  their  
home state. Such lists have won significant election victories in Austria, Denmark, France, the Neth-
erlands, the UK, and Sweden.35 Given their single issue focus, the parties in question have almost no 
role in normal domestic politics. The continental elections, in other words, promote groups that ex-
ist for no other reason but to rail against integration. This might still be acceptable, if  the Parliament  
in its current form made a useful contribution to democratic lawmaking. But if, as I have argued,  
that is not the case, the rise of  populist euroskepticism furnishes a consideration against the status  
quo.
A third problem concerns the issue as to whether a Bund could be the “final” political form of  
the integration project, or at least one that is stable over a long period. Direct election of  the Stras -
bourg legislature has created a transnational elite with a vested interest to further centralize power. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that even members of  the Commission, who likewise stand to benefit  
from a stronger EU, have wearied of  the perpetual clamor for more Union regulation and spending 
34 Leconte, Understanding Euroscepticism, 129-130.
35 ———, Understanding Euroscepticism, 119.
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that emanates from Strasbourg, often in contradiction to the preferences of  national voters.36 Em-
pirical work on the attitudes of  European political elites confirms that being a Union legislator pre -
dicts, first, support for a strong role of  Strasbourg relative to national parliaments and, second, a  
preference for a strong role of  the EU relative to the member states.37 Hence it will not surprise that 
at the European Convention, which drafted the TCE, the delegation of  the Parliament included 
some of  the most radical supporters of  more centralization.38
A future Bund will need to reckon with the fact that where you stand depends on where you sit. 
The centripetal forces in all federal systems are strong irrespective of  how decision making is organ-
ized, given that it is often enough more effective to execute policies on a larger scale. To prevent the  
gradual erosion of  its heterarchical character, a European Bund should therefore have institutions 
that balance the natural drive toward centralization or at least do not further strengthen it. This 
means, in particular, that it would be prudent to give leaders as few opportunities as possible to ad-
vance through posts at the Union level. The Commission, to be sure, cannot be dispensed with. It is  
needed as a neutral mediator among the member states and reservoir of  technocratic expertise. But  
does the EU also require a popular legislative chamber? The existing one, at least, has so far not 
proven its worth for democratic participation.
I do not intend to argue, though, that a second legislative chamber, in addition to the Council  
of  Ministers, is dispensable altogether. Such an institution might be ill suited to creating a robust 
link between public sphere and the Union political system. But it is needed to oversee the Commis -
sion. To date, the most important achievement of  the Parliament remains that it censured the mis-
management that occurred under Jacques Santer. There is no other actor in sight that would be as 
36 "An Ever Deeper Democratic Deficit," The Economist, 26 May 2012.
37 Marcelo Jenny et al., "Political Elites and the Future of  Europe. The Views of  MPs and MEPs," in The Making of  a  
European Constitution. Dynamics and Limits of  the Convention Experience, ed. Sonja Puntscher Riekmann and 
Wolfgang Wessels (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 208.
38 For an account of  the Convention proceedings see Ben Crum, "Genesis and Assessment of  the Grand Institutional  
Settlement of  the European Convention," Politique Européenne 2, no. 13 (2004).
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well equipped to supervise the Commission. A second important role of  the Strasbourg deputies is 
to improve deliberation within the Union legislative process. For one thing, when decision making 
power is shared between two bodies, one can hope that each will scrutinize the work of  the other,  
which should improve the ultimate result. The existence of  a transnational chamber might also open 
the legislative process to a wider set of  actors than have access to either member state governments 
or the Commission.39 Insofar as that is the case, there is a better chance that European policies will 
be acceptable to a greater number of  affected citizens.
To fulfill these roles, the Parliament requires most or all of  the powers that it wields at present.  
In particular, this includes codecision under the OLP, absent which the Commission and the mem-
ber states would have little reason to listen to transnational lawmakers. But neither of  the two func-
tions mentioned presupposes the direct election of  the Strasbourg representatives. Meanwhile, as we 
noted, this method of  choosing deputies has various undesirable ramifications. I therefore suggest 
that a future European Bund return to the system that was in place before 1979, when domestic le-
gislatures  appointed  the  members  of  the  Parliament.  This  reform  would  eliminate  continental  
second order elections and deprive populist Euroskepticism of  an important platform. Further -
more, politicians that belong to both a member state parliament and the Union legislature would no 
longer have much of  an incentive to promote deeper integration regardless of  what their voters 
think.
Abolishing direct elections is of  course tantamount to the end of  dual legitimation. Once the 
Parliament is composed of  national deputies, it can no longer aim speak for a European demos. It 
would be more sensible then to consider it an instrument for domestic legislatures to do what none 
39 There is no conclusive support for this hypothesis in the literature. Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo find that busi-
ness associations have, in general, better access to decision makers who can influence European legislation than cit-
izen groups. This advantage, though, is more pronounced with regard to access to the Commission and to national 
governments; the gap narrows somewhat when it comes to access to the Parliament and domestic legislatures. See 
Andreas Dür and Gemma Matteo, "Who Lobbies the European Union. National Interest Groups in a Multilevel  
Polity," Journal of  European Public Policy  (forthcoming).
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of  them is able to do on its own. National deputies can make the policies of  their government sub-
ject to public debate, ensuring that it acts in the interest of  the people. But within a separation of  
powers framework, the legislative branch has other functions, too. In particular, it must oversee the 
conduct of  executive officers and ensure that decisions are taken on the basis of  full information.  
With regard to Union governance, national parliaments cannot perform these roles, and hence it 
makes sense for them to work together in a joint European chamber. On the whole, then, the pro -
posed institutional design is a version of  a diet system: decision making power would rest with the 
intergovernmental process, while democratic legitimation is provided through member state parlia-
ments that oversee their own executive and cooperate with their peer institutions.
How would implementation of  this scheme affect the legislative work of  the Parliament? In 
some important respects, little would need to change. The existing political groups could operate in 
more or less the same manner as under the status quo (but the associated Europarties would be re -
lieved of  the futile burden of  working out a common program). A seat in Strasbourg would also not 
turn into a second class political office, at least not more so than is the case at present. The Parlia-
ment, after all, would retain its current powers. Moreover, its members would still have a popular  
mandate, given that domestic elections would determine the partisan makeup of  national delega-
tions. One main challenge of  the reform would be logistic. National parliaments would need to co-
ordinate their work calendar with Strasbourg.40 Representatives would furthermore come and go in 
the rhythm of  national polls, rather than at one specified time. This means that seat distribution 
among the different ideological blocs might change often. Sometimes, offices within the institution 
or a partisan caucus would have to be refilled at inopportune times. It cannot be denied, then, that 
40 This might not be as difficult as it sounds. Representatives who hold seats in the Parliament could be assigned fewer  
or no additional committee duties in the domestic legislature, and electronic communication might be used to hold 
meetings, votes, and the like.
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reform poses certain difficult issues. But the grave disadvantages of  the status quo, I believe, tip the 
scale in favor of  the proposed change.
To conclude the argument for reform, let us next consider three possible objections, which 
might be raised against the notion that national parliaments can bear the whole burden of  demo-
cratic legitimation in the EU. The first goes like this: political supervision of  the national executive is  
not enough because, even when the latter represents its constituents well, it can still lose a vote at 
the Union level. I have discussed a solution for this apparent problem in Chapters 3 and 4. Let me  
reiterate the point and elaborate further. Communities that form a Bund have rational ground to ac-
cept legislation their government has opposed, so long as it can be presumed to reflect the common  
good of  the union. In this regard, the position of  the losers in a federal decision procedure is the  
same as that of  minorities in domestic politics. The decisive question for us is hence not if  a mem-
ber state has voted for a particular measure, but rather if  the procedural framework of  the Bund 
justifies the presumption that legislation expresses the shared interest of  the whole. There is no 
reason to believe that for this to be the case, the federal legislative institutions have to include a pop-
ular chamber. Intergovernmental deliberation has the potential to mediate among unit public in-
terests, such that one can regard the outcome as the common good of  the Bund. The main precon-
dition here is the elimination of  member state vetoes. Furthermore, the political culture has to per -
mit unit governments, first, to adjust their preferences in response to persuasive arguments regard-
ing the content of  the shared interest and, second, to compromise with other member states, both 
without losing face before the domestic electorate. Pure intergovernmental deliberation, to be sure,  
might shut out relevant voices, lessening its potential to formulate policies in line with a true shared  
interest. As we noted, that is one reason for the EU to maintain a second legislative chamber, in ad-
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dition to the Council of  Ministers. But, again, such an institution can be effective without direct  
popular election.
The second objection is that one cannot depend on national politicians to formulate an inclus-
ive  view of  the  European common good.  If,  runs  the  argument,  citizens  do not  interact  with  
transnational parties, their preferences will reflect the narrow interests of  their member state. This  
objection is not persuasive either. For one thing, it seems rather doubtful that, at present, exposure 
to the platforms of  the transnational partisan blocs has much effect on the attitudes of  national  
voters. What is more, the proposed institutional scheme would make it hard for leaders to take a 
stance that focuses on the interest of  their member state and nothing else besides. Given that QMV 
would be the standard decision rule, even in the European Council, a blatant failure to consider the  
interests of  a wide range of  countries would isolate a government. It seems hence quite possible 
that national politicians will make an effort to persuade their constituencies that it is wise to forgo  
certain immediate benefits, so as to permit the whole continent to prosper in the long run. Indeed,  
hearing such arguments from their own leaders might have a greater impact on the attitudes of  cit -
izens than listening to representatives of  transnational parties. Of  course, as I have said in the previ -
ous chapter, there is no guarantee that a political culture oriented toward the common good of  the 
continent will in fact emerge. We cannot rule out that voters remain obstinate and demand from 
their  government  to  insist  on  the  short  term national  interest,  regardless  of  the  political  con-
sequences. But even so, there is no reason to believe that abolishing direct elections to the Parlia-
ment would aggravate this risk.
The third objection states that reliance on indirect legitimation means that citizens will never  
have a chance to “throw out the rascals” when dissatisfied with Union policies. Again, the same is  
true at the moment, too, and hence the proposed reform would at least not make things worse. To 
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be sure, under the status quo, voters can elect and dismiss their representatives in Strasbourg. But, as  
we have seen, this choice has little impact on actual legislative output. For this to change, the EU 
would need to give up its current system of  dual legitimation and move in the opposite direction 
from what I have suggested. In particular, the Commission would have to be responsible to the Par-
liament, and the intergovernmental process could not be more than a marginal side constraint on it.  
Once that is the case, there will be a direct link between the outcome of  the European polls and fu -
ture policies. Yet such an institutional design is, of  course, incompatible with the principles of  the 
Bund model. In a heterarchical EU, continental elections can never be referendums about the per-
formance of  the federal government, as the member states have to retain a significant role in the le -
gislative process. But this does not mean that democratic control is altogether impossible. Under the  
scheme I have proposed, European issues should become one aspect of  normal domestic politics. 
Voters will then be able to evaluate national leaders in light of  their promises and actions regarding  
Union affairs. To be sure, that is not the same as making a decision whether to retain or change a 
government based on its record in office. Yet, it seems, that such indirect legitimation is the most  
that we can hope for in a federal order, which aspires to uphold the independent political existence 
of  the member state peoples.
Demoicratic Federal Citizenship
We noted earlier that, in a Bund, citizenship has two separate tiers (see Chapter 1). First, each unit 
legal order establishes its own scheme of  constitutional rights and obligations. At the same time,  
there is federal citizenship: member states must grant certain privileges to all nationals of  the other  
units,  and individuals have rights against the central government. These should cover the whole  
range of  the standard constitutional liberties – civil, political, social, and economic. Yet the reach of  
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the legal norms in question has to be circumscribed. The federal system of  rights must not super -
sede that of  the member states. It will set forth negative limits on the conduct of  the central author-
ities, but public power in the unit sphere should be left free to operate according to different criteria.  
Perhaps the Bund will also undertake measures to honor liberties, whose implementation demands  
positive government action instead of  government restraint. Yet, again, the member state peoples 
need some latitude to realize their own vision of  how to fill the system of  rights with specific con -
tent.
Bund citizenship, then, is “demoicratic.”41 Those who hold it do not become equals like the 
members of  a single demos. Depending on their unit affiliation, individuals will rather have different 
bundles of  rights and obligations. The federal constitution, to be sure, modifies the schemes of  
equal freedom that exist within each member state. Foreigners gain easier access to at least some of  
the privileges of  national citizens, and each person obtains additional rights against the central gov-
ernment, irrespective of  unit affiliation. Nonetheless, the limits on federal harmonization ensure 
that citizens in different member states have different liberties and duties. In this sense, a Bund is a 
union of  demoi.
What kind of  political rights should a federal citizen have in such an order? The preceding has 
examined this question with regard to the specific case of  the EU. I have proposed a sharp limita-
tion of  the individual entitlement to direct participation: intergovernmental deliberation should be 
the  central  decision  mechanism;  popular  election  of  the  Parliament  is  to  be  abolished.  If  this 
scheme were  implemented,  citizenship  of  a  future  European Bund  would  be  demoicratic  in  a 
second sense.  The purpose of  the  suggested institutional  design is  to enable  fair  compromises  
41 Several authors, including foremost Joseph Weiler, have used this neologism to characterize the EU as based on 
“mutual recognition” among peoples, which aspire to maintain their cultural uniqueness. For an overview see Jan-
Werner Müller, "The Promise of  'Demoicracy'," in Political Theory of  the European Union, ed. Jürgen Neyer and 
Antje Wiener (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Here I attempt to develop a political rather than cultural in-
terpretation of  the term.
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among the public interests of  the member state peoples. It does not presume the existence of  a fed-
eral collective of  individuals that must articulate its preferences through a continental popular cham-
ber.  Rather,  political  participation is  expected to take  place  foremost at  the domestic  level.  Of  
course, Union citizens should receive transparent information about what EU organs do, have the  
chance to put forward grievances, and might even keep the right to start popular legislative initiat -
ives that was introduced at Lisbon (see Chapter 2). However, the more demanding aspiration of  
representing a continental demos via the Parliament is impracticable, and the EU should therefore 
abandon it. Or so, at least, this chapter has argued.
There is yet a third sense, in which one can describe a heterarchical federation as demoicratic. 
Unlike the members of  a unified people, the citizens of  a Bund do not form a single overarching 
collective that has established a fundamental order and gives ongoing consent to its existence. In-
stead, constituent power remains with the member state communities, each of  which has made a 
separate democratic choice to join the union and to submit to a common higher law (see Chapter 1).  
What remains for us to explore is how such a decision to federate might occur in the European con-
text.
Chapter 6
Adopting the Federal Compact
(with Jeffrey Lenowitz)
Imagine the EU undertook an effort to reconstitute itself  as a Bund. The first step would then be to 
hold a transnational convention that prepares a draft federal compact. Several issues regarding the 
design of  this process deserve attention. First, who should participate? Would it be wise to repro-
duce the makeup of  the last European Convention, which included delegates from both the existing 
Union organs and national governments? Or should the framers be more disinterested and not an-
swer to specific institutions? Second, would each national government need to endorse the pro-
posed federal compact? In 2004, when the European Convention had finished its work, member 
state leaders came together for an Intergovernmental Conference to work out a consensus draft of  
the TCE. National parliaments and citizens were then asked to pass the ultimate verdict on the  
amended proposal. The alternative would be to follow the example of  the American founding and 
skip the intermediate step between convention and ratification stage.1 In the following, however, we 
focus on a different question: what happens once a draft federal compact has in fact been submitted 
for approval? For most, the answer will be obvious: the member states should hold referendums on 
the proposed document. Others will favor a vote of  the domestic legislature. But this chapter will  
1 Of  course, what happened in 1787 is somewhat more complicated. It was in fact the subject of  acrimonious debate 
whether the states assembled in the Confederation Congress had the right to amend the proposed constitution or  
needed to approve it before sending it to the ratifying conventions. The Philadelphia delegates, in their most auda-
cious moment, had declared the existing rule for amending the Articles of  Confederation inapplicable. According to 
them, no unanimous vote in Congress was needed; rather, it would suffice that nine of  thirteen states accepted the 
constitution. In the end, this gambit was successful. Congress passed a resolution to submit the draft for ratification  
without commenting on its substance. See Pauline Maier,  Ratification. The People Debate the Constitution (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 52-59.
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argue that a third procedure would be preferable. All things considered, the best solution is to hold  
ratifying conventions, similar to the state assemblies that decided the fate of  the US constitution.2
To be sure, a small number of  domestic constitutions prescribe a referendum on significant 
changes of  Union legal framework.3 However, at least from a theoretical viewpoint, it would be pos-
sible to ignore such rules. If, as Chapter 1 argued, joining a heterarchical federation is an exercise of  
constituent power, legal norms of  the present cannot govern the modalities of  the act. When mak-
ing or remaking the fundamental order, the people has total freedom and is not obliged to adhere to  
a preexisting framework, although it might of  course resolve to do so. Hence the problem before us 
is not what the law of  a particular member state requires, but rather which procedure is most appro-
priate to formulate the constituent will regarding participation in a European Bund.
Of  course, the above presumes that national ratification has to take place at all. But is that in 
fact true? The hypothetical alternative would be a common European decision. One possible ap -
proach here is to hold a single continental referendum. In such a ballot, a positive outcome might  
require that a certain proportion of  all participants vote yes. Or the rules of  the referendum could 
stipulate that for the constitution to enter into force, it would need to win a certain share of  the  
total European vote and, in addition, secure majorities within a certain number of  member states. In 
principle, we can also imagine that a drafting convention enacts its proposal without ratification. Yet 
both procedures are incompatible with the idea of  a Bund. In either case, a collective decision at the  
Union level is allowed to overrule the will of  individual member state peoples. This violates the 
2 Other authors who believe that a European constitution should be debated in national conventions include Anneli  
Albi and Andrew Arato. The former mentions the idea in passing without further discussion. See Anneli Albi, EU 
Enlargement and the Constitutions of  Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 162. Arato 
envisages that conventions in the member states propose amendments to an initial draft produced at the European  
level; transnational framers should then have the final word. He, too, does not provide a full normative comparison  
of  different possible ratification devices. See Arato, "Conventions, Constituent Assemblies, and Round Tables. Mod-
els, Principles, and Elements of  Democratic Constitution Making," 199-200.
3 That is the case in Denmark and Ireland. In addition, the German high court has ruled that participation in a federal  
EU presupposes the direct approval of  national voters (see Introduction).
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political logic of  heterarchical federalism. Under such an order, we recall, the higher law of  the cen-
ter is valid alongside the constitutions of  the units but does not supersede them. Hence the federal 
compact cannot bind states, whose citizens have rejected it. If  the document enters into force des -
pite such opposition, the people in question has forfeited the power to determine its fundamental  
order, and it will then no longer possess an independent higher law. To join a Bund, national citizens 
must therefore give their approval, which establishes the federal compact as part of  the total unit  
constitution. A common European decision, in contrast, would institute a continental state with a 
single unified people.
Our question, then, is which procedure is most suitable for national ratification of  a federal 
compact. The argument proceeds as follows. First, the chapter examines the strengths and weak-
nesses of  the different possible ratification devices. A referendum, we argue, is an inferior means to  
register democratic approval or rejection of  a federal compact. Most participants would lack the 
knowledge needed to evaluate such a document. What is more, there could be no proper delibera -
tion about the merits of  the proposed system. A vote of  the domestic legislature, it will become 
clear, is an even less suitable mechanism. Constituted bodies should never decide on the creation of  
a new fundamental order, given that politicians might have different interests from normal citizens.  
A ratifying convention, finally, has the potential to overcome all of  these problems. Provided the in -
stitutional design is appropriate, the members of  such assemblies can be expected to have sufficient 
knowledge, to engage in proper deliberation, and to focus on the common interest. The chapter 
concludes with some thoughts regarding the number of  member states that would need to endorse 
a shared higher law before it can enter into force.
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Ratification Procedures Compared
A federal compact, we noted, must undergo ratification in order to ascertain whether the member  
state peoples agree to incorporate the proposed document into their respective constitution. The 
nature of  this question determines which procedure is most suitable to answering it. Our compar-
ison of  the possible choices will be structured around two general themes. First, we pose a normat-
ive question: in how far is each procedure fit to channel the exercise of  constituent power? The vari -
ables of  interest here include who makes the decision, and how do these participants arrive at their 
vote? Second, we need to consider probable empirical implications: how will the choice of  ratifica-
tion device affect the working of  a reformed EU? In particular, this decision might influence the  
level of  popular support and identification with the new order. The following will discuss both sets 
of  issues with regard to each possible option.
The Referendum
Referendums are in fashion. Democratic states hold more and more popular votes on local and, 
sometimes, national policies and legislation. In addition, citizens are often asked to decide on pro -
posed constitutional amendments or the ratification of  a new higher law. National ballots on EU 
matters represent a further manifestation of  the trend toward more direct participation. With the 
exception of  the UK, all member states that joined after 1957 called for a referendum when seeking 
to accede.4 Danish and Swedish citizens voted on, and rejected, the introduction of  the Euro. Fur-
thermore, there have been referendums on various reform treaties. Until 2005, these took place just  
in Denmark, Ireland, and France. However, when the TCE came up for ratification, no fewer than 
4 Following a change in government, the UK held a popular vote after it became a member state in 1973. Norwegians 
refused to join the EU twice; all other accession referendums were successful. Note further that, in 1973, France 
held a popular vote on the first wave of  enlargement. At the time, there was no legal obligation to call for a referen -
dum. However, since 2005, the domestic constitution (Art. 88-5) prohibits the French government from approving 
the accession of  new member states without a referendum.
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ten member states planned to involve the electorate in the decision.5 Right now, there is discussion 
of  a referendum on EU membership in the UK, while German politicians contemplate a popular  
vote  on a new domestic  constitution in  order  to remove legal  obstacles  to further  integration.  
Against this background, it seems fair to assume that support for national referendums on a federal  
compact would be strong. The case for this ratification procedure rests, first, on the belief  that a  
popular vote is the ideal mechanism to formulate the constituent will and, second, on the expecta-
tion that citizens would not perceive the new order as legitimate, unless it has passed the test of  a 
referendum. How persuasive are these rationales?
The intuitive force of  the claim that a popular vote is the best mechanism to channel the exer-
cise of  constituent power derives from the fact that all citizens, rather than just a subset of  repres -
entatives, can participate. But we must be careful not to make things too simple here. When all cit -
izens vote, the whole demos, it might seem, has spoken. Yet what justifies this equation of  separate  
individual actions with a decision of  the collective? The latter, after all, has no concrete existence – 
it is a fictional subject. Proponents of  the referendum procedure will respond that imputing the out-
come to the popular will is plausible for two reasons. To begin with, universal participation forestalls  
elite capture. As one author puts it, referendums on European integration provide for a check on 
the “empire building” schemes of  a transnational political class.6 More important, though, the ad-
vocates of  direct popular ratification will maintain that it can best reflect the values and interests of  
the electorate.7
5 The French and Dutch no votes brought this process to a premature halt. Further referendums were scheduled but 
not held in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and the UK. Voters in Spain and Luxembourg 
approved the TCE.
6 Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 299.
7 See for example George Tridimas and Takis Tridimas, "Electorates v. Politicians. The 2005 French and Dutch Refer-
endums on the EU Constitutional Treaty," in The European Constitution and National Constitutions. Ratification  
and Beyond, ed. Anneli Albi and Jacques Ziller (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law, 2007), 277-278.
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The first of  these arguments has some merit. One should indeed expect politicians to have dif -
ferent interests from normal citizens. This, as the next section will elaborate, makes for an important  
consideration against legislative ratification. Compared to the latter, a referendum has the advantage 
that it limits the influence of  the political elite. Note, however, that sitting officeholders might still  
control the timing of  the decision and, perhaps, the public education campaign that precedes it.  
Popular votes, then, can diminish the power of  selfish politicians but not eliminate it. Furthermore,  
a national convention, too, has the potential to rein in the influence of  sitting officeholders. Or so  
we argue below. Referendums, in other words, offer at best a small advantage on this score.
The claim that a popular ratification vote would best reflect the values and interests of  the  
people opens a more complex debate. At first sight, it might seem that referendums provide the 
fairest possible method – each voice is heard and given equal weight. However, one should also take 
into account how citizens reach their decision. One relevant observation here is that participants in  
a referendum might refuse to express a preference on the question at stake (“issue voting”) and use  
their ballot instead to communicate an opinion regarding domestic politics (“second order voting”).  
An even more serious problem is that most citizens will lack the knowledge needed to assess how 
approval or rejection of  a proposed federal compact would affect them. These two factors call into  
question that direct popular ratification would reflect the values and interests of  the people. Let us 
consider each aspect in turn.
It  has  long  been  a  widespread  opinion  that  most  participants  in  referendums  concerning 
European integration are second order voters. Recent empirical work, though, demonstrates that in-
dividual attitudes toward the EU provide a stronger explanation of  how citizens decide. Nonethe-
less, satisfaction with the national government, general trust in politicians, and perception of  the  
current economic situation have likewise significant predictive value.8 This means that contingent 
8 Sara Binzer Hobolt, Europe in Question (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 65-83.
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factors might determine the fate of  a federal compact, if  the latter is put to a referendum. Depend -
ing on the size of  the second order vote, and depending on how close the issue vote splits, the result 
could hinge on parameters such as whether citizens believe the government is doing a good job, 
whether there is high unemployment, and the like. This element of  randomness provides a first in-
dication that a referendum might not offer the best means to reach a decision in line with the values  
and interests of  the people.
A second consideration is voter ignorance.9 Of  course, we do not mean to argue here that 
Europeans are too stupid for democratic participation. It is quite plausible to believe that voters are  
capable of  electing leaders who then represent them well. Without doubt, citizens are likewise com-
petent to evaluate referendum questions such as, for example, whether a town should build a new 
train station or if  gay marriage should be legal. Assessing a federal compact, though, is a rather  
more complex task. Voters would need to understand how the new order would balance Union 
power with member state independence. They would need to evaluate how much influence their na -
tional government would have relative to other countries. They would need to predict other dis -
tributive effects of  the new order. They would need to ponder if  the proposed document estab-
lishes a proper framework for the exercise of  public power: would it guarantee the rule of  law, per-
mit sufficient democratic participation, and safeguard individual rights? In addition,  voters would 
need to think about the probable effects of  failed ratification. Perhaps the status quo ante would be  
preferable to the proposed order, but approving the latter might still be more attractive than dealing  
with the consequences of  a rejection. Given how difficult all of  these calculations are, it seems fair 
to assume that most Europeans would find it hard to reach a meaningful judgment.
9 The following is partly based on the more general discussion of  voter ignorance and constitutional ratification in  
Lenowitz, "Why Ratification? Questioning the Unexamined Constitution-Making Procedure."
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The available empirical data support this claim.10 Large numbers of  citizens do not know basic 
facts about the EU political system. Ignorance about the latter is much higher than with regard to 
national institutions. A 2004 Special Eurobarometer, conducted after the member states had signed 
the TCE, showed that a third of  the respondents had not even heard of  the document. Less than 
half  of  the participants were able to answer simple question about its content. Furthermore, in polls 
taken subsequent to national  referendums, a third of  the participants  in Spain and a fourth of  
Dutch voters reported “lack of  information” as one reason for their rejection of  the TCE. To sum 
up, one cannot expect that an average person would be able to grasp the implications of  approving  
or rejecting a federal compact.
Voter ignorance, then, is a serious challenge to direct popular ratification. If  most citizens do 
not understand the consequences of  their decision, we must question whether a referendum would 
in fact lead to an outcome that is consistent with the values and interests of  the people. Some of  the 
uninformed participants will misjudge which option is best for them. Others will not even attempt  
to formulate an issue preference and follow second order considerations instead. A third group will  
recognize their information deficit and – like the Spanish and Dutch voters just mentioned – opt for 
the status quo, which might appear to provide a safer bet than supporting an unknown alternative. 11 
In all three cases, at least some of  the referendum participants will cast votes that contradict their  
actual values and interests. 
Let us now consider two possible counterarguments that might be raised in defense of  direct  
popular ratification. The first is that suitable education programs can reduce voter ignorance to an 
acceptable degree. Efforts of  this kind often precede referendums on a proposed constitution. Pos-
10 We cite the following data from Sara Binzer Hobolt, "Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party En-
dorsements in Referendums on European Integration,"  European Journal of  Political Research 46, no. 2 (2007), 
152-155.
11  On the status quo bias of  referendums see Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan, Demanding Choices. Opinion, Vot-
ing, and Direct Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of  Michigan Press, 1998), 33-35.
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sible instruments to enhance voter knowledge include websites, television and radio programming,  
print materials, public hearings, civic workshops, and town hall meetings. So far there is no compar-
ative empirical work on the effectiveness of  such measures. It is, however, rather implausible that  
education programs could have a strong enough impact, even in affluent countries with sophistic-
ated electorates. To begin with, the threshold for someone to meaningfully assess a proposed federal 
compact is just too high. This task requires specialist knowledge about the working of  a transnation-
al constitution and, in addition, a grasp of  the political dynamics that approval or rejection might 
generate. What is more, exposure to the messages of  the yes and no campaigns would likely under -
mine the effectiveness of  a simultaneous effort at citizen education. The purpose of  the latter is to  
impart objective information; campaigns, in contrast, aim to persuade individuals of  a particular 
viewpoint. At least in the run up to a popular ratification vote, the shortest route to achieve this goal  
involves manipulative tactics. Why is that so? Compared to regular elections, more citizens will be  
undecided because the issue at stake is complex and unfamiliar. These same factors make it easier to  
mislead the public.12 Campaigns have therefore a strong incentive to take particular true facts out of  
context, focus on select topics instead of  accounting for all relevant considerations, prime an issue  
that is unrelated to the vote, or make altogether false statements. Such an information environment  
will hinder voters from reaching an educated assessment of  a federal compact.
The electoral fights preceding the French and Dutch referendums on the TCE corroborate this 
hypothesis. Public debate in France concentrated on the social and economic consequences of  in-
tegration. One major topic of  the campaign was the “Bolkestein” directive on the liberalization of  
trade in services, which the Commission had just introduced for legislative consideration. 13 Without 
doubt,  French politicians  offered legitimate reasons to be concerned about both this  particular  
12 Lawrence LeDuc, "Opinion Formation and Change in Referendum Campaigns," in The Dynamics of  Referendum 
Campaigns, ed. Claes H. De Vreese (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
13 Matt Qvotrup, "The Three Referendums on the European Constitution Treaty in 2005," Political Quarterly 77, no. 1 
(2006), 91-92. 
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measure and the perceived neoliberal bias of  the EU in general. However, the debate had at best a 
tenuous link to the provisions of  the TCE, whose main purpose was to overhaul the Union decision 
making process and to change the symbolic basis of  integration. Dutch voters, too, were exposed to  
a campaign that gave short shrift to the actual content of  the proposed document. Here the discus-
sion focused on a rather diffuse fear that national culture was under threat from Brussels. The main 
instigator of  this debate was the far right politician Geert Wilders who also managed to plant the 
rather absurd notion that approving the TCE would lead to Turkish EU membership.14 In light of  
past experience, then, we need to expect that campaigns preceding referendums on a federal com-
pact would spread distorted, irrelevant, and false information, subverting whatever beneficial effect  
citizen education programs might otherwise have.
A second, more powerful response to the voter ignorance challenge is that people might not in  
fact  require  much  knowledge  to  make  a  competent  decision  in  a  referendum.  The  use  of  
“heuristics”, goes the argument, enables the participants to vote as if  acting on complete informa -
tion. In particular,  the endorsements of  political parties,  interest groups, religious authorities,  or 
prominent individuals are supposed to provide cues regarding the consequences of  the alternative 
choices.15 Often, this might well be the case. But would such information shortcuts work in the con-
text of  a popular vote on a European federal compact? During the campaigns leading up to past in -
tegration referendums, the most salient cues have been the endorsements of  parties.16 This,  of  
course, is somewhat ironic: if  most voters depend on these recommendations, would it not be easier  
to let politicians decide without the detour via a popular vote? Another consideration here is that 
partisan endorsements might have rather limited heuristic value. While most parties on the contin-
ent have formed around the left-right cleavage, support for integration cuts across this dimension: at  
14 ———, "The Three Referendums on the European Constitution Treaty in 2005," 92-93.
15 Arthur Lupia and John G. Matsusaka, "Direct Democracy. New Approaches to Old Questions," American Review 
of  Political Science 48, no. 7 (2004), 467-470. 
16 Hobolt, Europe in Question, 144.
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least for mainstream parties, there is no clear relationship between location on the ideological spec-
trum and their attitude toward the EU. This means that citizens need to know specific details about 
the platform of  a particular organization in order to evaluate its recommendation. Some of  them 
lack such information – for these voters, partisan endorsements do not provide useful cues. 17 A re-
lated problem is that, sometimes, parties send ambiguous messages before a referendum. For ex-
ample, the French Parti Socialiste (PS) struggled to formulate a unified stance during the campaign 
preceding the vote on the TCE. Its leadership was divided over the issue, and hence an internal ref-
erendum was needed to determine the position of  the PS.18 Given that national mainstream parties 
often face similar disagreement regarding European integration, one can expect that popular votes 
on a federal compact would provoke more such disputes over the appropriate endorsement. The lat-
ter, as a result, would have limited heuristic value.
We have reason to believe, then, that voter ignorance will tend to prevent referendum outcomes 
that are consistent with the actual values and interests of  the people. There is, however, yet another, 
more profound objection to direct popular ratification. So far we have taken for granted that a suit -
able procedure must somehow aggregate private utilities. On this view, citizens have values and in -
terests that should lead them to prefer either approval or rejection; the sole problem is for a voter to 
find out which option lies closer to her ideal point. This task, as we have seen, is rather difficult.  
Nonetheless, if  enough people were able to perform it, a referendum would provide the best means 
to  determine  the  popular  will,  understood as  the  sum of  private  utilities.  We should  question,  
though, if  that is the right yardstick in the first place.
Few political  choices  will  have  as  profound an  impact  as  the  decision  whether  to  enter  a 
European Bund. Rejection of  a proposed federal compact might leave the member state in question  
17 ———, Europe in Question, 145-147.
18 58 percent of  the participants opted for supporting the TCE.
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isolated from the rest of  the continent. And if  the overall ratification process failed, integration 
would suffer a massive and perhaps irreparable setback. On the other hand, in joining a Bund, a 
people remakes its constitution. From then on, it must see the values and interests of  the other unit  
communities as integral to its own public weal, and hence the national government will have to fol -
low binding rules that can impose sacrifice for the good of  the whole. Unilateral exit from the new 
commonwealth is moreover not foreseen. Future generations will either have to live with the de -
cision to participate in the Bund or secede in breach of  the shared higher law. The new order will  
also set forth the basic rules that govern public power in the federal sphere. Given the coequal rela -
tionship between these norms and the domestic constitution, the latter can no longer impose addi -
tional limits. Unless the Bund tramples its own founding principles, member state organs should not  
resist it on the grounds that national higher law is being violated. In other words, ratifiers must think 
hard if  the new order will function at least as well as the present domestic constitution. Here we  
should also note that a federal compact will be entrenched against change. Amendment, to be sure,  
need not require unanimous consent. Nonetheless, future generations will have to overcome signi-
ficant hurdles to revise the federal higher law.
Against  this  background,  unfiltered  aggregation  of  private  utilities  is  the  wrong normative 
standard. In a sense, of  course, such a conception of  democratic will formation is questionable per  
se. What reason do the losers of  a vote have to accept the outcome when it only benefits the win-
ners? Under the conditions of  normal politics, this can perhaps still be acceptable. For one thing, re-
spect for majoritarian procedures secures the peace, and no one, it is to be hoped, will be on the los-
ing side all of  the time. What is more, there are courts that safeguard the basic rights of  minorities.  
Even so, a democratic system is healthier when citizens seek to persuade each other through “public  
reason”, or justifications that appeal to values and interests common to all. This holds a fortiori for 
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constitutional politics, whose purpose is to define the rules of  the game and entrench them against  
future change. Ratifiers of  a federal compact should therefore transcend their private perspectives.  
Their goal must be to reach an informed judgment as to whether the proposed document serves the 
shared interest of  current and future compatriots. For this to happen, it is crucial that, before the fi -
nal vote, there is enough deliberation. Open and fair exchange of  arguments has been proven to  
motivate  participants  to reevaluate their  normative  commitments,  to  think past  their  immediate  
selfish concerns, to assume the perspectives of  others, and, not least, to gain a better factual under-
standing of  the proposal under consideration.19 When such a transformation of  individual perspect-
ives takes place, the ultimate outcome will tend to approximate the common good, and therefore, it 
should be acceptable to the whole people.
Popular ratification votes cannot live up to this more demanding criterion. The ideal paradigm 
of  deliberation is face to face argument. Here the participants have little choice but to listen to the  
other side and to answer to their reasoning. Attempts to mislead and manipulate the audience can be 
met with a direct response. Of  course, the whole electorate cannot engage in such a direct exchange  
of  arguments. If  a European federal compact were put to a referendum, the best that participants  
could do is to track public debate and weigh the reasons pro and contra ratification on their own. At  
least in principle, such “internal” deliberation can still lead to a rational judgment. However, most  
citizens will not follow the disputes taking place on the editorial pages of  major newspapers, attend 
deliberative events such as townhall meetings, or make a point of  perusing the information materials 
that public authorities might distribute. As we argued earlier, the average person will go to the polls 
uninformed or, worse, misled through manipulative campaigning. In light of  this, one should not 
19 For an overview of  the empirical literature on the benefits of  deliberation see Michael X Delli Carpini et al., "Public  
Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and Citizen Engagement. A Review of  the Empirical Literature," Annual Re-
views of  Political Science 7 (2004).
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expect popular ratification votes to produce outcomes that reflect considered views as to which de -
cision is best for the public weal.
We still have to address the claim that citizens would not perceive a federal compact as legitim-
ate, unless it has passed the test of  a referendum. This argument is perhaps the strongest that ad-
vocates of  this procedure can muster. A belief  that direct participation is always the most democrat-
ic approach might have become ingrained in public opinion. If  this were true, ignoring the demand 
for a popular vote could indeed undermine support for the new order. Still, the force of  the argu -
ment from empirical acceptance relies on contingent facts rather than on the attractive moral prop-
erties of  the referendum procedure as such. Hence, if  another mechanism turns out to be superior 
from a normative perspective, one should advocate for its use and hope that citizens at large will re -
cognize the benefits of  this choice. Such an expectation might not be altogether unrealistic. In the  
American case, at least, the ratifying conventions proved rather successful in generating widespread  
acceptance of  the new constitution (see below). But can this achievement be replicated today, given 
the social changes that have occurred since the 1780s? Let us postpone this discussion until we have  
considered the merits of  the other two ratification devices.
The Legislative Vote
From Rome to Lisbon, ratification of  European treaties has, for the most part, been the preserve of  
national parliaments. Even the TCE was supposed to be approved in all  27 member state legis-
latures; 17 countries, moreover, did not plan to hold additional binding or consultative referendums. 
Of  course, past treaties, including the TCE, have normally been understood as international agree-
ments. If  the member states sought to adopt an explicit federal compact, the issue of  ratification  
244
would appear in a somewhat different light. Nonetheless, it seems probable that opponents of  direct 
participation would still regard legislative votes as the default alternative.
What are the strengths of  this procedure? First, we can expect that parliamentarians are know-
ledgeable enough to assess the implications of  approving or rejecting a federal compact. Profession-
al representatives will be able to familiarize themselves with the issue and to consult with experts  
when needed. Second, parliament is, to a degree, a suitable forum to deliberate the reasons pro and  
contra ratification. Indeed, the traditional justification for empowering legislative bodies is that de-
bate among the representatives will lead to more enlightened policies. Of  course, this ideal is not al-
ways met in practice. Legislative debates will often just serve to produce soundbites for public con-
sumption; good faith attempts to persuade the other side of  a particular view tend to be scarce. This  
could well hold true for the ratification of  a federal compact, too. Partisan leaders might take a de-
cision behind closed doors and then suppress dissent within their own ranks, preventing a genuine  
exchange of  arguments between different camps. On the other hand, it seems also possible that, giv-
en the profound importance of  the issue, parliamentarians would disregard caucus discipline and 
make a genuine effort to assess the proposed document on its merits.
Legislative ratification, in other words, has at least the potential to overcome the weaknesses of  
the referendum procedure. However, it suffers from a crucial flaw of  its own. As “constituted bod-
ies”, legislatures should not be permitted to create a new fundamental order. What is the rationale  
behind this principle? The most basic purpose of  a constitution is to separate the authorization of  
public power from its exercise. Higher law, which derives from the constituent power of  the people,  
is supposed to prevent that officials use the coercive resources of  the state for their own private in -
terest or similar illegitimate purposes. If  the bearers of  public power had discretion to remake the 
constitution, this objective would be jeopardized. Parliaments, to be sure, can amend the higher law 
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according to certain procedures. Adoption of  a federal compact, it might be said, falls under this  
power – domestic legislatures should therefore be allowed to take the decision. Yet this argument is  
misleading. Participation in a Bund vitiates the claim of  the domestic constitution to regulate all 
public power within the land. The shared higher law replaces the existing fundamental order insofar  
as the federal competence sphere is concerned. Such a transformation, we noted, involves the exer-
cise of  constituent power, and hence constituted bodies should not have the final word.
Proponents of  legislative ratification might dismiss this line of  reasoning as too abstract. Let us  
therefore discuss in more concrete terms how leaving the decision to parliament could distort the 
process of  making a federal compact. The general problem is that, with regard to European integra-
tion, politicians might have different interests from normal citizens. At first sight, it could seem as if  
the main concern here is that national officials, in particular legislators, have an incentive to resist a  
stronger Union, given that it would strip domestic institutions of  their power. However, there are in 
fact a number of  reasons to think that selfish interest can lead politicians to prefer deeper integra-
tion than normal citizens. George and Takis Tridimas provide a list of  relevant factors. Partisan 
leaders who hold executive office or vie for it might benefit from a more powerful EU insofar as it 
would enhance their position relative to the opposition, their own backbenchers, and subnational of-
ficials, all of  whom remain shut out from European decision making. This, of  course, presupposes 
that member state governments keep a strong hold over Union policies, which might not be the best 
institutional arrangement in all cases. What is more, politicians in general stand to profit from deep -
er integration because it enables them to shift blame for unpopular policies to Brussels. It also gives  
them additional opportunities to dole out patronage or to advance their own career.20
20 Tridimas and Tridimas, "Electorates v. Politicians. The 2005 French and Dutch Referendums on the EU Constitu-
tional Treaty," 281-285.
246
We have reason to believe, then, that legislative ratification introduces significant bias into the 
making of  a federal compact. Another consideration that militates against this procedure is that it  
could hurt popular acceptance of  a European Bund. Citizens would have no role whatsoever in the 
creation of  the new order. The latter might therefore come to be seen as an elite project, of  which 
the people as a whole has little ownership. Such a perception could destabilize the Union, in particu-
lar during times of  crisis. To sum up, while legislative ratification might overcome the central weak-
nesses of  a direct popular vote, it brings with it another set of  disadvantages. Let us next consider  
an institutional device that relies on representation as well, but is less susceptible to the problems  
just discussed.
The Convention
When, in 1787, the federal convention in Philadelphia had finished its work, the stage was set for  
“one of  the greatest and most probing public debates in American history.”21 So writes Pauline 
Maier,  the foremost scholar  of  the process through which separate conventions in the thirteen 
states ratified the US constitution. In each case,  local freemen elected representatives who then 
came together to discuss and decide the fate of  the proposed document. Eleven of  these conven-
tions voted for ratification. The big exception was Rhode Island, which, at first, held a referendum 
that brought a resounding defeat to the federalist camp. A convention did not take place until after  
the constitution had entered into force. The final vote was narrow, but Rhode Island chose to re-
main in the union. North Carolina, too, hesitated for some time. But, in the end, all thirteen former 
confederate states approved the new order.
What motivated the founding fathers to prescribe state conventions as the ratification mechan-
ism? According to Maier, these assemblies were understood as “embodiments of  the people” that 
21 Maier, Ratification. The People Debate the Constitution, ix.
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could formulate the constituent will better than individual citizens voting in a referendum. The del -
egates, went the expectation, would be more intelligent and educated than the average person, and 
the conventions would enable a genuine debate leading the participants to appreciate the merits of  
the proposed document. Furthermore, the delegates, it was hoped, would put the common good 
above their private interest.22 In other words, the founding fathers trusted the convention procedure 
to avoid the weaknesses that beset direct popular ratification and legislative votes. Yet were their op -
timistic expectations justified? If  so, could the feat be repeated in the European context?
Let us begin with the claim that convention delegates will, on the whole, be more intelligent 
and educated than the average person. This should be uncontroversial, and there is little doubt that  
it held true in the American case. It is a somewhat different question, though, if  one can expect that 
representatives will be competent to meaningfully assess a constitutional document. The historical 
record of  the ratification debates in the United States indicates that most of  the delegates were in  
fact “capable” and “remarkably well informed.”23 But should one expect a similar level of  qualifica-
tion from representatives asked to decide on a European federal compact? Above we listed the dif -
ferent issues that ratifiers would have to consider in this scenario. Most normal citizens, ran our ar -
gument, could not succeed at the task. Is it possible that delegates to a ratifying convention would  
not do much better?24 One author is rather critical of  the sort of  people that now participate in  
constitution making bodies: “in this age of  television and mass media dominance”, we should fear  
that a “convention [is] filled with pop singers and athletes who, among other deficiencies, lack ex-
pertise in constitutional matters.”25 Yet that is a too pessimistic view. Even if  some or most deleg-
ates are unfamiliar with the issues facing them, this might change in the course of  the process. Edu-
22 ———, Ratification. The People Debate the Constitution, 146.
23 ———, Ratification. The People Debate the Constitution, 468.
24 The following draws from the more extensive discussion in Lenowitz, "Why Ratification? Questioning the Unex-
amined Constitution-Making Procedure."
25 Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 315.
248
cation programs, we argued, cannot but fail if  the target audience is the electorate as a whole. How-
ever, it is much easier to impart the knowledge needed to assess or even write a constitutional docu-
ment to a small group of  representatives. Individuals chosen to draft a new higher law often receive  
extensive training before their actual work begins. National ratifying conventions might likewise dis-
tribute information materials to their members and invite experts to teach inexperienced delegates 
the requisite technical knowledge. What is more, the representatives would learn about the proposed 
federal compact through observing and participating in the debate about its merits.
This brings us to the claim that a ratifying convention is a deliberative forum. In the American 
case, the hopes of  the founding fathers were borne out. At least in the states where significant op -
position to the constitution existed, the conventions examined the document in sometimes excruci-
ating detail. Just like the federalists had expected, this gave them a chance to convince enough deleg-
ates to join their side. Such persuasion could not have occurred if  all ratifiers had arrived at the con -
ventions with their minds already made up. Some of  the delegates, to be sure, received binding in-
structions from their constituents, although the latter had of  course little power to enforce these.  
Others were diehard supporters or foes of  the constitution. But in most states, there were a signific -
ant number of  delegates who remained undecided and were prepared to give each side a fair hear-
ing. As a result, the convention debates were serious and probing. The participants, Maier summar-
izes, “put their mind to complicated problems, tried to reconcile the ideals of  the Revolution with  
the needs of  the nation, and considered the impact of  contemporary decisions not just on their own 
lives but for the future.”26
Could one expect a similar outcome in the European setting? In principle, there is little reason  
to believe that convention delegates in the member states would not rise to the occasion. The main  
danger, it seems, is that most of  them arrive with an imperative mandate. In this case, deliberation 
26 Maier, Ratification. The People Debate the Constitution, 468.
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would be more or less superfluous. Therefore, institutional design matters. Election rules should  
state that mandates are free; votes during the convention should be taken in secret. These simple 
provisions would ensure that delegates will not suffer the rancor of  disappointed constituents, mak-
ing it likelier that a genuine debate occurs. In addition, the rules might forbid candidates to run on  
the ticket of  political parties. Such a restriction would prevent that most of  the delegates represent  
larger organizations that define their position before the convention has even begun. Another pos-
sible means to protect free mandates is to appoint, rather than elect, at least some of  the delegates,  
choosing from prominent figures in public life.27
What about the claim that members of  a ratifying convention put the common good above 
private interest? As we just observed, this seems to have been true in the United States. But are there 
structural reasons that such delegates will care more for the public weal than voters in a referendum 
or parliamentarians? Regarding the former comparison, it should be noted that members of  a con-
vention undergo the transformative effect of  deliberation, which distinguishes them from parti-
cipants in a popular ratification vote. At the same time, these representatives need not have the same 
distorting incentives as members of  the legislature. So long as the number of  professional politi -
cians in the convention remains limited, the selfish interests of  this functional elite will not bias the 
ratification process. Once again, then, the rules of  delegate selection matter. Perhaps, it would be  
too extreme to prohibit all members from holding elected office for a period after the convention 
has taken place.28 The suggested ban on partisan election tickets might suffice to ensure that enough 
candidates hail from walks of  life other than politics. Appointing prominent individuals to unelected 
seats can likewise help to generate a more diverse group of  representatives.
27 To prevent a “convention filled with pop singers and athletes”, it might then be helpful to also select NGO repres-
entatives, religious leaders, intellectuals, and the like. One relevant model here is the German Bundesversammlung. 
State parliaments choose half  of  the members of  this institution, whose sole task is to elect the federal president.  
Often, the appointees are prominent public figures rather than professional politicians.
28 The historical precedent here is the French National Constituent Assembly of  1789. See John Elster, "Forces and  
Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process," Duke Law Journal 45, no. 2 (1995), 385.
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Let us next address the probable empirical implications of  using conventions to decide on a  
European federal compact. Above we speculated that citizens will not view such a document as le-
gitimate, unless there has been a referendum. It is worth noting, though, that in the United States,  
the ratifying conventions appear to have bolstered popular acceptance of  the constitution. During 
the process, opposition to the proposal was fierce and when it came to the final vote, the federalists  
often prevailed with a rather narrow margin. Yet once ratification had been successful, most of  the 
critics embraced the new order as legitimate. One delegate in New York said that, after careful re-
flection, he could not approve the constitution but would nonetheless “aid it all he can” if  the other  
side ended up winning.29 This statement, according to Maier, illustrates the general mood that settled 
over the opposition camp after the ratification fight had been lost.30 In other words, using the con-
vention procedure did little harm to the American constitutional project.
A skeptic could respond that circumstances have changed since the 1780s. In particular, voters 
have become more educated and public communication is now instantaneous. These factors might 
lead citizens to prefer direct participation over representative procedures.31 Indeed, as we mentioned 
earlier, there is a general trend toward more frequent use of  referendums. Against this background, 
the idea of  holding national conventions to decide the fate of  a European federal compact is more 
or less certain to be decried as undemocratic. From a theoretical viewpoint, this charge misses the 
point. Or so, at least, we have argued here. Still, the limited role of  normal citizens is a significant 
concern. Ratifying conventions should therefore strive to include as much as possible all voices that 
wish to be heard. Such popular input can take multiple forms. During the election campaign, voters 
should be able to communicate their views to candidates. Once chosen, delegates should continue 
to interact with their constituents. Furthermore, the meetings of  the convention should be broad-
29 Maier, Ratification. The People Debate the Constitution, 400.
30 ———, Ratification. The People Debate the Constitution, 432-434.
31 Tierney, Constitutional Referendums, 8-9.
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cast to the public, and citizens should have a chance to submit questions and comments for debate. 
These channels of  access would make a convention more inclusive than legislative ratification. Of  
course, there would remain a gap compared to a referendum, and hence some citizens might still 
feel disenfranchised. In member states where this attitude is expected to be widespread, it could be  
prudent to give in to the demand for direct participation.
There is one further advantage of  the convention procedure that deserves mention. In the 
American case, the ratification debates launched a conversation about interpreting the constitution 
that is still ongoing. The critics of  the proposed system forced its supporters to explain just how the 
new order would protect the freedoms that were gained during the revolution. One response to this  
challenge were the famous Federalist Papers, which still provide an important guide to understand-
ing the American higher law and indeed the idea of  constitutional government as such. At the same  
time, the critics urged changes to the initial draft. The first ten amendments to the constitution, 
which have since come to be known as the Bill of  Rights, resulted directly from this effort. Ratifying 
conventions, in other words, have the potential to generate an intense focus on the strengths and 
weaknesses of  a proposed higher law. If  the latter is approved, this debate can inform subsequent 
practice and, when needed, trigger changes to the original document. Neither referendums nor legis-
lative votes have a similar constructive effect.
The Ratification Threshold
So far, the chapter has discussed which procedural device is most suitable to approve or reject a  
European federal compact. Before we conclude, let us briefly examine a second important question  
related to ratification: how many member states would need to approve the shared higher law before 
it can enter into force? In 2005, the negative result of  the French referendum on the TCE effect-
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ively sealed the fate of  the latter. At the time, the framers relied on all EU countries to endorse the 
proposed document. It seems that a future effort to make a constitution should follow a different 
approach. With now 27 member states, the chance that all of  them approve a federal compact is 
quite small. Against this background, it would be frivolous to allow just one single negative decision 
to derail  a process that, once it  reaches the ratification stage, will  have consumed an enormous 
amount of  resources.
Consider once more the American precedent. Here the federal convention famously decided 
that nine out of  thirteen votes would suffice to adopt the constitution. This did not mean that states 
could be forced to participate in the new order.32  Rather, once there were enough yes votes, reject-
ing the constitution implied automatic exit from the union. In other words, the remarkable thing 
about the ratification threshold was that a subset of  states could abolish the existing Articles of  
Confederation against the will of  the rest. This was more or less an illegal usurpation on the part of  
the Philadelphia delegates, even if, afterward, the states reluctantly agreed to let the ratification pro-
cess move ahead.
To avoid a similar breach of  existing law, the EU member states would need to authorize a 
transnational convention to draft a federal compact that can enter into force short of  unanimous 
consensus. Setting the ratification threshold would then be up to the framers. The hurdle should be  
low enough that success is in fact possible. Yet it should also prevent the creation of  a rump federa -
tion – a European Bund without, for example, French or German participation is rather hard to  
imagine. In light of  this, the best solution might be to follow the model of  the Lisbon QMV rules,  
which count both member states and population size. A sensible threshold, we believe, would per -
mit the federal compact to enter into force, even if  a certain number of  countries reject the pro -
32 Rhode Island, to be sure, was given little choice when, in 1790, Congress threatened to impose a complete trade em-
bargo. Even so, the state ratifying convention would still have rejected the constitution, if  four of  the delegates op -
posed to it had not missed the final vote. See Maier, Ratification. The People Debate the Constitution, 459.
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posed document; these states could then be offered new terms of  partnership with the reformed 
EU. However, ratification should fail as soon as the no column exceeds a certain population limit. 
The latter could be defined such that it would be impossible for the new order to take effect if  sev-
eral large member states refuse to join.
Whatever threshold is chosen in the end, a decision to approve or reject a federal compact in-
volves high political stakes. National peoples that oppose the proposal would risk isolating them-
selves, whereas overall ratification failure would undo a strenuous effort to give the integration pro-
ject a better constitutional framework. The risk of  a rash and thoughtless rejection must therefore 
be minimized. On the other hand, ratification should not be a foregone conclusion either. Perhaps,  
federalism is, after all, the wrong approach for the continent or, at least, for some of  the current 
member states. And even if  founding a Bund is in fact desirable, the framers should be under pres -
sure to design a shared higher law that respects the values and interests of  national peoples. This  
cannot be assured if  approval for the draft will be too easy to obtain. It matters a great deal, then,  
which ratification mechanism is chosen. Our goal in the preceding was to show that, on balance, rat-
ifying conventions provide the best solution. This procedure has the potential  to overcome the  
weaknesses of  both referendums and legislative votes. While it does not involve all citizens in the fi -
nal decision, imputing the outcome to the popular will is nonetheless plausible, given that delegates 
can be expected to make an informed and considered judgment, based on their view of  the com-
mon good. Furthermore, ratification assemblies might begin a constructive dialogue about how to 
interpret and improve the new order. If  the EU ever sought to adopt a federal compact, the mem-
ber states should keep these virtues of  the convention procedure in mind.
Conclusion
When I began to work on this dissertation, it seemed to me as if  the EU was looking forward to a  
period of  relative calm, following the tumultuous decade of  reform that began with the Laeken De-
claration of  2001 and ended on 1 December 2009 when the Lisbon amendments entered into force.  
How wrong I was. Today the European house is on fire. The sovereign debt crisis and the attendant  
economic recession call into doubt not just the future of  the Euro, but also the survival of  the in-
tegration project itself. The latter, it appears, cannot thrive unless the member states pool still more  
of  their power. But which specific additional competences should Brussels obtain? I leave this ques-
tion to others. My goal here was rather to examine how a suitable constitutional framework for a yet 
mightier EU could look like.
We have seen that, even at present, there is a significant deficit in this regard: enforcement of  
competence limits remains weak, the legislative process is undemocratic, and judges have too much 
unchecked power to define the content of  individual freedom. To overcome these problems, the 
member states should join together in a heterarchical federation, or Bund, that has a strong center,  
but nonetheless preserves the independent political existence of  national peoples. Such an order 
would look quite different from the status quo. First, a Bund would derive its power from an explicit  
constitutional document rather than a set of  international treaties. Second, it would abolish the exit 
option under the current Art. 50 TEU. Third, amending primary law would no longer require unan-
imous agreement. And fourth, regular decision making, too, would need to become more flexible, in  
particular through ending consensus rule in the European Council.
This  reform agenda gives  a  clear  answer  to one of  the more perplexing questions  of  the  
present crisis: how should the continent deal with the rift that has opened between, on the one 
hand, member states that wish to integrate far beyond the single market and, on the other, countries  
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that are hesitant or unwilling to embark on such a path? In particular,  of  course,  this  gap has  
emerged between the Eurozone and member states that hold on to national currencies. Monetary 
union, one can no longer dispute, is bound to fail without more centralized economic governance. It 
seems as if  politicians and citizens in the Eurozone have woken up to this realization, however 
grudging their acceptance might be. Change will nonetheless be difficult to achieve. For one thing,  
there remains profound disagreement about which exact reforms are needed. The other great chal-
lenge is that countries outside the Eurozone, foremost of  course the UK, will resist greater central-
ization, or at least seek to remain exempt from it, while also seeking to maintain their influence  
within the Union governance process.
One potential response to this problem is to adjust the current institutional framework in order  
to  better  accommodate  multiple  speeds  of  integration.  For  example,  German  foreign  minister  
Guido Westerwelle and colleagues from other member states have proposed to give Brussels more 
power over economic policies inside the monetary union. Democratic legitimation, the plan envis-
ages, shall flow from those members of  Parliament that represent the electorate of  the Eurozone.  
This subset  of  deputies is  supposed to oversee policies  that  concern their  home countries,  but  
which are not binding for the rest of  the member states.1 Such a reform, we might object, would 
give the EU an even more byzantine structure than it  has now. Under the proposed scheme, it  
would be possible that power in Strasbourg shifts between different coalitions of  parties, depending  
on which countries are subject to a particular legislative measure. Intricacies of  this sort seem un-
avoidable, if  one attempts to hold together a club of  27 countries that have far divergent prefer-
ences on integration. As a result, popular identification and engagement with the EU might further 
decline. The far better alternative, I believe, is reform along the lines of  the Bund model. Once a  
1 "Final Report of  the Future of  Europe Group" (Warsaw, 2012).
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federation has been established, new terms of  partnership could be negotiated with member states 
that prefer to remain outside.
In making the case for a European Bund, the dissertation has tried to subvert certain wide-
spread beliefs that pervade the current discourse on integration. First, I needed to refute the view 
that a proper transnational constitution has long been in place. “The real  must be rational” seem 
those academic observers to think who hold that Union norms deserve coequal status with do-
mestic higher law. But this view ignores that integration progressed through a series of  somewhat  
haphazard compromises. The latter have produced a hybrid system that operates, in practice, like a  
federal constitution, yet fails to meet the commensurate normative standards. As the member states 
prepare to delegate even more power to Brussels, this needs to change.
Second,  I  have sought to undermine the notion that  a  more democratic  EU must entail  a 
stronger Parliament. This dogma disregards the crucial role of  partisan contest, or at least overlooks 
the fact that so long as the member states retain independent political cultures and institutions,  
transnational partisan contest has to remain weak. Direct election of  the Parliament, then, seems no 
longer useful, and it might indeed have been a bad idea from the start. To improve democratic legit -
imation, a European Bund should rather focus on better oversight from national lawmakers.
A third established wisdom I have opposed is that citizens must themselves approve or reject a 
federalist relaunch of  integration. The reasoning here does not sit well with the ever more prevalent  
attitude that plebiscites are the ideal form of  democratic  rule, whereas representation is a poor  
second best. However, referendums make little sense when voters cannot be expected to understand 
a proposed constitutional document and when there is no serious deliberation of  its merits. Na-
tional ratification conventions offer a superior procedural alternative, which enables an informed 
and reasoned decision without bestowing undue power on the political class.
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These views, I admit, are unorthodox. Some, or perhaps most, readers will disagree. However, 
as the future of  the Union seems once again wide open, questioning old certainties might be just  
what is needed to move the reform debate forward.
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